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This dissertation defines and analyzes the infrastructure of classified information 
including the sites, systems, objects and discourses that enable the creation, maintenance, 
management and destruction of classified information. Seeking to situate classified information 
as something other than a mere absence of information or an impediment to knowledge, this 
dissertation focuses on what kinds of records, documents, evidence and knowledge are created 
through the daily practices of official secrecy at the federal level. The increasing complexity of 
overlapping technical infrastructures and organizational standards requires thinking about 
records infrastructurally, re-framing individual documents as systems, if we are to begin thinking 
of future use and access. 
This dissertation examines records within the infrastructure of classified information 
by contextualizing the need for research into these records as objects of great complexity that 
eschew easy distinctions between open and closed. It utilizes a research framework oriented 
 
 
 
ii 
 around four elements: Standards, Economies, Rupture and Culture. Using methods from 
infrastructure studies, archival studies and critical discourse analysis, it analyzes the field of 
creation within socio-technical systems and identifies materiality as a matter of paramount 
importance for the maintenance of evidential value within overlapping systems of trust. 
 
This dissertation illustrates the paucity of nuanced understandings of networked records 
in federal agencies and exposes a number of areas for further research and challenges for those 
who work in archival studies and information policy. This dissertation finds that a vital 
rethinking of the role of archival work and thinking could lead to an integration of archival 
processes into daily government work instead of traditional modes of custodial transfer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 The dissertation of Stacy Elizabeth Wood is approved. 
Anne J. Gilliland 
Michelle Caswell 
 
Lisa Parks 
 
Safiya U Noble, Committee Chair 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of California, Los Angeles 
 
2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iiii 
 Table of Contents  
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………….. 1 
 
Secrecy and Bureaucracy………………………………………………………………… 3 
 
Research Questions……………………………………………………………………... 11 
 
Method………………………………………………………………………………….. 12 
 
Limitations……………………………………………………………………………… 19 
 
Roadmap………………………………………………………………………………... 20 
 
Chapter 1: Standards and Classification……………………………………………………...23 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..23 
Executive Orders and Legislative Acts…………………………………………………. 24 
Department of Defense…………………………………………………………………. 34 
The Information Oversight Office……………………………………………………… 38 
The Manual as Genre…………………………………………………………………… 39 
Standards in Action, a Proliferation of Training and Instruction Manuals……………... 42 
Secrecy as Standard and the Standards of Secrecy……………………………………....…..52 
 
Chapter 2: Public Records, Private Phones…………………………………………………..58 
 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………... 58 
Private Contracts and the United States Government: Setting the Scene………………. 59 
Public Records and Private Contractors……………………………................................68 
Regulations for Contractors…………………………………………………………….. 71 
Cell Phones in the DoD…………………………………………………………………. 75 
SME-PED to DMCC-S…………………………………………………………………..81 
“Smartphones” at the Top………………………………………………………………. 88 
Classified Records…………………………………………………………………………... 89 
 
ivi 
  
Chapter 3: …but her emails or Spectacle and Rupture in Classified Information 
Infrastructure…………………………………………………………………………………...96 
 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………... 96 
Mapping a Controversy…………………………………………………………………. 98 
Records Management in the State Department…………………………………………. 99 
FAM/FAH……………………………………………………………………………... 104 
SMART and “Print-and-File”………………………………………………………………110  
A Generation of Controversy………………………………………………………….. 115 
The Investigation……………………………………………………………………… 123 
Classified Information on the Server………………………………………………….. 127 
Perpetual Breakdown……………………………………………………………………… 129 
 
Chapter 4: The Majestic Twelve: Classification, Evidence and Conspiracy……………...131 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 131 
The Majestic Twelve………………………………………………………………….. 133 
Studying Conspiracy Theory………………………………………………………….. 135 
We Want to Believe…………………………………………………………………… 147 
Hoax of Proof? Authenticating the MJ-12 Documents………………………………... 154 
Diplomatics……………………………………………………………………………. 166 
The MJ-12 Documents as Imagined Records…………………………………………. 170 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 171 
 
Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms…………………………………………………176 
 
Appendix B: Department of Defense Organizational Chart……………………..……………..177 
 
References…………………………………………………………………...…………………180 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Example of Derivatively Classified Document ………………………….55 
 
Figure 2 Markings on Photographs …………………………………………………...56 
 
Figure 3  DMCC-S Fact Sheet from Defense Information Systems Agency ….......86 
Figure 4  General Dynamics Sectera Edge …………………………………….......89 
Figure 5  A.J. Bond Johnson photo of Gen. Ramey with alleged Roswell debris. 
Credit – Fort Worth Star-Telegram Photograph Collection, Special 
Collections Division, The University of Texas at Arlington 
Libraries……………...............................................................................149 
 
Figure 6  Page 5 of the Majestic 12 Documents in “The Vault” Credit: FBI ……164 
Figure 7  Truman-Forrestal Memo Credit: Ryan Woods ………………………...168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii
 STACY WOOD  
Department of Information Studies 
University of California Los Angeles 
 
EDUCATION 
 
PhD University of California, Los Angeles Anticipated 2017 
 Information Studies  
MLIS University of California, Los Angeles Anticipated 2017 
 Archival Studies  
BA University of California, Los Angeles 2007 
 English and World Literature, Gender Studies, Media Studies 
SELECTED AWARDS  
Aimee Dorr Fellowship for Public Policy 2015 
University of California Los Angeles  
Distinguished Teaching Award 2015 
University of California Los Angeles 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles 
 
2016 Wood, S. Police body cameras and professional responsibility. Preservation, Digital 
Technology & Culture. Forthcoming. 
 
2016 Cifor, M. and Wood, S. Critical feminism in the archives. Journal of Critical Library 
and Information Studies. Forthcoming. 
 
2014 Wood, S. et. al. Mobilizing records: re-framing archival description to support human 
rights. Archival Science. 10.1007/s10502-014-9233-1 
 
2014 Kelty, C., Panofsky, A., Erickson, S., Currie, M., Crooks, R., Wood, S., Garcia, P., 
Wartenbe, M. Seven dimensions of contemporary participation disentangled. Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science and Technology. doi: 10.1002/asi.23202 
 
Book Chapters 
 
2016 Wood, S. Police body cameras: Emotional mediation and the economies of visuality. 
Emotions, Technology, and Design. Ed. Safiya U. Noble and Sharon Y. Tettegah. Elsevier; UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 2014 Wood, S. Collective Intimacies. Making Invisible Histories Visible: A Resource Guide 
to the Collections. Ed. K. McHugh, B. Johnson-Grau and B. Sher. UCLA Center for the Study 
of Women. 
 
Book Reviews 
 
2011 Wood, S. Book Review: Narrating from the Archives: Novels, Records, and Bureaucrats 
in the Modern Age by Marco Codebò. InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and 
Information Studies, 7(2), Article 12. 
 
INVITED TALKS 
 
Wood, S. (2017) Police Body Camera Footage: Public Records and Private 
Evidence Memory Work, Black Bodies, and Social Justice  
University of Michigan Institute for the Humanities and the University of Michigan School of 
Information 
 
Wood, S. (2015) Classified Information Infrastructure and Archival Concerns 
Library and Information Studies Alumni Association Annual Colloquium 
University of California Los Angeles Department of Information Studies 
 
RECENT CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS 
 
Wood, S. (2017) Citizen Documentation and Police Body Cameras. Paper presented at the 
Personal Digital Archiving Conference. 
 
Wood, S. (2016) Un/Natural Silences: Donor Requested Destruction in the Mazer Archives. 
Paper presented at the American Studies Association meeting. 
 
Wood, S. (2016) Police Body Cameras and the Privatization of the Chain of Evidence. Paper 
presented at the Conference and School on Authority, Provenance, Authenticity, Evidence 
(APAE) University of Zadar. 
 
Wood, S. (2016) Conspiracy Theories and Classified Information Infrastructure. Paper presented 
at the Summer School on Controversies and Conspiracies, SciencesPo. 
 
Wood, S. (2016) Navigating Public Records Law and Police Body Camera Evidence. 
Paper presented at the Archival Education Research Institute, Kent State University. 
 
Wood, S. and Cifor, M. (2016) Critical Feminism in the Archives. Paper presented at 
the Archival Education Research Institute, Kent State University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viiii 
 Introduction  
“Doesn’t the act of noticing matter as much as what’s noticed?” – Harry Mathews, The Journalist 
In a series of documents declassified and released by James Clapper and the Office of the 
 
Director of National Intelligence in November of 2013, one might have noticed a few curiosities 
with respect to redaction. A number of them had their dates of filing and signing redacted, 
including a document signed by Reggie B. Walton, a judge of the United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court. This particular ruling document exposed some of the persistent 
mistakes and challenges presented by managing information across agencies, platforms, 
standards and contexts. Firstly, although the date was redacted in the released document itself, 
the date of the ruling remained in it’s URL. Additionally, the document had already been 
declassified and released with entirely different redactions. Adobe’s Portable Document Format 
(PDF) has consistently presented challenges for redaction with government officials and 
contractors alike. In a filing for a lawsuit over AT&T’s alleged compliance with the warrantless 
wiretapping program of the National Security Agency (NSA) in 2006, a redacted PDF 
contained text underneath the redactions that anyone could read by selecting the text and 
copying it into Microsoft Word. This document, presented in Hepting, et al. v. AT&T, 439 
Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), listed a multiplicity of possible reasons for AT&T’s use of a 
secret switching room that was designed with the capability to monitor telephone calls and 
internet transmissions. To make matters more absurd, this PDF “accident” occurred just a few 
months after the NSA published the guide “Redacting with Confidence: How to Safely Publish 
Sanitized Reports Converted from Word to PDF.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 National Security Agency. (2005) Redacting with Confidence: How to Safely Publish Sanitized Reports 
Converted from Word to PDF. Report #1333-015R-2005. Ft. Meade, MD: National Security Agency. 
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 In setting forth to define and analyze the sites, systems, objects and discourses that 
enable the creation, maintenance, management and destruction of classified information, this 
dissertation attempts to hold still the moving target of official secrecy as it functions at the 
federal level in the United States. These mistakes and accidents make visible the complexities of 
managing massive interconnected systems that rely on radically different levels of technological 
literacy, institutional norms that might be at odds, and incompatible standards or challenges of 
interoperability, just to name a few challenges. Attempting to define the infrastructure of 
classified information, this work is concerned with the operations that result in a particular kind 
of record, and how shifting technological arrangements affect those records. Classified 
information has predominantly been understood as representing an absence of information and 
an absence of content. This dissertation seeks to situate classified information as something other 
than what Peter Galison has called an “anti-epistemology,”2 and in fact contends that classified 
information is a generative category of information. Replacing the question “what don’t we 
know” with “what does it do” allows us to move beyond considering government structures as 
“institutional frames”3 within which document production and transmission occurs, and instead 
fosters an understanding of the immensely productive and formative qualities of a vast 
infrastructure. 
 
This dissertation responds to the research need for the study of classified information 
infrastructure within the context of Information Studies by demonstrating the centrality of 
infrastructural layers for creation and maintenance of records; for the formation of knowledge 
communities; for the evaluation of evidence; and to ongoing challenges presented by networked 
information to access, use and preservation. It utilizes a research framework for studying 
 
2 Galison, P. (2010). Secrecy in three acts. social research, 941-974.  
3 Wolter, U. (1995). Institutional frames. Recent Trends in Data Type Specification, 469-482. 
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 complex, infrastructural, socio-technical arrangements and the records they produce. This 
framework has four elements: (1) Standards, (2) Economies, (3) Ruptures, (4) Cultures. 
Employing techniques and methods from infrastructure studies, media studies and archival 
studies, it illustrates the generativity of classified information infrastructure. In turn, it exposes 
the material conditions and restraints of classified information as networked records that present 
epistemological and political challenges for archival functions such as transparency and 
accountability, and challenges to archival principles such as creator or fonds. 
 
Secrecy and Bureaucracy 
 
Secrecy, when applied to government affairs, tends to be held in contrast to openness and 
transparency. Claire Birchall traces the roots of transparency movements within the United States in 
the tenets of liberal democratic concepts of the public sphere, and critiques its alliances with the 
neoliberal values of individualism and voluntary regulation.
4
 These debates correspond to activist 
engagements in Archival Studies which contrast the liberal ethos of open access with cultural 
protocols emerging from different systems of value.
5
 The rhetoric of transparency and accountability 
from within the United States government perpetually characterizes secrecy as a balancing act, a 
necessary evil that holds certain classes of information secret to temper their potential harm or their 
volatility. Dennis Thompson has characterized this balancing act as something like the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle as it applies to information, the ability of the citizen to evaluate a policy or 
process would itself disturb that policy or process.
6
 The rhetoric of transparency conceives of 
something as either secret or transparent, however secrecy functions in 
 
 
 
4 Birchall, C. (2011). Introduction to ‘Secrecy and Transparency’ The Politics of Opacity and Openness. 
Theory, Culture & Society, 28(7-8), 7-25.
 
5 Withey, K. C. (2012). Does information really want to be free? Indigenous knowledge systems and the question 
of openness.
 
6 Thompson, D. F. (1999). Democratic secrecy. Political Science Quarterly, 114(2), 181-193. 
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 multiple ways. With respect to government secrecy, its functionality relies on what Braditch has 
referred to as the “spectacular deployment of secrecy.”7 This picks up on one of the features of 
secret in its etymological history, that secrets are forever active, they require maintenance and 
their status only remains secret when we name them as such, “…take concealment, or hiding, to 
be the defining trait of secrecy.”8 There is no natural relationship between the contents of a 
secret and its status as secret. 
 
State secrets require a substantial apparatus and infrastructure to maintain their protected 
status. Because these secrets are not typically unidirectional but implicate different adjacent 
hierarchies and knowledge communities, their status must be legible and recognizable. For their 
status to remain acceptable by a public invested in the politics of liberal democracy and 
accountability, these secrets must also be legible and visible outside of their institutions of origin. 
The moment of revelation is just as important as their original classification, because the 
contents are assumed to justify their previous hidden-ness. Classified information infrastructure 
then is the public means by which the state creates and maintains secrets. Justifications and 
revelations perform the balance between the assumption that the first amendment is meant to 
foster and protect the access of the public to information necessary for engagement in public 
debate, and the notion of national security. Temporal constraints and considerations are integral 
elements of Executive Orders dealing with classified information. These constraints structure 
relationships between agencies, information seekers and the information itself while serving an 
ameliorative function, positioned as a necessary barrier between secrecy and public access to 
information. References to specific and even general temporal markers within Executive Orders 
act as an appeal to normative, shared symbols of accountability and stability, as well as creating 
 
7 Bratich, J. (2006). Public secrecy and immanent security: a strategic analysis. Cultural Studies, 20(4-5), 493-511.  
8 Ibid. 
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 a persistent state of information control through the development of infrastructure that 
transcends individual agencies, practices and behaviors. As legal documents that derive their 
justification from Constitutional powers, Executive Orders represent breaks from or expansions 
of legal precedent, a legal manifestation of temporal inertia. Justification for the entire classified 
information infrastructure has relied on assumptions about the future uses or potential uses of 
information, from its roots as a specific and somewhat narrowly conceived piece of military 
strategy to its present day status as a piece of sprawling totalizing information policy. As the 
apparatus became more elaborate and the enumerative powers became more detailed, temporal 
constraints and benchmarks for the status of classified information followed suit. Descriptions of 
the imagined future uses or potential uses of information, however, remain similarly pointed in 
the causal relationship between information and eventual harm. Classified information then 
always already contains within it an accompanying time based omen about its potential uses as 
well as its eventual uselessness. The status of its potential for risk is linked to contingent political 
and military contexts, most pointedly expressed by the term "declassifying event."
9
 This 
declassifying event signifies the end of the information's sensitivity and thus its usefulness 
strategically. The declassifying event could be anything, but it is important to acknowledge that 
the bureaucratic language that dominates legal documents such as Executive Orders allows for 
the transformation of violent acts into the euphemistically benign "declassifying event”; to say 
nothing of the tension between the strategic usefulness of information and its life as public or 
historical knowledge. 
 
Temporal resources in this instance are not just the future, past and present, they invoke 
their imaginative properties, all oriented around the potential for disaster or, as the differentiated 
 
 
9
 Brooks, N. (2006). The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework. National Security Issues, 139. 
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 justifications for the classes of information imply, oriented around the potential for grave 
damage, serious damage or simply damage. In much of his more recent work, David Hoy
10
 has 
discussed elements of Foucault's work on disciplinary regimes and power, highlighting how 
mechanisms for discipline (both from the state as well as from the self) rely on a shared concept 
of the future. This future orientation can be expressed in utopian terms of peace or those of a 
deterrent alternative, either way the future is shared and requires a "constant disciplinary state 
of becoming" stemming from both the logic and language of its imagination.
11
 In A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari characterize every secret as a collective assemblage, a project 
that requires constant social reproduction and a shared sense of what is, can, should or cannot 
be known.
12 
 
The history of archives and archival work cannot be disentangled from the history of 
bureaucratic organization in general, and the role of secrecy in bureaucracy has represented a 
challenge to goals of citizen access to both contemporary and historical information. Critiques 
and concerns about the overreach of government secrecy have accompanied each subsequent 
expansion of the classification system. As early as 1956, the Defense Department Committee 
on Classified Information issued a report stating that “overclassification has reached serious 
proportions,”13 and concerns that classification was having consequences outside of its original 
intent, such as undermining transparency and inter-agency cooperation or assisting in covering 
up abuses and mistakes.
14
 In 1958, Max Weber outlined the characteristics of an “ideal type” of 
 
 
10 Hoy, D. C. (1981). Power, repression, progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt school. Triquarterly, 52, 43.  
11 Costas, J., & Grey, C. (2014). The temporality of power and the power of temporality: Imaginary future selves in 
professional service firms. Organization Studies, 35(6), 909-937.
  
12 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus.  
13 DEF. DEP'T COMM. ON CLASSIFIED INFO., REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 6 (1956), available at 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/foi/coolidge-committee.pdf
  
14 Report of the commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, S. Doc. No. 105-2 (1997). 
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 bureaucratic organization. A bureaucracy is hierarchically organized, and is oriented around 
shared and standardized rules that govern operations. In addition it is dependent upon technical 
prowess and continuity.
15
 He also draws an explicit connection between bureaucratic 
institutions and their investment in secrecy, both official and unofficial, framing secrecy as a 
form of regulation. Sarangi and Slembrouck assert that these basic features of bureaucracy 
necessarily rely on information exchange,
16
 as management of people is done by proxy through 
information about them and interactions between citizens and public bureaucracy is dependent 
upon processes of information seeking and exchange. 
 
The expansion of the classified information system represents a form of bureaucratic path 
dependency,
17
 which assumes that once an institution of a certain size establishes a standard, the 
institution will grow, expand and contract according to that particular path barring some kind of 
disastrous fall into dysfunctionality.
18
 This path then acts as the path of least resistance, a 
primary characteristic of the dispersed agency that characterizes bureaucratic processes. 
Authority then lies in the daily reproduction of individual functions, the maintenance of the path. 
The growth of bureaucratic forms of government that characterized the development of states 
throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries relied on the ability to function across micro and macro 
levels in a standardized way. The contemporary disparaging of the usage of bureaucracy, as both 
Kafka and DuGay
19
 pointed out, exists alongside this proliferation of processes and 
 
 
 
15 Weber, M.(1958). Bureaucracy. In H.H. Gerth (translated). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: A 
Galaxy Book.
 
16 Sarangi, S. and Slembrouck, S. (2014) Language, Bureaucracy, and Social Control. New York: Routledge.   
17 Mahoney, J. (2000) Path Dependency in Historical Sociology, Theory and Society, 29, 507-548.  
Peters, B.G. (2006) Path Dependency and Public Sector Reform, Paper presented at conference on 
Path Dependency Theory, Roskilde University, Denmark. 
18 Peters, B.G. (2009) The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration. 6 th 
Ed. New York: Routledge.
 
19 Kafka, B. (2012) The Demon of Writing: Powers and Failures of Paperwork. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
DuGay, P. (2000) In Praise of Bureaucracy: Weber – Organization – Ethics. London: Sage. 
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 idiosyncrasies. However, David Graeber reminds us that while these processes might multiply to 
the point of absurdity, an essential element of their success is the persistent possibility of 
violence from the state itself to regulate and punish noncompliance, which is meted out along 
lines of racial, sexual, gender and class privileges.
20
 What makes classified information 
infrastructure distinct as a form of regulation and organization is that it is a system of 
information organization with explicit threat as both its justifying cause and its system of 
enforcement. 
 
The work bureaucracy brings to mind a world of paper, containers, stamps and 
organizational aids, forms in triplicate and the expectation of deferral, a slow moving process 
anathema to efficiency. While the association of bureaucracy with paperwork is strong in the 
popular imagination, scholarly investigations into the relationship between documents and 
bureaucracy are relatively few. In his review of anthropological literature concerning 
bureaucracies, Matthew Hull
21
 points to several reasons this could be, including that 
anthropologists as researchers produce an abundance of documents themselves and as such do 
not confer specialized status onto them. He also addresses the “container” assumption, that 
documents are simply a way of communicating their contents, rather than having meaning in 
their material specificity. David Graeber also points out that paperwork is boring, a stand in for 
tedium. 
 
Studying the state, however, as Philip Abram’s aptly titled essay demonstrates, is 
difficult, namely because it is particularly invested in keeping certain aspects of its work 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Graeber, D. (2015) The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. 
New York: Melville House.
 
21 Hull, M. (2012) Documents and Bureaucracy. The Annual Review of Anthropology. Vol 41, 251-67. 
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 hidden.
22
 One element of the broadly based justification for this hidden-ness is the public 
interest or public good, that the individual need for information or access is outweighed by the 
commitment to the whole. In his description of these difficulties, Abrams has a radical 
proposition, that they are just as much a product of researchers as the state itself. Possibly, he 
suggests, there is no such thing as “the state” and we have but to refuse “the legitimating account 
of it that political theorists and political actors so invitingly and ubiquitously hold out to us.”23 
 
This power then is an ideological one, one that gets reproduced through processes and “illusory 
common interest”24 To bring together Hull and Abrams, the key to studying the state as it 
presents itself is to study the processes that bolster its cohesiveness. If documents and 
information exchange are an integral part of how interactions with the public bureaucracy of the 
state occur, understanding the expression of state power requires attention to these processes and 
the layers of hiddenness implied by the general work of state power and the explicit work of 
classified information; infrastructure requires not just attention to processes but also to structure. 
 
Processes and structure mutually reinforce one another, establishing and justifying shared 
stakes and identity. In this way, this dissertation also argues that classified information 
infrastructure operates as a form of cultural technique. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young has traced 
three different emergent uses of the term cultural techniques ranging from its initial deployment 
as an agricultural term borrowing from the Latin root colere (to cultivate, tend). As a wordrelated 
to the planning and implementation of agricultural systems, it is through these cultural 
techniques that land becomes "habitable."
25
 The second incarnation of cultural techniques 
 
 
 
22 Abrams, P. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State. Paper delivered at the 1977 British 
Sociological Association. University of Durham.
 
23 Abrams Ibid.  
24 Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1965) The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wishart. P. 42  
25 Winthrop-Young, G. (2013). Cultural techniques: Preliminary remarks. Theory, Culture & Society, 30, 3-19. 
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 emerged as a strategy to contend with new media spaces and technologies, this meaning shares 
some kinship with another concept, media literacy, which considers ones’ own repository of 
skills and techniques for understanding and inhabiting new and different media. This second 
formulation most importantly foregrounded the persistent debate concerning the agency of the 
user pitted against the constraints and affordances of particular media and technologies. 
The third, contemporary usage of cultural techniques refers less to a particular set of 
skills, media or technologies, and instead refers to a "complex technical, social and 
administrative mediation" process. Cultural techniques erase their own making, their status 
stands for itself, their operations coalescing "into entities that are subsequently viewed as the 
agents or subjects running these operations."
26
As a strategy, this strain of thought seeks, through 
attention to the materialities of technologies and processes, to bring attention to the "constitutive 
media dependent ontic operations" 
27
 that underlie our most basic methods of distinction and 
identification. Cultural techniques do not refer to all of the influences and mechanisms of 
culture, but are rather self-legitimating and self-referential
28
; in this context we can identify 
classified information as cultural technique, since classified information is information that is 
determined to be in need of classification and classification is the process whereby information 
is determined to need classification. In his description of cultural techniques, Thomas Macho 
invokes the "technologies of the self" defined by Foucault, curiously ignoring three other 
techniques by which Foucault claims humans can understand and regulate themselves.
29 
 
Technologies of production, sign systems, power and self are never isolated, instead gaining 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Vismann, C. (2013). Cultural techniques and sovereignty. Theory, Culture & Society, 30, 83-93.  
27 Winthrop-Young, G. Ibid. 
28 Macho, T. (2013). Second order animals: Cultural techniques of identity and identification. Theory, Culture & 
society, 30, 30-47. 
29 Macho, T. Ibid. 
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 purchase through their interdependence. In his use of Foucault, Macho attempts to bridge the 
historical (archaeological) mode of Foucault with the material and technical analysis of 
media archeology. Media cannot arrive spontaneously and ahistorically just as history has to 
be recognized as a process that happens within and across media technologies. 
The cultural technique of classified information requires the acknowledgment of all four 
of Foucault's technologies. Executive Orders are clearly products of a sign system, expressions 
of and agents of power, regulatory policies governing and shaping production and constituting 
particular knowledge communities that produce the self. Just as classified information defines 
itself in terms of its status as information that needs to be classified, so too do government 
officials self-identify according to their access to or ability to regulate information, as do 
members of the public with stakes of varying degrees of intimacy in the revelation or 
maintenance of classified information. Classified information infrastructure defines classified 
information, sets its terms and consequences, and justifies its own existence through the creation 
of shared community stakes. 
 
Research Questions 
 
My dissertation begins by asking three broad research questions: 
 
(1) What are the elements and characteristics of the infrastructure of classified 
information within the United States federal government? 
In order to understand how classified information is produced and maintained by socio-technical 
arrangements, it is necessary to identify the layers of infrastructures including the standards, devices, 
platforms, software, network architecture, policy, regulation and professional practices that make 
classified information possible. Being able to identify these elements both individually 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 and collectively can help understand the challenges and barriers to future archival work 
with respect to classified information. 
(2) How does a material understanding of classified information infrastructure affect archival 
expectations such as transparency, accountability, description and access of and to 
archival resources? 
Here, I am engaging with specific archival functions and practices. As technologies and 
policy change, contradict and/or complicate each other, how does this present difficulties for 
those attempting to preserve and provide access to an evolving historical record? 
(3) How does a material understanding of classified information infrastructure challenge 
evolving definitions of information elements (document, data, metadata, record)? 
This question attempts to situate classified information as a category of information that 
interacts uniquely with shifting definitions from within Information Studies. Elements of 
information are defined across legislative, organizational and executive documentation and these 
definitions build on each other as often as they contradict each other. The consequences of this 
definitional work are myriad, clumsy definitions or exclusive interpretations have often led to 
legal challenges or overreach. 
 
Method 
 
In this dissertation I use mixed-methods in order to get at the complexity of the 
interconnected layers of classified information infrastructure. I use methods outlined in 
infrastructure studies, historical analysis, case study and multi-modal critical discourse analysis 
to think through a variety of layers and scales of classified information. 
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 Infrastructure has long been defined as a set of physical arrangements or networks that 
enable, “a collective term for the subordinate parts of an undertaking.”30 The term “critical 
infrastructure” was introduced with the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) in July of 1996 under President Bill Clinton. The PCIIP’s 1997 report 
highlighted increased vulnerabilities for cyber security infrastructures stemming from a growing 
indistinguishability between commercially available technology and technology used by the 
government. Their core recommendation sought to increase and strengthen cooperation between 
the federal government and the private sector. 
31
 Clinton followed this report with Presidential 
Decision Directive No. 63, integrating representatives from the private sector into the daily work 
of critical infrastructure protection.
32
 The Directive also called for critical infrastructure 
preparedness within individual federal agencies specifically and as a broad agenda item by 
assigning a Chief Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) to each federal agency and setting up a 
National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The Directive proposed the establishment of the 
Federal Intrusion Detection Network (FIDNET) in order to detect and respond to cyber attacks 
and vulnerabilities quickly and flexibly. FIDNET was ultimately abandoned as privacy and inter-
agency security concerns were raised and the comparable EINSTEIN program was introduced. 
Operated through the Department of Homeland Security, the current program, EINSTEIN 3 
enlists the aid of internet service providers (ISPs) analyzing federal network traffic.
33 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Infrastructure [Def. 1] n.d. In Oxford English Dictionary, Retrieved September 10, 2016 
from http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/95624?redirectedFrom=infrastructure&
  
31 Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures: The Report of the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. October 1997.
  
32 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 
63. White Paper, May 22, 1998.
 
33 Privacy Impact Assessment for EINSTEIN -3 – Accelerated. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. April 
19, 2013.
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 The language and priorities of critical infrastructure continued in the text of the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001, meaning systems and assets “so vital to the United States that the incapacity 
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”34 If 
we understand infrastructure to be the subordinate parts of an undertaking, then this new 
definition that makes some infrastructure critical, also makes the disentanglement of the state 
and infrastructure a categorical impossibility. In 2013, the Office of the White House Press 
Secretary released the details of President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive – 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
35
 which designated critical infrastructure sectors 
as: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense 
industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government 
facilities, healthcare, information technology, nuclear reactors, transportation systems, and water 
and wastewater systems. In addition, this policy directive identified improved information 
exchange and management as a key strategic objective for defending critical infrastructure. The 
outlining of these critical infrastructure sectors acknowledges the shifting understandings of the 
boundaries of what can be considered infrastructure. Much like classified information, they are 
defined in this instance as priorities through future threat. But classified information moves 
throughout each of these critical infrastructures, operating across agencies and contexts and 
requiring both coordinated and uncoordinated cooperation through the application of standards 
and shared technological protocols. 
 
Work in infrastructure studies has enabled researchers to explore and understand 
technological arrangements used for labor, economic activity, social and cultural connection and 
 
34 USA Patriot Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. . § 5195 c – e.  
35 Presidential Policy Directive. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. PPD-21. February 12, 2013. 
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 communication. For this dissertation, the methods most salient are infrastructural inversion
36
 and 
scales of analysis, in order to be able to capture multiple layers of activity and interactivity. 
Infrastructural inversion proposes a figure/ground switch in which the researcher looks past the 
product or process that emerge through infrastructure and instead focuses on the structures and 
activities in their constituent parts. Rather than understanding transportation infrastructure as a 
series of roadways then, infrastructural inversion would enable the understanding of 
infrastructure as a series of technical standards, legal constraints, interaction between public and 
private economies, geographic cultures and habit – everything from the concrete to traffic 
algorithms work together to make traffic happen. Scales of analysis
37
 is an adaptation of Thomas 
Misa’s scales of society analysis by Paul Edwards, in which studying infrastructure at different 
scales gives one a different vantage point on how infrastructure develops and functions. The 
micro scale is the individual level, the ways in which an individual operates within infrastructure 
each day. If we extend the traffic example, this would be a person’s daily commute. The meso 
scale operates at the institutional level, allowing us to capture larger trends across society in 
small amounts of time. The macro scale captures epochal infrastructural shifts. Historical 
analysis relies on the interpretation of historical events, documents and processes as a series of 
negotiated narratives. This method not only asks why and how a particular event occurred, but 
how and why the evidence we use to understand the event was created. Therefore an attention to 
the institution, collective or individual that produced a piece of evidence in conjunction with how 
it was used and how it is now considered are all vital matters of concern. 
 
 
36 Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (2000). Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. MIT press.  
37 Edwards, P.N. “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of 
Sociotechnical Systems,” Modernity and Technology, T.J. Misa, P. Brey, and A. Feenberg, eds., MIT Press, 2004, 
pp. 185–225.  
Misa, T.J. , “How Machines Make History, and How Historians (and Others) Help Them to Do So,” 
Science, Technology, & Human Values, vol. 13, nos. 3–4, 1988, pp. 308–331 
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 Critical Discourse Analysis is an interdisciplinary methodological approach that 
understands language as one form of social practice and situates that practice in a web of power 
relations. Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on the analysis of “opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in 
language.”38As alluded to earlier in this dissertation, discussions around policy often identify 
power as unidirectional from the policy document to the effect on the citizen. With respect to 
information policy, there is the temptation to understand the policy document as having direct 
and visible results, which may or may not be true. Critical Discourse Analysis attempts to 
understand the ways in which the more opaque aspects of communication and linguistic 
expression are co-constitutive of power relations. The core texts at the heart of this study each 
state an explicit purpose and operate on multiple levels not simply to address a logistical problem 
or information need, but to create differentiated knowledge communities with varied levels of 
access, serve as reference for day to day operations, and promote or advocate for particular 
technologies or techniques, to name a few. As a starting point, this project engages Norman 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis.39 This involves considering 
each of the assembled texts
40
 at three levels. At the discourse-as-text level, I will explore these 
texts for emergent rhetorical patterns, recurrent themes and structural elements. These texts are 
highly formalized and consistent, their structure indicating their intended purpose as well as 
gesturing to both transparency and legibility. At the discourse-as-discursive practice level, the 
eco-system of production will be considered. Returning here to previous sections concerning the 
 
 
 
38 Wodak, R. (1995). Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis. Verschueren et. Al. 1995, pp. 204-10.  
39 Fairclough, N.and Holes, C. (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. Longman. 
Fairclough, N. (2001). Language and Power. Longman.
  
Fairclough, N.(2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: Routledge. 
40 For a complete listing of assembled texts, please see References. 
 
16 
 context of this project, one might consider the different intended audience of each document 
type. While each of the texts assembled are publicly available, the method and logic of their 
production, dissemination and consumption vary greatly, as do their functionality. This also 
allows for the consideration of intertexuality not simply between the assembled texts, but also 
with their explicit stated function, standardization, conventions and resultant forms. At the 
discourse-as-social-practice level, the features of the assembled texts outlined above come into 
contact with broad socio-political processes, facilitating historical comparison and exposing key 
moments of rupture in discourse. My approach to Critical Discourse Analysis also relies on the 
developments of Wodak, specifically her foregrounding of historical methodologies. 
41 
 
This project requires an extension of Critical Discourse Analysis to include Multi-Modal 
Critical Discourse Analysis. This method acknowledges the limitations of studying only textual 
sources and extends analysis to a multiplicity of media objects and artifacts. While Fairclough 
gets us to the level of understanding the circumstances of production and circulation, it is 
necessary to move beyond this to include mediation as a critical point of analysis. This is crucial 
to keeping archival questions in the foreground as media specificity plays a large part in not just 
the circulation and management of records, but also constrains the mechanisms for and 
conditions of future use. The infrastructure of classified information does not solely rely on a 
group of texts but also employs various media and technologies, that may or may not be 
standardized enabling interoperability and usability. The media involved in marking, transmitting 
and storing classified information are managed and regulated through information policy. 
However, within the texts assembled, there are varying degrees of media specificity. Executive 
Orders and Legislative Acts in general tend to treat media and technologies as generalizable and 
 
41
 Wodak R, ed. 1989. Language, Power and Ideology. Studies in Political Discourse. Amsterdam: 
Benjamins. Wodak R. 1996. Disorders of Discourse. London: Longman. 
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 abstract, what Lisa Gitelman has referred to as the mistake of treating media as a “unified 
entity.”42 The media involved in classified information infrastructure are complex objects, 
acting simultaneously as the means for accessing information and for obscuring it, as the means 
for signaling its status and signifying its political potentialities. These media and technologies 
can have the same effect as the genre of the manual, an assumption of both usefulness and 
transparency that elides their complexities and assumes their status to be nothing more than a 
vehicle for informational content. The media and technologies of classified infrastructure also 
present a challenge in the sense that new technological means of communication often become 
the justification for changing policy. Again invoking Gitelman in her introduction to Always, 
Already New, the approach of this dissertation includes the protocols and normative practices 
surrounding media as elements of their historical construction. Diplomatic pouches for example 
are defined by the United States Department of State as “any properly identified and sealed 
package, pouch, envelope, bag, or other container that is used to transport official 
correspondence, documents, and other articles intended for official use,”43 and are considered 
inviolable by both national and international law.
44
 As diplomatic entities, these containers are 
legally considered, much like embassies, to be a piece of the land and as such only under the 
jurisdiction of the sovereign nation to which it belongs. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations contains protocols for marking, storage and transmission and specifies the ways in 
which one might physically tamper with such a container, but one might imagine how elastic 
these definitions might be. While I do not contend that media or technology solely “determine 
our situation,”45 it is vital methodologically not to abandon media specificity and media history 
 
42 Gitelman, L. (2006) Always Already New: Media, History and the Data of Culture. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
43 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) Article 25  
44 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) Article 27.3  
45 Kittler, F. (1999) Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
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 in favor of the linguistic alone. In her book Files: Law and Media Technology, Cornelia 
Vismann finds media materiality missing from many scholarly analyses of the law in fictional 
texts, an attention to the embodied encounters with bureaucracy litter the pages of Kafka and 
Melville
46
. This is true too across media. 
 
This dissertation uses case study to center a wide-ranging analysis. Case study is 
appropriate when the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and the context.
47
 I 
employed theoretical sampling, as the goal of the study is not comprehensiveness or 
representativeness but instead, information richness. Cases then are chosen purposefully rather 
than randomly and illustrative. Case study allows research to focus on processes and allows for 
the use of conceptual categories that guide research and analysis, allowing analysis to come 
from pre-existing analytical categories derived from Infrastructure Studies. 
 
Limitations 
 
There are some obvious and not-so obvious limitations to this project. The contours of 
this dissertation are necessarily shaped by my own limited access to the daily workings of 
classified information policy and implementation. While I can access publicly available 
documentation concerning these issues, they are all describing what is essentially an ideal type 
rather than particular instances. From the Statute down to the Manual, an ideal type of classified 
information is imagined and dealt with alongside a parallel work, employee and technical 
environment. 
Throughout the process of conducting this project, people have persistently asked me 
about declassification. As declassification tends to be the forward-facing activity on the part of 
 
 
46 Vismann, C. (2008) Files: Law and Media Technology. Trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
 
47 Yin, R. K. (2013). Case study research: Design and methods. Sage publications. 
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 the government and particularly on the part of archives when it comes to secrecy, it is often 
framed as our only intervention. It is both a boon and a limitation to this project that I have 
decided to (as much as possible) steer clear of declassification, its protocols and practices so as 
to remain focused on the making of secrets to begin with. 
 
Roadmap 
 
Through considering the infrastructure of classified information within each of these 
methodological frameworks, I derived four categories of analysis: standards, economies, rupture 
and knowledge cultures. In each chapter I consider one of these categories through a 
juxtaposition of micro, meso and macro layers, focusing on one object or set of documents for 
analysis within their historical and infrastructural context. The first chapter consider the most 
recent manual on the handling, marking, transmission and storage of classified information 
produced by the Department of Defense, published in 2012. In examining this manual within its 
historical context this chapter seeks to understand the ways in which the Department of Defense 
itself defines its records, how it attempts to move policy and protocol into organizational action, 
as well as the historical context of standards development with respect to classified information. 
The second chapter focuses on emergent economies of classified information infrastructure by 
zeroing in on a new category of approved mobile telephones, the DMCC-S or Defense Mobile 
Classified Communication – Secret. The challenges that have forestalled the development of 
mobile networked telephony in the field that can successfully receive, store and transmit 
classified information exposes the interconnected layers of infrastructure that both enables and 
disables the movement of information. The current program emerged within the context of 
generational economic partnerships between private industry and the federal government. The 
third chapter engages with a standard trope in infrastructure studies – that infrastructure is most 
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 visible upon breakdown. In examining the role of infrastructure in the recent scandal 
surrounding Hilary Clinton’s private email server during her tenure in the State Department, this 
chapter considers the role of breakdown and spectacle not just in exposing infrastructure but also 
its role in its ongoing success. Classified information as a manifestation of legal and codified 
ongoing secrecy requires a cyclical justification that must remain public. Leaking, mishandling 
and hacking happen often, but few cases receive sustained and widespread attention, and fewer 
still are formally investigated or prosecuted. Those cases that do often represent a political and 
legal flashpoint expose a critical flaw in the system of classified information and reify the 
rhetorical support behind its daily functioning. The fourth chapter explores the relationship 
between classified information and conspiracy theory generation and support. Secrecy, as a 
routine part of government work and the relationship between citizens and the government, plays 
a role in the formation of knowledge cultures. This chapter foregrounds the knowledge culture 
that has arisen around a set of documents with disputed provenance that have become integral to 
conspiracy theories concerning the cover up of UFOs by the United States government. These 
documents claim authority through the markings and formal qualities that align them with 
classified information infrastructure and benefit from a culture of generalized acceptance toward 
government secrecy. They have produced an economy of authentication across ufology circles 
that simultaneously mimics and critiques traditional modes of authentication. The conclusion of 
the dissertation is a challenge to think of classified information, and government records in 
general, infrastructurally and to confront the practical implications of that line of thinking in 
addition to outlining further work. 
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 Chapter 1: Standards of/and Classification 
 
Introduction 
 
What do we mean by standards within the context of classified information 
infrastructure? The sheer number of standards involved in large scale networked technological 
systems would require a work unto itself, and while I can gesture to the complexity of the 
standards involved in order to create, maintain, transmit and destroy classified information, this 
chapter will predominantly be concerned with the legal standards and protocols for classified 
information,, and analyze the most recent training manual for marking and handling classified 
information produced and disseminated by the United States Department of Defense. Defining 
precisely what classified information is happens at a few different levels, through Executive 
Orders and Legislative Acts, whereas the standards for the daily work of processing and handling 
classified information occurs at an organizational level, and through training manuals and 
certification processes. We can understand these overlapping forms of enunciation as chains of 
reference, and while the laws governing the classification of information contract and expand 
rather than progress in a linear way, their current status is always built upon precedent. In his 
ethnographic work on the Conseil d’Etat, The Making of Law, Bruno Latour asserts that we 
should not view law as “mere wrapping for power relations,”48 and instead urges us to 
understand the law as practice. Of course the law does not act unto itself, but requires 
operationalization. Thinking infrastructurally about law requires us to think about precedent in a 
broader sense, as a referent to an installed base. For their part Geoffrey Bowker and Leigh Star 
argued for standards to be considered material and political, emerging from past assumptions that 
we may or may not have access to and which are patently ubiquitous. 
49
This is precisely why 
 
48 Latour, B. (2010). The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'État. Polity. P 141  
49 Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (2000). Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. MIT press. 
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 sometimes standards are hard to see, they are everywhere and typically embedded into the way 
we think and do things, and in ways that sometimes masquerade as intuitive. Bowker and Star 
see the key to unmasking this invisibility, this sense of the intuitive, by paying attention to the 
infrastructure of standards as well as the standards within infrastructure. Thinking in this way 
also requires an attention to law as a system, which in this case relies on a balance between 
consensus based (statute) and unilaterally based (Executive Orders) implementation that relies on 
an incredibly diffuse system of enforcement. 
 
Executive Orders and Legislative Acts 
 
Executive privilege and one of its most persistent manifestations, Executive Orders, are 
the source of much hand wringing in the current political climate. The Executive Order is 
routinely rhetorically leveraged against particular presidents as representative of their despotic 
influence or, conversely, as the action of a strong and decisive leader, often eschewing both the 
historical precedents that enabled their existence or the consequences of their language and 
directives. Precise definitions of what an Executive Order can be or has been vary greatly, the 
majority highlight their administrative and regulatory functions, and ability to craft statements 
"which are directed to, and govern actions of, governmental officials and agencies."
50
 However, 
Executive Orders are responsible for some of the most profound policies governing civil rights, 
environmental policies, and privacy rights, which suggests that their strategic and practical value 
far exceeds their narrow conception as an executive administrative tool. Debates surrounding the 
validity of Executive Orders are intimately related to debates about executive power and 
privilege broadly conceived. Although Executive Orders are consistently supported and 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, their status represents ongoing debates about the 
 
 
50 Cash, R. (1963). Presidential power: Use and enforcement of executive orders. Notre Dame Lawyer 39(1), 44-55. 
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 Constitutional basis for Executive power and the legal precedents that uphold Executive Orders 
as law. 
Article II of the constitution opens with "The executive power shall be vested in the 
President of the United States of America," and this power is positioned against the independent 
judiciary and the collective power of Congress as a legislative body. As such, the power of all 
three branches are constituted mutually, challenged and reinforced by each other. The language 
of Article I, which described the power of Congress, is far more explicit and specific with 
regards to the limits and extent of its powers. As a result of this disparate Constitutional 
foundation, the executive branch "has undergone a process of development by practice and by 
judicial decision."
51
 Logistically speaking, Executive Orders are far simpler to construct than 
large pieces of legislation and as a result, Congress typically occupies a reactionary position, 
forcing it to contend with a process that does not submit to the same kind of collective action as 
Congress must. While Article II is limited in its treatment of enumerated powers attributed to 
the Executive, the implied powers that derive simply from the vestment of executive power have 
been debated as everything from a vestment that does nothing but charge the president with 
maintaining the status quo,
52
 to giving the president the ability to take various forms of 
independent action with or without the support of statute.
53 
 
There are no specific powers related to the president's ability to have unique access or 
control over information in the Constitution, these standards have been developed ad hoc through 
legal precedent and subsequent interpretation. The courts have agreed in several cases broaching 
the subject, that the President should indeed have both access to information not readily available 
 
 
51 Randall, J.G. (1951). Constitutional problems under Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, 
35. 52 Fisher, L. (1995). Presidential war power. University Press of Kansas, 21.  
53 Mayer, K. (2001). With the stroke of a pen: Executive orders and presidential power. Princeton University 
Press, 43. 
 
25 
 to the public as well as maintain a role in the management and development of an infrastructure 
including formalized secrecy.
54
 Executive privilege has its genesis in the late 1790s, and has 
continued to the present day in a series of requests from Congress for access to information that 
the executive has denied. George Washington refused compliance with requests for information 
surrounding the failed St. Clair military expedition and the negotiation of the Jay Treaty 
55
 and 
Thomas Jefferson denied Congress information in the trial of Aaron Burr. However, the majority 
of cases that have set the precedent for executive privilege have arisen within the post WWII 
context, drastically tightening control on the ability of members of the Executive Branch to 
provide both testimony and documentation to Congress either voluntarily or under subpoena. 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower blocked federal employees from testifying regarding internal 
decision making, conversations or written communications from within the White House itself. 
Although executive privilege had been asserted for generations, it became an explicitly 
constitutional issue in United States v. Nixon in 1974,
56
 Nixon argued that executive privilege 
enables the president to refuse the release of information, claiming it is an implied element of 
Constitutional power vested in the Executive to control sensitive information. In this case the 
Supreme Court ordered Nixon to release subpoenaed tapes that would eventually shed light on 
the Watergate scandal. Having struggled since the first presidency
57
 to define these boundaries it 
is a rarity that the courts challenged executive privilege directly. 
 
While government information policy is the domain of all branches of government, the 
executive has almost singularly defined and set forth the protocols governing classified 
 
 
54 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971). Chicago and Southern Airlines v. 
Waterman Steamship Cor., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).  
55 
 
56 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  
57 In 1792, George Washington exerted the first version of executive privilege, refusing to give information 
to Congress regarding a failed military expedition. 
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 information. Several key legislative endeavors have served to expand and augment the 
infrastructure of classified information, but the bulk of this infrastructure has been developed, 
implemented and regulated through executive orders. 
The roots of the contemporary classification system can be traced to information control 
policies developed specifically for the United States War Department during World War I. 
Modeled on British and French systems of information policy and control, the system 
implemented by the War Department was the first agency wide system of classification and 
established the three-tier system (secret, confidential, restricted). With Executive Order 2954 
Woodrow Wilson created the Creel Committee, a committee on public information with the 
authority to limit and disseminate publicity about military activity (later, the Office of 
Censorship). One of its most significant contributions was a code of wartime practices which 
identified information, the sensitivity of which required close consultation and subsequent 
approval for dissemination by government agencies. In the first of a series of Executive Orders 
that established what would become the elaborate infrastructure that characterizes the 
contemporary system of classified information, Franklin Roosevelt carefully defined the genres 
and types of information considered "vital" and therefore potentially subject to classification. 
The first to explicitly reference materials, Executive Order 8381, names materials such as books 
and pamphlets as well as their reproductions. 
 
While the classification system is now one of inter-agency coordination with oversight 
emerging from the National Security Council as well as the Information Security Oversight 
Office, with Executive Order 9182 the classification system was brought entirely under a single 
organization, the Office of War Information. Executive Order 10104 (1950) established specific 
standards for each level of classification and Executive Order 10290 replaced the ad hoc system 
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 of widely varying sets of regulation in various departments with a White House controlled 
centralized system fully centralizing classified information infrastructure and bringing the system 
under one office. This Executive Order also more broadly alluded to justification, shifting the 
language from a national defense criteria to a national security criteria which would become the 
overriding logic of secrecy, balanced against the specter of individual privacy and eschewing 
larger social structures or collective experience. This brought with it a contraction of reach and 
an implementation of the first procedure for declassifying documents that no longer warranted 
protection. For the next several decades, the shift to classification infrastructure would occur 
outside of the Executive, affected predominantly by two legislative acts, the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (accompanied by Executive Order 10865 which provided safeguards for classified 
information within industry) and the Freedom of Information Act of 1967. As a significant 
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the 1954 Act loosened restrictions on private 
enterprise related to nuclear energy or fissile materials. While it still upheld strict protocols for 
information control and its own hierarchical designation system (the highest being restricted 
data), its amendment signaled a shift in partnerships between contractors, private industry and 
the government. The Freedom of Information Act was the first legal protection against the abuse 
of the classification system which, while conceived as a wartime necessity had become a 
routinized and normative bureaucratic extension of government information management. 
Executive Order 11652 issued by Richard Nixon attempted to both reduce the level of 
classification and tighten enforcement of abuses. Reducing the number of agencies and personnel 
with the authority to classify documents at the "Top Secret" level and requiring quick and 
standardized declassification schedules, were part of a broader attempt to keep leaks from within 
agencies and Congress in check. This Order also extended the justification for classification to 
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 include the protection of information that had the potential to negatively affect foreign relations. 
Although the divisions between foreign and domestic information management and gathering are 
still some of the most contentious, this Order also attempted to bring all classified information, 
including that concerning diplomatic and foreign affairs, under the umbrella of a unified system. 
President Carter continued the trend toward reduced secrecy, employing a stronger 
standard for classification which relied on 'identifiable damage' to national security and imposed 
for the first time a balancing test in declassification review requiring agency officials to weigh 
the public's interest in knowing against the potential damage from release. In an attempt to 
transcend the protracted struggle for power between Congress and the Executive, Executive 
Order 12065 was the first to even circulate as a draft to congressional committees seeking public 
comment and broadly based support. Executive Order 1256 was a drastic change in tone: 
discarding the balance test for classification; eliminating mandatory declassification procedures, 
allowing agencies to reclassify previously public information; imposing secrecy requirements on 
government contractors; and drastically attempting to limit the Freedom of Information Act as 
much as possible. The basic features of the classification system remained remarkably similar, 
relying at this point on entrenched protocols and institutional knowledge to mirror the policies of 
the Executive. Rather than bolster the system with legislation related to scientific knowledge and 
development, this period was defined by its relationship to Cold War era intelligence practices 
and methods. Shortly after Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 1256, Congress passed the 
Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982, making it a federal crime to release or even seek to 
know the identities of intelligence officers. By 1995 the political tone had changed in the wake 
of revelations concerning activities of the Central Intelligence Agency throughout the Reagan 
administration. Attempts to build in safeguards against unitary Executive control over 
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 information policy and the tendency to use classification to cover up covert action regardless of 
sensitivity characterized Executive Order 12958, issued by Bill Clinton in 1995. Requiring the 
identification of the classifier attached to each classified piece of information alongside a 
justification, this Order built accountability into the system. 
In 2003, the basic outlines of much of classified information infrastructure and its 
justifications shifted in the wake of 9/11. As legal protections for surveillance and intelligence 
gathering broadened, the classification process became even more fully entrenched within the 
Executive office. For the first time, Executive Order 13292, issued by George W. Bush, 
authorized the Vice President as an original classifying authority. This Order also expanded to 
categories of classifiable information to include infrastructures and "protection services," relying 
on ever more vague and flexible language to provide significant latitude for interpretation. The 
Archivist of the United States, who had heretofore had the role of managing declassified 
information as well as overseeing the beginning of declassification review processes, lost this 
power, which instead, was transferred to the Director of the Information Security Oversight 
Office. Barack Obama's 2009 revocation of this Order in reality maintained much of its language 
and changes. Executive Order 13526 strikes a different tone in its preamble, which is longer than 
the average and appeals to a "free flow of information" that must be balanced against the threats 
of "transnational terrorism." A departure from previous Orders is the creation of the National 
Declassification Center, which operates from within the National Archives somewhat 
independently, although still under the oversight of the ISOO and subject to the Interagency 
Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP). As Executive Order 13526 is the current 
standard, I will spend a bit of time breaking it down. 
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 Section 6.1 of Executive Order 13526 provides operational definitions for terms 
contained within the text of the executive order, including everything from “access” to 
“unauthorized disclosure,” and as these terms are legal terms they may or may not be 
synonymous with colloquial or other professional or disciplinary use of the terms. For example, 
the definition of records is stated as referring to “the records of an agency and Presidential papers 
or Presidential records, as those terms are defined in title 44, United States Code, including those 
created or maintained by a government contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee that are 
subject to the sponsoring agency’s control under the terms of the contract, license, certificate or 
grant.” Glossary and other definitions in government documents often refer the reader to a 
seemingly endless chain of referents. Instead of just quoting or reproducing the definition of 
records used in title 44 of the U.S.C., we have here a directive to visit another document. 
Classification is defined as tautology, as “the act or process by which information is determined 
to be classified information.” Classified then is an adjective and noun, it can describe the state of 
information as well as the process by which it is defined as such. E.O. 13526 generally describes 
two processes, classification and declassification. There are two kinds of classification, original 
and derivative. The standards for original classification fall back into a familiar tautology, 
“information can be originally classified under the terms of this order if…an original 
classification authority is classifying the information.” Further standards include the expectation 
that there is a reasonable expectation of threat and that the information is the property or under 
the control of the U.S. Government. This executive order maintains the standard three levels of 
classification: 
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 (1) “Top Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national 
security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 
(2) “Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that 
the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 
(3) “Confidential” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of 
which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that 
the original classification authority is able to identify or describe 
Each of these relies on the oft repeated “reasonable expectation” justification but also pairs it 
with the additional expectation of providing evidence of this reasonable expectation. Although 
the instruction here is vague, it is a key to the authority of classification. If a piece of information 
is classified, then a citizen might themselves have a reasonable expectation that it was classified 
as a result of someone identifying and describing a potential threat that is itself reasonable. 
Classification authority stems directly from the President and Vice-President, and moves down 
through the agency heads and officials appointed by or designated by the president. Top Secret 
classification authority stays at that level, whereas Secret and Confidential can also be at the 
level determined by an agency appointee whose job includes the administration of classified 
information policy, including regulatory practices and training and oversight. According to the 
most recent report by the Information Oversight Office (ISOO) published in 2014, there were 
2,276 government officials with original classification authority. Together they made 46,800 
original classification decisions, 11 percent of which were considered to be Top Secret. Each of 
these classification designations must be considered part of seven predetermined categories 
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 including: military plans, weapons systems or operations; foreign government information; 
intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; 
foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; 
scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; United States 
Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or 
capabilities, systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating 
to the national security; or the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction. 
E.O. 13526 is material and format agnostic, meaning that it avoids referring to particular formats 
or materials. In fact, it carefully posits that “document” means “any recorded information, 
regardless of the nature of the medium or the method or circumstances of recording,” leaving the 
determination of specific methods of marking up to agencies heads or other designees rather than 
providing general guidelines. The guidelines for marking remain at a fairly high level, specifying 
only that classified information should always contain one of the three classification levels: 
identity of the original classification authority as well as the agency and/or office of origin; 
declassification instructions; and a reason for classification. The majority of classified 
information becomes so due to Derivative Classification, which is the kind of classification that 
occurs when people reproduce or summarize previously classified information, or who are 
applying classification markings using a classification guide. In contrast to the numbers we see 
with original classification, derivative classification occurred over 75 million times in 2014. 
Those who apply derivative classification must receive training at least every two years, which 
can occur at the agency level or through external certification organizations. In rare 
circumstances, senior agency officials can provide a waiver for individuals who cannot 
participate in mandatory training. In addition, each agency with original classification authority 
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 must author a classification guide with an eye towards achieving uniformity and 
proper application of the standards. 
 
Department of Defense 
 
The United States War Department, the predecessor of the United States Department of 
Defense, was established by the first Congress in 1789. The War Department acted as the 
civilian administrative body overseeing the field army, gradually expanding to provide for 
recruitment and training as well as the administration of medical and financial resources. With 
each conflict, the powers and responsibilities of the War Department expanded, resulting in 
fragmentation and confusion concerning authority and accountability. With the War Powers Act 
of 1941, the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces and the Services of Supply were defined, 
further segmenting operations. 
Following World War II, President Harry Truman proposed the consolidation of 
scattered and disparate military bodies into a single department housed in the Executive branch 
of the United States Government. Within the context of post-war prosperity, Congress debated 
the appropriate size and role of the military in American society, culture and political life, in 
addition to the entrenched struggle over the consolidation of power within the Executive.
58
 In 
1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act into law, setting up what would later 
be renamed as the Department of Defense in a 1949 amendment. Alongside Executive Order 
9877, President Truman attempted a clear delineation of roles, missions and functions
59
 of the 
military services and civilian command. The National Security Act also established the Joint 
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 Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, among other 
moves, to both compartmentalize and streamline channels of communication and authority 
along the chain of command. Centralization would soon become further entrenched with the 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which situated authority with the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense rather than the historical precedent of somewhat 
independent military departments and command. 
The Secretary of Defense acts as the head of the Department of Defense. As this position is 
appointed by the President, its’ authority is a direct derivation of the Constitutional authority of the 
President as it relates to matters of the military.
60
 While the organizational structures shifts, 
contracts and expands according to the establishment of new subordinate or regulatory bodies, the 
first major revision of the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DoDD) pertaining to the 
functions of the DoD and its major components was signed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 
2010. The original founding version of 5200.01 was issued in 1954, and was routinely amended and 
revisited until 1987, at which point a substantive transformation reflecting shifts in policy orientation 
and practical challenges occurred. In addition, this revision of the Directive can be partly attributed 
to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act passed in 1986.
61 
 
Itself a result of political fallout and logistical challenges presented by the Vietnam War, the Act 
responded to a lack of cooperation and communication across the military services.
62
 Signed by 
President Ronald Reagan, it significantly tightened the chain of command, providing for a direct 
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 line from the President through the Secretary of Defense to Combatant Commanders.
63
 The Act 
also considerably reorganized standard operator procedures for military action, reconfiguring 
them along strategic or geographic lines rather than by resource or expertise. Instead of silos of 
expertise individually strategizing, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) would now 
allocate assets and resources according to objective. In addition, the Act allowed for shared 
technological and infrastructural resources, encouraging technological interoperability. 
 
A key factor precipitating contention, competition and compartmentalization between 
agencies and governmental organizations is intelligence. Sharing information across 
organizational lines presents complex challenges partly due to the intricacies of information 
policy across levels of government and operations. The Department of Defense presents a unique 
case in terms of information management and sharing, as it derives its power from the Executive 
and acts as the clearinghouse for individual intelligence agencies and operations under the 
military services. The Department of Defense acts as a manager and coordinator of intelligence 
services, including geospatial intelligence(GEOINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), human 
intelligence (HUMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence(MASINT). The Department 
of Defense also manages, coordinates and maintains the infrastructure for satellite assets in 
service of the intelligence agencies. A significant amount of information policy is devoted to 
regulating access to certain classes of information, either regulating the government’s access to 
the information of citizens or, conversely, the citizen’s access to government information. 
However, this statement, and much of the literature concerning access and open government, 
fails
64
 to move beyond this one to one relationship. The assertion that policy dictates access does 
 
63 Again, note the terminology; Combatant Commanders marks a departure from military specific terminology, 
a move that acknowledges the increasing use of civilian contractors and extra-military services, characterizing 
contemporary United States military operations.
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 not address the thick layers of bureaucratic control and management logic that regulates 
operations of intelligence agencies and government bodies. By concentrating on the Department 
of Defense, this research focuses on the space between policy and accessibility, and challenges 
the direct association between policy and action. Policy in this case, made up of both Executive 
Order and Legislative Acts, precipitates a series of institutional behaviors and mechanism that 
proliferate as policies, technologies and organizational structures shift. The relationship of record 
as command delineated by Cornelia Vismann,
65
 and recently expanded by the scholarship of 
James Lowry,
66
 involves not simply the production and circulation of the record itself, but also 
relies on a series of human activities and material practices as outlined by internal directives, 
manuals and instructions. The documents produced by the Department of Defense relating to 
information policy and control produce the very classes of information for which policy 
documents call. 
 
The current organizational chart (Appendix B) for the Department of Defense illustrates its 
role in terms of operations and management. Chief Information Officer Terry Halvorsen, along with 
David De Vries, Principal Deputy Chief Information Officer, and Christopher E. Thomas, 
Administrator of the Defense Technical Information Center, are the principal information officers 
within the DoD shaping the ways in which policy becomes instrumentalized across the bureaucratic 
structure of the agency. Terry Halvorsen acts as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense 
concerning Information Management, Technology, and Assurance, as 
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 well as infrastructure, including telecommunications, satellite communications, navigation, timing 
programs, and non-intelligence space systems. David De Vries also supports the Chief Information 
Officer. Christopher E. Thomas operates with a different mandate, as the Administrator of the 
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), his mission is to coordinate science and technology 
information (STINFO) policy across agencies for the Department of Defense. He is also the Chief 
Technology Officer for the DTIC and oversees the DTIC’s operation of the DoD’s Information 
Analysis Centers. During his tenure, DoDTechipedia was unveiled, allowing DoD scientists and 
researchers to share information and data within the Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol 
Router Network, formerly the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Net (NIPRNET), and the Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). 
 
The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) 
 
Although professional archivists and archival scholars across the United Sates have been 
and are engaged in advocacy concerning issues of secrecy and access, there remains a division 
between the archival community in general and the National Archives specifically. The National 
Archivist is an appointed position and may or may not be someone with archival experience. The 
arm of the National Archives responsible for standardizing and assessing the “management of 
classified and controlled unclassified information through oversight, policy development, 
guidance, education, and reporting” is the Information Security Oversight Office, which acts as 
the liaison between accessions from agencies to public use and/or storage in the archives.
67
 They 
are also responsible for the education and training of the agencies with respect to information 
security. The ISOO also deals with regulatory functions and sees to appeals; contained within the 
ISOO are the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the National Industrial 
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 Security Program (NISP), the National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee 
(NISPPAC), the Classification Management Working Group (CMWG) and the State, Local, 
Tribal, and Private Sector Policy Advisory Committee (SLTPS-PAC). The director of the ISOO 
is also the acting executive for the ISCAP. Established with Executive Order 12958, ISCAP 
acts as an intermediary and appeals to authority for classification challenges, exemptions from 
declassification protocols and declassification requests. 
Established in 1978 by Executive Order 12065 and signed by President Jimmy Carter, 
the ISOO was meant to replace an Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC), itself 
established through Executive Order in 1972 by President Richard Nixon. The ICRC was 
assembled by representatives from various departments and commissions acting on behalf of 
their particular constituencies, whereas the ISOO was meant to act as an independent office 
enacting oversight and mediating interagency issues and disputes. John P. Fitzpatrick is the 
current Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, his explicit mandate being to both 
adhere to executive commitments to openness and transparency in balance with the protection of 
information vital to ‘national security.’ 
 
The Manual as Genre 
 
The oldest known manual can be traced back to the Sumerian civilization, approximately 
1375 B.C.E. The text is inscribed on clay tablets by Kikkuli, the squire of the King of the Hittites 
Suppiluliuma and outlines the proper care and training of horses.
68
 The program is outlined in 
detail, setting forth standards for ration amounts; periods of rest and training schedules; and 
creating standard regimen across a burgeoning military force increasingly reliant upon horses. 
The text has become a boon to researchers interested in a multitude of subjects, but also provides 
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 insight into an antecedent of a genre typically associated with bureaucratic organizational structure, 
professionalization or personal technology. While the manual is a genre of organizational 
communication it is also characterized by a “socially recognized communicative purpose and 
common aspects of form.”
69
 Rather than represent individual communicative practices, a genre in 
this sense operates within a community, formally defining a set of common priorities and 
reinforcing cohesion.
70
 The commonly understood purpose of a training manual is to train, to teach 
and to inform a constituency of how to perform a particular set of skills in a standardized fashion. In 
this way, changes in organizational policies and priorities can be communicated consistently, and 
all members of the organization can share a common referent. While organizations function within 
a genre repertoire,
71
 rather than relying on a single communicative or document genre, the manual 
serving as a reference text positions it as a more static genre compared to a memo or single task 
related document. Additionally, manuals are meant to simplify. Typically, a genre has characteristic 
and recognizable form, and relies on a shared sense of both understanding and purpose. However, 
manuals are also dynamic
72
, they do nothing on their own. In order for them to function, you must 
already possess a great deal of knowledge about the subject, and must identify either externally or 
internally as a member of a specialized community of knowledge and practice. Crucially though, 
manuals are also meant as reference texts to be consulted rather than wholly internalized, and apart 
from initial training are typically sought out when an individual recognizes a gap in their own 
knowledge or confront an issue on which they need guidance. Guides for dealing with classified 
information are many and 
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 are produced by agencies themselves, external training services and offices. An individual 
worker who may deal with classified information incidentally or infrequently might have three 
manuals and sixteen laws governing her behavior, and internal audits have found consistently 
that training on these issues is minimal and ineffective.
73
 However, the distribution of the 
manual fulfills the minimum requirements set forth by law, that agencies train and inform their 
employees of proper protocols, and can more often be a tool of indemnity rather than knowledge 
or skill transfer. Manuals maintain a curious relationship to what Michel Foucault has called the 
“author function.”74 Foucault writes that an individual author’s name “manifests the appearance 
of a certain discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and a 
culture,”75 and sets authored texts apart from anonymous texts, guarantors and other more 
remote entities. This concept of author arises as texts are placed within complex economies, 
apportioning both responsibility and ownership over particular ideas and discourses. The author 
itself is a subject position constituted in relation to the author-function. Although outside of the 
literary debate between Barthes and Foucault
76
 concerning the function and role of the author in 
postmodernity, manuals offer a unique test case for disrupting the boundaries of authorship and 
discursive position. Manuals rely on an author-function that transcends the particularities of their 
writing and instead identifies a broader entity as author, in this case a particular government 
agency. The agency’s author-function activates the text as discourse that communicates not just 
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 its position as an extension of executive power but as a mandate for individual responsibility of 
agency employees, a real explication of bureaucratic and legal power as practice. 
 
Standards in Action, a Proliferation of Training and Instruction Manuals 
 
The current Department of Defense Manual Number 5200.01 Volumes 1-4 were 
published in 2012
77
 and comprise the most comprehensive overview of the classification 
program, its authorities and currently sanctioned practices with respect to classified information. 
Each of the four volumes has its own purpose: Volume 1 provides an overview of the DoD 
Information Security Program; Volume 2 outlines the methods and standards for marking 
classified information; Volume 3 outlines means of the protection of classified information; and 
Volume 4 deals exclusively with a category of information called “Controlled Unclassified 
Information.” In its entirety it contains three hundred and sixty-two pages, each volume 
containing its own glossary in order to decipher not only acronyms but to act as a guide to 
organizational priorities and structure. The glossary is an extension of the stated purpose of each 
volume of the manual, and gives a broad picture of the ways in which classified information is 
placed at the center of overlapping discourses concerning United States “national security.” 
National Security runs throughout these documents, performing multiple functions as it has in 
policy discourse for the last several decades. The National Security Act
78
 was passed in 1947, 
embedding a nebulous concept of national security into foreign policy. The Act created the 
National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the precursor to the DoD. 
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 However, the Act did not define what it meant by national security, leaving it as a broad 
 
umbrella under which to house any conceivable threat. In an essay entitled “The Legitimate 
 
Claims of National Security,” General Maxwell Taylor outlined an expansive vision of national 
 
security: 
 
The national valuables in this broad sense include current assets and national interests, as 
well as the sources of strength upon which our future as a nation depends. Some 
valuables are tangible and earthy; others are spiritual or intellectual. They range widely 
from political assets such as the Bill of Rights, our political institutions and international 
friendships, to many economic assets which radiate worldwide from a highly productive 
domestic economy supported by rich natural resources. It is the urgent need to protect 
valuables such as these which legitimizes and makes essential the role of national 
security.
79 
 
These manuals reflect the priorities and ideologies expressed in President Barack Obama’s 
 
National Security Strategy. 
80
 Obama emphasized security as one of four enduring national 
 
interests, which when considered together conceptualize a totalizing brand of American 
 
exceptionalism that places U.S. interests at the heart of international peace and security and 
 
asserts the U.S. as a protector of universal values. By describing these four interests as 
 
inextricable, Obama ties activities justified with national security rhetoric to each of these other 
 
priorities. Interestingly, the DoD manual itself defines national security along much more narrow 
 
lines as “the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. National security includes 
 
defense against transnational terrorism.”
81
 Although this definition is narrow in the glossary, it is 
 
deployed as the primary justificatory principle throughout the manuals, suggesting a larger 
 
ideological footprint than defense and terrorism. The manuals also invoke prior authorizing 
 
bodies and documents through a comprehensive list of references to directives, memos, statutes, 
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 executive orders, instructions and of course, other manuals. Volume 3 references 63 of these 
documents alone. These manuals take as their overriding precedent Executive Order 13526 
which attempts to set broad standards for a “uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and 
declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense against 
transnational terrorism.”82 The language of the Executive Order couches this goal within a 
larger system that purportedly aligns “democratic principles” with a generalized prioritization of 
freedom of the circulation of and access to information. Classified information is then defined as 
extraordinary, an exception to routine practices. Additionally, the application of uniformity 
throughout this document and its proliferating manuals, directives and instructions are framed as 
another mechanism for ensuring transparency and accountability of government activities. The 
Executive Order is divided into six parts: original classification; derivative classification; 
declassification and downgrading; safeguarding; implementation and review; general provisions. 
Original classification identifies the entities that possess classification authority as well as 
provides a framework for determining what exactly should be classified. Again, this 
determination is framed in broad terms relying on a generalized investment in national security 
as a governing principle. The very foundations for considering information classifiable rely on a 
stated understanding of this principle, “Information shall not be considered for classification 
unless its authorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable 
damage to the national security…”83 In addition to reaching the nebulous standards of 
identifiable and describable, the information must also pertain to at least one of the following 
things: military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign government information; 
intelligence activities, sources and methods; foreign relations or foreign activities of the United 
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 States; scientific, technological, or economic matters relation to national security; United States 
Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or 
capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services 
relating to national security; or the development, production or use of weapons of mass 
destruction.
84
 Volume 1 of the manual is a much more detailed description of principles outlined 
in the Executive Order including descriptions of who can possess Original Classification 
Authority (OCA), how they can get it and the procedures for applying for exemptions to 
automatic declassification. This Volume also includes guidance on the production and circulation 
of the manuals themselves. E.O. 13526 requires Agency heads to provide guidance as well as 
periodically review the guidance they produce regarding classified information. The manual 
specifies this review as every 5 years and requires their classification guides to be distributed to 
organizations covered by the guide. Each published piece of classification guidance must also be 
sent to the Defense Technical Information Center as long as the guide does not itself contain any 
proprietary or classified information. DTIC then indexes and provides online, searchable access 
to the guides. 
 
Volume 2 provides granular instructions for marking classified information. This goes 
beyond general markings and extends into even more specifically formed and regulated 
communities of information. Apart from generalized categories of classified information, there 
are two additional areas in which further protocols and standards are outlined: Special Access 
Programs (SAPs) and Intelligence Information. The Intelligence Community (IC) has developed 
its own specific standards of classification and control through the IC Directive (ICD) 710, 
“Classification and Control Markings System,” which is issued by the Office of the Director of 
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 National Intelligence (ODNI) in conjunction with standards outlined by the Special Security 
Center (SSC), Controlled Access Program Coordination Office (CAPCO), and the CAPCO 
Register and Manual for guidance on marking and dissemination of classified and unclassified 
intelligence information. These IC designations are included in the banner line along with the 
prevailing classification level. For example, a Top Secret intelligence document might say in the 
banner “TOP SECRET/IMCON,” which signifies that it is considered Top Secret as an original 
classification and has the additional control standard of “Controlled Imagery,” which governs 
sources and methods used by geospatial intelligence.
85
 As this manual is specifically concerned 
with the application of uniformity prioritized by E.O. 13526, this section is perhaps its most vital 
component. It provides a comprehensive and uniform guide to control markings. Information 
control (nee) bibliographical control has long been a central concern to those in Information 
Studies. In his foundational essay “Two Kinds of Power,” Patrick Wilson explores the 
conceptual challenges of bibliographic control as a distinct practice. He posits bibliographic 
control as a form of power and in fact, a kind of power over power, given the assumption that 
knowledge somehow leads to power itself. 
86
 As a functional term, control then is something that 
we can implement over a set of resources. The relationship between control and organization, 
which Wilson describes as contingent instead of necessary, comes to the fore in classified 
information. We might see the infrastructure of classified information as operating within the 
transitional space identified by Gilles Deleuze in his essay “Postscript on the Societies of 
Control.”87 In this essay, Deleuze describes what he sees as the transition of society from a 
Foucauldian disciplinary one to one of control, meaning that previous, formally controlled spaces 
 
85 Department of Defense. (2012) DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information. 5200.01, 
Volume 2.
  
86 Wilson, P. (1968). Two kinds of power: An essay on bibliographical control. Univ of California Press.  
87 Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59, 3-7. 
 
46
 are broken apart, and power is reconstituted through perpetually moving barriers and 
mechanisms of control. Within government information environments, classified information 
operates as a mechanism of control. Control here facilitates ease of communication within close 
information communities, control markings signaling immediately to the reader whether or not 
they are allowed to go forward and read. This form of control fundamentally requires everyone 
to agree to its terms and act accordingly, and access and boundaries can shift at any point. In 
terms of classified information, control is multi-directional, operating through detailed protocols 
within government environments and outside of government information environments. 
Analyses and understandings of control proliferate across disciplinary and professional 
boundaries. James Beniger’s book, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic 
Origins of the Information Society,
88
 posits control at the heart of all economic and social 
behavior through the 21
st
 century. Control permeated the strategic and rhetorical registers of the 
United States military and cybersecurity. “Command and control” has become a stock phrase 
across agencies with multiple definitions. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms define command and control as “the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission.”89 A 2006 report expanded this definition to include: establishing intent (the goal or 
objective); determining roles, responsibilities, and relationships; establishing rules and 
constraints (schedules, etc.); and monitoring and assessing the situation and progress.
90
 This 
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 report situates these traditional mechanisms of command and control as problematic within the 
“Information Age,” which requires flexibility of ability and authority to make immediate 
decisions while maintaining a consistent intent across entities. The relationship between 
networked communication and information hierarchies that characterize traditional bureaucratic 
and military structures is consistently figured as a crisis. Although there is debate concerning the 
exact time-period of its writing, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War91 is considered the oldest manual for 
war strategy. The gathering, dissemination and control of information is at the heart of the text, 
as the key to maintaining advantage and avoiding violence. The text contains specific 
instructions for intelligence gathering and deception. Although he does expose techniques and 
describe the centrality of strategy, the emphasis always remains “foreknowledge” as amount of 
information means nothing without appropriate timing. The temporality of information 
organization, standards and classification all rely on this same assumption, the more knowledge 
is not necessarily better, but well timed and strategic knowledge is key to success in military 
contexts. Control is intertwined with structural maintenance and manifests differently in diverse 
structures of government and power. In their analysis of the transition away from the fixed 
stratification of the state defined by bureaucratic norms, to what they dub the speedy and flexible 
“war machine,” Deleuze and Guattari identify secrecy and speed as the heart of the successful 
war machine.
92
 A disjuncture occurs, then, in the creation, maintenance and proliferation of 
standards. As information is framed as one of the primary resources that keeps the United States 
safe and information controls function to ensure that safety, and enable communication across 
agencies, then classified information infrastructure is always already about the deferral of harm. 
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 Paranoia about information getting where it is not supposed to be leads to overclassification and 
overly complex policies that subsequently result in the dilution of how important a particular 
classification can be. In testimonies before Congress, a handful of government officials have 
estimated that as much as fifty percent of defense information may be improperly classified.
93 
 
Emerging from what Lawrence Halloran has called a cultural bias against information sharing 
that characterized Cold War domestic and foreign policy, practices of overclassification have 
ossified within agency standards.
94
 In the flurry of post 9/11 diagnostics concerning 
intelligence communities, overclassification and compartmentalization were often cited as 
major roadblocks.
95
 Nevertheless, classification and additions to the classification system have 
proliferated, rendering the movement of information from classified to declassified all but inert 
as the resources and time to declassify information has not been met with similar funding and 
attention. 
 
The complexity and length of manuals and training programs have led to a secondary 
economy made up of external training programs. In addition to the Department of Defense’s own 
manual, the Center for Development of Security Excellence also produced a shorter, more 
concise manual in 2014 that is used in their certification program.
96
 Written for both Department 
 
 
 
93 See Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to Information Sharing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 
108th Cong., at 82 (Aug. 24, 2004) (statement of Carol A. Haave, Deputy Secretary of Defense for 
Counterintelligence and Security); Donald Rumsfeld, War of the Worlds, Wall St. J., July 18, 2005, at A12 
(acknowledging “too much material is classified across the federal government as a general rule”). 
 
94 Halloran, L. (2005). Briefing Memorandum for the Hearing “Emerging Threats: Overclassification and 
Pseudo-Classification,” Memorandum for the Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations.
 
 
95 The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United 
States. Government Printing Office, 2011.
 
 
96 Center for Development of Security Excellence. (2017) Marking Classified Information: JOB AID.  
 
49 
 of Defense employees, and also taking into account both classified and uncontrolled controlled 
information, the manual attempts to summarize practices and justifications for a range of 
classification practices with the goal of simultaneous protection of information and 
information sharing across necessary constituencies. Whereas the language of both executive 
orders and legislative acts are relatively lacking in detail, this manual specifies that information 
regarding original classification should be shown in standardized ways across documentation, 
identifying standard marking elements as: banner lines, portion marks, agency, office of origin, 
date of origin, and classification authority block, specifying down to the format for the 
declassification date.
97
 If a document contains derivative classification of information from 
multiple sources (either original or derivative), the classification level will defer to the highest 
used in any of the source material. 
 
The Information Security Oversight Office published its rules and regulations for 
classified information in the Federal Register in 2010 and revised in 2014, giving a much more 
comprehensive view on the day to day handling of classified information than could be found in 
either executive orders or legislative acts. Most saliently, the ISOO provides guidance for 
marking and handling classification in the “electronic environment,”98 including guidance on 
classified email, web pages, URLS, relational databases, blogs, wikis, instant messaging and 
chats, and attached files. The prevailing concern with respect to the electronic environment is its 
traceability to original classification authorities. Information that is considered dynamic in nature 
presents a challenge for security, and especially for traditional means of marking and handling 
classified information. The instructions regarding relational databases exhibits a deep discomfort 
with the ways in which information combines and displays according to query. Indeed, the 
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 guidance provided defaults to the highest level of classification of any individual informational 
element for the entire database. The database itself must provide the user with a warning 
attached, transferring the onus for discerning over-classification on the user who is encouraged to 
make further inquiries on individual elements. Wikis and email on the other hand, forms that 
could be considered dynamic, are not considered dynamic by the ISOO, their instructions 
consider the email string or wiki as a whole instead of breaking it down into its constituent parts. 
Therefore, the overall classification designation and declassification instructions for the entire 
string, or for the entire wiki, should prevail. In addition, wikis should be portion marked and 
keep a log of different users and the changes they make. 
We should be aware too of the shifts in classified information infrastructure that have 
brought on an expansion of categories and classifications that extend secrecy beyond the three-
tiered system. This extension is so profound that one of the four volumes of the Department of 
Defense manual is entirely devoted to Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). In a 
Presidential memorandum sent to Heads of Departments and Agencies in 2008, George W. Bush 
created the category of CUI, and placed the National Archives in charge of implementation, 
oversight and management of the CUI framework. This memo was an attempt to harness the over 
one hundred different information designations across government agencies for unclassified 
information considered critical or sensitive, and as a result, under strict controls. A lack of 
standardization and information sharing across these agencies made policies a moving target. 
The National Security Archive conducted a government-wide audit of policies regarding 
unclassified but sensitive information, the results of which resulted in Congressional hearings on 
information controls and policies. 
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 In 2010, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13556 specifically targeting the 
 
disarray represented by the proliferation of control classification and markings, and attempted to 
 
mandate both uniformity and openness with respect to the system’s application. Making 
 
Controlled Unclassified Information the government-wide designation, this Executive Order kept 
 
the management of CUI under control of NARA and prompted agency heads to review all 
 
markings used for designating unclassified information and submit a catalogue of proposed 
 
categories within 180 days of the issuance of the order. Within one year of the order, each 
 
agency was to maintain a public registry of all categories, which would come up for review each 
 
year for five years and every two years after that. NARA issued a final rule setting guidelines for 
 
federal agencies regarding the protection, release and disposal of CUI. One of the major 
 
implications for this rule was the burden placed on contractors dealing with CUI in their dealings 
 
with government agencies. In its response to public comments and final publication of the rule 
 
governing CUI, NARA did not mince words, 
 
the dispositive issues are not who protects the information, whether it is difficult or costly 
to protect it, or even how one goes about protecting it; the dispositive issue is that certain 
laws or similar authority require the Government, and by extension, those who handle or 
receive it, to protect this information.
99 
 
The rule goes on to describe the balance between information need and management and 
 
explicitly denies the reduction of regulations for any entity. The current definition of Controlled 
 
Unclassified Information (CUI) is 
 
Information the Government creates or possesses, or that an entity creates or possesses for 
or on behalf of the Government, that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy 
requires or permits an agency to handle using safeguarding or dissemination controls.  
However, CUI does not include classified information …or information a non-executive 
branch entity possesses and maintains in its own systems that did not come from, or was not 
created or possessed by or for, an executive branch agency or an entity acting for an agency. 
Law, regulation, or Government-wide policy may require or permit safeguarding or 
dissemination controls in three ways: Requiring or permitting agencies to control or 
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 protect the information but providing no specific controls, which makes the information 
CUI Basic; requiring or permitting agencies to control or protect the information and 
providing specific controls for doing so, which makes the information CUI Specified; or 
requiring or permitting agencies to control the information and specifying only some of 
those controls, which makes the information CUI Specified, but with CUI Basic controls 
where the authority does not specify.
100 
 
 
Before CUI, the most common term for information that did not qualify as needing to be 
 
classified but still required sensitivity regarding its circulation and management was Sensitive 
 
but Unclassified (SBU). The term only appeared in the late 1970s, but came to encompass a 
 
whole range of information outside of formal classification structures, including proprietary data, 
 
law enforcement information, health information etc. It would eventually become even more 
 
expansive, covering information that was exempt from disclosure under FOIA or information 
 
that came under the Computer Security Act of 1987.
101
 When Bush issued his CUI 
 
memorandum, he was attempting to bring together all of the disparate categories that had popped 
 
up through the decades, but the slow pace at which any new information control policy is 
 
implemented results in splintering of use and cooperation. The current CUI registry contains 24 
 
categories with 85 subcategories. While the manual for marking and classifying information 
 
published in 2012 by the Department of Defense is technically still active, its guidance is moot in 
 
the face of new CUI streamlining regulations and there is currently no specific training for DoD 
 
employees or agencies regarding CUI, all of which would be through NIST or NARA. The DoD 
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 had in fact publicly stated its resistance to change in between the issuance of the memorandum or 
Executive Order, and to a coherent and decisive interagency policy.
102 
 
Secrecy as Standard and the Standards of Secrecy 
 
The infrastructure of classified information presents an interesting case for analyzing 
standards and classification. Bowker and Star define classification as “a spatial, temporal or 
spatio-temporal segmentation of the world,” and a classification system as “a set of boxes, 
metaphorical or not, into which things can be put in order to then do some kind of work-
bureaucratic or knowledge production.” Bowker and Star go on to define standard as “any set of 
agreed-upon rules for the production of (textual or material) objects.”103 Classified information 
infrastructure as a system is one of classification insofar as it separates knowledge according to 
potential for damage and to particular levels of access according to role. It is also, however, a 
standard as it governs the production of specific textual objects. Classification is often talked 
about as something that is done to a document, but it is fundamentally also the production of a 
new document and an entirely new record. Vital to any discussion of standards and systems of 
classification is a definition of the community. If standards must be agreed upon, then they must 
be agreed upon by somebody, and if a classification system is to be useful, the kind of work it is 
doing must be fairly easy to identify. As this Chapter has shown, who agrees upon the standards 
is cyclical and often oppositionally defined, and starts with an overgeneralized singular directive 
that is then subject to more deliberative and consensus based processes. The kind of work the 
classified information infrastructure is doing is often less easy to identify. The work is justified 
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 through the implication of potential harm caused by the possession of information by another 
entity and what it does is situate information within a system of risk. Take for example the two 
documents reproduced here, which are both found in the DoD Manual, and meant to illustrate the 
proper implementation and display of marking standards and techniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1: "Figure 4. Example of Derivatively Classified Document" from DoDM 5200.01-V2, February 24, 2012 
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 The first document we recognize as a bureaucratic document, it’s a memorandum, containing 
basic elements of a widely-circulated document: a date, a heading, a subject line, a body, a 
signature. The classification markings follow and in this example we see that the information can 
be segmented out in part or in whole, but that entering into the classified system requires 
document elements that immediately identify it as separate from other circulating information. 
Bold boxes outline the elements of classification: portion markings, banner line, classification 
authority block, classification, separator, dissemination control. Classified information then is 
visually different and immediately recognizable, becoming a new document and a new record 
identifying a separate set of organizational actions than the informational content of the previous 
document. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: "Figure 22. Markings on Photographs" from DoDM 5200.01-V2, February 24, 2012 
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The second document we see is doing something different. It is displaying proper classification 
markings for photographs and contains a much more streamlined set of markings, a classification 
authority block and banner line. Exactly what is being classified here however forces us to be 
more specific about the separation between content and context, and asks for critical separation 
of information and documentation. There are limits to control within artificially controlled 
information environments. This artificiality is exposed periodically by the paradoxes inherent in 
the assumptions embedded within the classification system. In 2010, internal memos within the 
Navy and the Marine Corps warned troops against accessing WikiLeaks directly or through 
published media sources, essentially barring them from access to public knowledge.
104
 This 
classified photograph or similarly classified geolocation data belies the same artificiality of 
closed systems, as the physical space itself cannot be classified but its representation can. Even 
the most expansive understandings of documentation, such as Suzanne Briet’s focus on 
functionality,
105
 do not collapse the distinctions between representations and abstractions. The 
futility expressed by the WikiLeaks memo demonstrates this failure, as it tries to assert the form 
of classified document over the circulation of knowledge outside of its own closed system. 
Commercial entities can be relatively quick to recognize the failure of a standard. Failed 
standards and formats for audio-visual materials are multitudinous, and the relative speed of 
adoption and rejection depends on overlapping factors but rarely have anything to do with what 
is “better.”106 Within a classified information infrastructure, arguably failed standards and 
classifications are plagued with inertia as the competing temporal registers of law, policy and 
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 technology impede one another and expectations of control turn justification into paradox. One 
of the great challenges of a classified information infrastructure involves the increased 
dependence on networked communication and information technologies provided through 
government contracts, partnerships that require rethinking standards and classifications system-
wide. 
 
Chapter Two: Public Records, Private Phones 
 
Introduction 
 
On February 13, 2013, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13636, 
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” The text of this Executive Order extended 
and solidified practices and policies concerning the working relationships between private sector 
entities and the United States government that in the past thirty years have become increasingly 
inseparable and incredibly lucrative for individuals and corporations alike. Expressing great 
urgency, Obama stressed the dire need for cooperation between the federal government, 
intelligence agencies and the corporations that create, own or maintain cyber and 
communications infrastructure in order to both defend and gain access to sensitive and critical 
information. A subsequent proposed framework to be adopted by “agencies with responsibility 
for regulating the security of critical infrastructure,”107 asserted the inextricability of such 
rhetorically and politically hefty concepts as Homeland Security, Counterterrorism, Economic 
Affairs, National Security and private information infrastructure. 
 
Three years later, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has begun to roll out 
one part of the Pentagon’s Joint Information Environment Plan, mobile devices for use in the 
field by persons with Secret clearance, that is operating under the name, Department of Defense 
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 Mobility Classified Capability – Secret or DMCC-S. These devices and their related software, 
apps, standards and protocols will replace the now defunct Secure Mobile Environment Portable 
Electronic Device System. Reliant upon private infrastructure and contracts for the program’s 
success, this transitional moment offers a window into understanding how the what, where, 
when and why of a classified record is shifting dramatically in the face of new socio-technical 
configurations. This chapter focuses on this transition to think through these questions, situating 
this program within a longer history of contracts between the federal government and the private 
sector. 
 
Private Contracts and the United States Government: Setting the Neoliberal Stage 
 
The use of contractors by the United States Government is hardly new, these contractors are 
such an integral part to the daily workings of government that they are often referred to as a 
“shadow government,” and their effectiveness and cost is notoriously difficult to track. The Office 
of Budget and Management has estimated that 70% of the Department of Defense’s annual budget 
is spent on contractors. The definition of contractor is as expansive as their activities and 
engagements with operations of government. For the purposes of this discussion, an expansive 
definition is useful in order to capture the ways in which the shifting boundaries of public and 
private work have been reconfigured, therefore we can consider any private company producing 
goods or offering services to the federal government under contract. Government contractors for the 
most part have been divided into two general types: those whose goods and services are separated 
out under a project management organizational model, and those that are used to supplement the 
daily needs of government under both long and short term contracts. Contemporary contracts with 
the private sector that involve networked technologies represent a third type of contract which 
makes short term engagement increasingly difficult, as the private 
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 sector owns the infrastructure so crucial to contemporary operations. The ability of the 
government to continue to do business with private entities relies on what Daniel Guttman has 
referred to as three co-existing constitutional models of accountability.
108
 The “presumption of 
regularity/public law” model places the onus of accountability with the government entity or 
official who contracts with the private sector, assuming that the entity or official will be 
responsible for keeping the contractor on the right track. Extending any oversight to the 
contractor would be seen as an unnecessary overreach. The common law model is based on the 
belief that regulations and oversight in place for public officials and activities should also follow 
private contractors engaging in work on behalf of or paid by the public. The mechanisms of 
accountability and oversight come from the contractor, and are seen as one of many ways of 
evaluating past work and negotiating future contracts. The governance/accountability model is 
invested in incentivizing compliance and leveraging market forces and competition to course 
correct. 
 
The United States federal government has contracted with private entities since its 
inception, but the unprecedented expansion of government that characterizes the second half of 
the twentieth century was bolstered by similarly unprecedented reliance on government 
contracts. Prior to World War II, the most prevalent use of private contractors came in the form 
of entities like the Institute for Government Research (which would eventually become The 
Brookings Institute). Private donations fueled what the organization’s original 1918 charter 
stated as “scientific investigations into the theory and practice of governmental 
administration…to carry on such inquiries, directly or with the cooperation of governments, 
learned societies, institutions of learning or other agencies and individuals and to make public 
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 the results of its investigations.”109 This and other privately funded research institutions have 
held and do hold great influence over government reform. While relatively little attention has 
been given to this constellation of think tanks and interest groups as a system rather than on 
specific institutional histories, what is easily established is the growth of their numbers and 
their influence. Claiming to produce reliable and unbiased research for the improvement of 
government function and accountability, organizations such as the Institute for Government 
Research have been identified as directly leading to the passage of the Budgeting and 
Accounting Act in 1921, creating both the budget bureau and the congressional accounting 
 
offices.
110 
 
The buildup to World War II required a new set of tools and relationships in service of 
preparedness and mobilization. This period saw the growth and development of the Manhattan 
Engineer District, later nicknamed the “Manhattan Project,” focused on the successful and 
expedient development of the atomic bomb, as well as the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD) which maintained oversight of a host of research and development 
initiatives. President Franklin Roosevelt allowed his then science advisor Vannevar Bush to 
“contract out most of its (OSRD’s – authors parentheses) programs to universities, de-emphasizing 
federal laboratories…”
111
 This period set the standard of operations for large scale government 
projects. The Manhattan Project was managing much more than individual research projects; they 
also were in charge by default and then by contract of the cities that housed the projects, creating a 
micro-economic system. Acknowledging this growing trend, President John 
 
 
109 Willoughby, W.F. 1918. The Institute for Government Research. The American Political Science Association. 12 
(1). Pp. 49-62. 
110 Roberts, A. S. (1994). The rhetorical problems of the management expert (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard 
University Cambridge, Massachusetts).
 
 
111 McDougall, W. A. (1985). Heavens and the earth: a political history of the space age. P. 67. 
 
61 
 F. Kennedy issued a Letter to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1961 referencing a 
recently issued Budget Circular No. A-49 which outlined federal policies for issuing contracts 
for government activities. The Circular and the subsequent letter both emphasized that activities 
considered “inherently governmental” should always be in official hands, not in the hands of 
contractors. Debates about what exactly should be considered inherently governmental are 
constant. Currently, arguments over this inherency tend to be focused on private contractors in 
military zones or extending military activities. More specifically, inherency comes up in 
discussions about the protocols governing drone operations, both as a means of surveillance and 
in active mission scenarios.
112
 The strict definition of inherently governmental is a teleological 
one – activities that are inherently governmental are those that are as a matter of law and policy, 
considered to be confined to public employees, thus garnering public oversight and 
accountability. The prescience of Kennedy’s 1961 letter has less to do with the logistical context 
of military or scientific need of the time, and more to do with building the infrastructure of 
government research and technological expertise, not only in partnership with private entities 
but in deference to them. The Manhattan Project recruited contractors to engage not just in 
research but in sustained “life-cycle” support of nuclear projects which took place on 
government property and in government facilities. A specific contract became the model for this 
and subsequent projects for years, the management and operating (M & O) contract. While there 
was little to no movement on the legislative side to substantively confront the complexities or 
potentialities of this heavy reliance on contracting, “the preference for private enterprise conduct 
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 of U.S. weapons development and production work…is essentially an unwritten law.”113 
Support for the protraction of these relationships came in the form of financial justifications of 
course, but importantly, also relied on the assertion that the success of such programs were not 
alone due to the scientists involved but in the management expertise and business acumen of 
their parent companies. Vannevar Bush pointed out the obvious when he reflected that “it was 
soon possible to gather together committees on various aspects of the problem, for the men who 
could contribute were already working together.”114 This period solidified the connections that 
comprised President Eisenhower’s vision of the “military-industrial complex,” think tanks such 
as RAND were established, technology projects on a massive scale were almost entirely out of 
direct government hands and oversight, and contractors became intimately involved in 
congressional decision making and policy development. The position of think tanks and policy 
institutes outside of the government allowed them to advocate for their interests to Congress 
without any official improprieties. The Aerospace Corporation saw the development of the 
intercontinental ballistic missile system concurrently with the development of the computerized 
air defense system developed by the Mitre Corporation. 
 
At least one government entity was created and operated from the beginning with the 
assumption of government business by contract. Following the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration was established and its engagement with 
contractors for all levels of its operations was unprecedented. Reconceiving the governmental 
function as one of project management, NASA immediately relied upon private aerospace 
manufacturers like Boeing to build its rockets and invested in contract research organizations 
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 like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Right up to the present, contractors dominate 
construction, research, training and mission control for all NASA flights. NASA was in fact the 
first such agency to become publicly embroiled in a law suit alleging that its hiring practices 
were violating laws governing civil service, as well as the federal employee’s union’s collective 
bargaining agreement. Although the 1978 lawsuit Lodge 1858 American Federation of 
Government Employees v. Webb brought attention to how prevalent these dependencies were, 
NASA was ultimately vindicated due to the very conditions of its founding. The National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was passed establishing the agency as entirely civilian in 
nature, rather than military, skirting arguments about what might be inherently governmental. 
The law stipulated that the basic work of NASA would be done by federal employees, but also 
acknowledged the need for and provided for the use of contractors. The law also capped the 
number of federal employees to be hired by NASA at any given time, placing limits on growth 
and expansion before it even began. In what would become a familiar story, contractors 
emerged as a way of operating outside of both federal pay caps and hiring freezes. 
 
This period also witnessed the establishment and growth of several new civilian 
governmental bodies including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of 
Transportation. These too were established with pay and personnel caps which made their 
staffing inadequate as their responsibilities and services continued to grow. Many of these new 
agencies in turn created their own versions of RAND, policy and research institutes that could 
ameliorate the pressures of their work, but was also a means of bringing the perceived 
management skill and expertise of the private sector to bear on public social problems. Perhaps 
most egregiously, the Office of Education brought in military contractors, including 
Westinghouse, to mimic the Department of Defense’s management style within public schools. 
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 When the rhetorical promise of small government emerged in the 1980’s, the patterns were 
already established and the prevalence of privatization, deregulation, and public-private 
partnerships as positive goals became familiar terrain. Seen as a counterweight to the familiar 
complaints leveraged against bureaucracy and its relative sluggish tempo of activity, public-
private partnerships were meant to automatically be more responsive and much more in tune 
with market forces. The problem of bureaucracy, it seemed, was that it was not subject to the 
kinds of competition that produced the best work. Ronald Reagan’s 1987 budget proposal 
included more proposals for privatization than any president had ever put forth including the 
federal sale of satellites, airports and power agencies.
115
 Richard Fink, then president of 
Citizens for a Sound Economy was quoted as saying, “It’s going to be the greatest effort to 
return the provision of goods and services to the private sector that we’ve seen in this 
country,”116 and although the Administration had limited success in its budget agenda, it led the 
president to create the President’s Commission on Privatization which depicted a broad and far-
reaching vision for the privatization of everything from the U.S. Postal Service to prisons to 
Medicare and low-income housing. This too made little progress, but signified the beginnings of 
an organized and expansive coalition of lobbyists, researchers and politicians focused on 
expanding privatization; piggybacking on ideas contained in both Stuart Butler’s Privatizing 
Federal Spending and Madsen Pirie’s Dismantling the State.117 Butler advocated for a complete 
reconceptualization of the relationships between special interests, lobbyists and government 
work. 
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 Conditions must be created in which the demand for government spending is diverted 
into the private sector. This is the beauty of privatization. Instead of having to say ‘no’ to 
constituencies, politicians can adopt a more palatable approach to cutting spending. 
They can reduce outlays by fostering private alternatives that are more attractive to 
voters, thereby reducing the clamor for government spending. Changing the political 
dynamics of government spending in this way is the secret of privatization.
118 
 
This wholesale reconfiguration led to a re-conceptualization of public good(s), as Robert Poole 
 
of the Reason Foundation, a libertarian think tank, stated: 
 
most local services have few attributes of true public goods. Most of them – garbage 
 
collection, park and recreation services, libraries, airports, transit, and aspects of police 
 
and fire protection – have specific, identifiable users, who are the services’ beneficiaries. 
 
Rather than an investment in public trust or collective will, the dependence on contractors 
 
represents a cynicism about engagement in public work that assumes limited motivation and 
 
short-term investment. Perhaps the most curious thing about the language of reinvention was its 
 
complete and utter ignorance of the very entrenched traditions and policies that were now being 
 
presented as characteristic of radical reinvention. In their 1992 book, Reinventing Government: 
 
How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, David Osborne and Ted 
 
Gaebler
119
 could not ignore that many of their innovative strategies had already been integrated 
 
into the public sector for years. The title of the book became a kind of motto for the 
 
Administration of Bill Clinton. Together and individually they would go on to write several 
 
books introducing strategies for individuals to reinvent government at various levels of 
 
engagement, as well as books on management style and the evils of bureaucracy. Both the 
 
catalog of Osborne and Gaebler and the policy adoption on the part of the Clinton 
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 Administration focused on not just the increased use of private contracts for the sake of 
efficiency but also argued for the “blurring” of the very lines between public and private. 
 
In many ways, the Clinton Administration represented the successful adoption of 
previous administrations’ failed policy interventions with respect to privatization, implementing 
the National Performance Review, an intergovernmental task force geared toward efficiency and 
downsizing of federal programs and spending. While the National Performance Review 
identified programs that could be eliminated, privatized or reinvented, and the results were 
widespread, the most significant shift of this period concerns ideological and rhetorical shifts; a 
wholesale acceptance and promotion of neoliberal policy; embedding competition into the 
foundation of government service provision; and development and recasting citizens as 
consumers, which individualized exchange between individual people and the government at 
large. By transforming public goods into burgeoning new private markets, government services 
shifted from the provision of necessities to markets that to some extent rely on dependency. The 
Welfare Reform Law of 1996 signified a substantive change in the ways that corporations 
interacted with the public sector by transitioning from a product development and exchange 
model, to one in which corporations were able to make decisions and shape policy; in this 
instance determining what qualified individuals for welfare assistance, how they should be 
tracked and managed and what the services consisted of. 
 
George W. Bush made privatization a more explicit part of his overall vision of the work 
of government and specifically a larger part of his platform stating, “Government should be 
market-based – we should not be afraid of competition, innovation and choice. I will open 
government to the discipline of competition.”120 Although initial efforts to privatize Social 
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 Security fizzled out due to opposition, his Administration focused on sectors of the government 
less prominent in the public eye including the Forest Service and large part of the intelligence 
community. Remarkably, this period saw rapid expansion of the use of contractors in war zones. 
As of 2007, contractors outnumbered troops in Iraq by twenty-thousand and in 2009, the 
Congressional Research Service reported that contractors made up over half of the troops in 
Afghanistan.
121
 Contractors had become such an essential part of the U.S. military that 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld included them in his definition of the Department’s 
Total Force as described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Most recently, the Barack 
Obama Administration represented a kind of push-pull when it came to the place of private 
contractors in the public sector. While thousands of jobs, specifically those in the intelligence 
and defense sector, were insourced over the past decade, there was also massive support for the 
privatization of schools through charter and voucher programs. This trajectory, that marks a re-
definition of public good and a reconceptualization of how to get there, follows the development 
of neoliberalism as an ideology in a broader sense. Neoliberalism is a comprehensive political 
and economic ideology that positions individuals as economic agents and equates efficiency and 
profitability with success and well-being.
122
 This philosophy swallows the very possibility of 
inherent governmental functions as it prioritizes corporate models of management that 
emphasize the responsibility and agency of individuals and de-emphasizes both the actual and 
potential roles of government in life. 
 
Public Records and Private Contractors 
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 As resources for public work contracts and the opportunities for private contracts grow, so 
follows public records, archival work and records management. This has presented challenges to 
practices of accountability and transparency, as regulations regarding the retention and access to 
public records may or may not apply to records held by private agencies. Additionally, private 
corporations fundamentally share and prioritize different values. Government entities do not 
necessarily have to be profitable or accountable to shareholders and private corporations do not 
necessarily have to be accountable to the public. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was 
signed into law in 1966, and its commitment to facilitating access to government information for the 
sake of accountability and transparency has met legal and logistical challenges since its signing. One 
of many unforeseen challenges was that the definition of agency records remains inadequate 
considering the growth and expansion of the privatization of government work. In recent years, even 
the work of providing access to public records has been contracted out to private companies. In 
2012, at least twenty-five agencies were outsourcing parts of the FOIA process. The arguments for 
this are familiar, the rhetorical situating of efficiency as driving force, claiming that privatization can 
lead to a reduction in backlogs and financial savings. Private companies are operating at each stage 
of the FOIA process, including correspondence with requestors and submitting recommendations for 
exactly what to redact.
123
 This activity is directly at the heart of what becomes defined as inherently 
governmental, and increasing compartmentalization of activities creates a moving target of 
inherency. CACI International Inc., represents another potential conflict of interest or point of 
departure for appropriate FOIA work. CACI provided translation services at the Abu Ghraib prison 
and is also one of the major recipients of FOIA contracts; therefore CACI could be in a situation in 
which they were 
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 reviewing documents involving their own employees. In an essay about the rise of private 
prisons and the challenges they present, legal scholar Nicole Casarez discusses the side effects of 
skirting FOIA laws within private contracts, as prison officials have a uniquely powerful 
position from which to “abuse the public trust or prisoners’ rights.”124 She even goes so far as to 
warn against the possibility of the federal government intentionally circumventing transparency 
and accountability measures outlined by FOIA. Between 1996 and 2007, FOIA defined a record 
as “any information that would be an agency records subject to the requirements of the [FOIA] 
when maintained by an agency in any format, including an electronic format.” This definition 
was amended in 2007 to include the previous definition and “any information described under 
subparagraph (A) that is maintained for an agency by an entity under Government contract, for 
the purposes of records management.
125
 While this change specifically acknowledges the need 
for a more expansive definition in reaction to new forms of government labor, it also makes for 
difficult work, since the responsibility for compiling records still falls to agencies. As records 
management and archival work has become increasingly networked and records are created in 
and accessed through multiple formats and platforms, these issues have become even more 
complex. In 2015, InfoReliance won a contract to provide Cloud Managed Services
126
 to the 
National Archives and Records Administration, entrenching commercial services within the 
heart of the work of the National Archives. NARA has been using contractors for a myriad 
services for years, but this contract represents a point of no return in terms of infrastructural 
investment. Private corporations not only do not have the same relationship to transparency and 
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 accountability expectations but in this instance, a five-year contract operates on an entirely 
different timescale than the National Archives, which focuses on the lifecycle of the record 
from its creation to its use. 
 
Regulations for Contractors 
 
While agencies retain the responsibility for keeping track of and procuring records 
produced by contractors, the contractors themselves are increasingly bearing the burden of 
implementing security controls in compliance with government standards. To aid in this there are 
two main points of reference for standards and protocols: the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The FAR system 
regulates the ways in which executive agencies
127
 of the United States federal government 
contract for services, projects and goods. The system has three phases: need recognition and 
acquisition planning; contract formation; contract administration and the details of the process 
are within the Code of Federal Regulations.
128
The explicit purpose of FAR is to provide clear 
cut, uniform standards for those soliciting government contracts. Contractors are expected to 
perform due diligence and know the details of FAR in order to comply. With the passage of the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974, the FAR was established alongside the 
authority to maintain and issue its parameters. This authority lies with the Secretary of Defense, 
the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
Administrator of General Services and all issuances must be jointly approved by the 
Administrator of Federal Procurement Policy.
129
 There is one section of the FAR that deals 
explicitly with classified information, “Subpart 4.4 – Safeguarding Classified Information Within 
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 Industry,”130 its text consisting of a series of cascading citations to other statutes, protocols, 
manuals and procedures that require layers of research for compliance officers or parties 
negotiating on behalf of contractors. Once establishing that the authority of this particular 
section of the FAR is precipitated by the signing of Executive Order 12829 in 1993 or the 
National Industrial Security Program (NISP), a program to safeguard classified information that 
is released to contractors, licensees or grantees of the United States Government was outlined. 
Executive Order 12829 amended Executive Order 10909 signed in 1961 and Executive Order 
10865. The requirements laid out in these Executive Orders are given more specific shape in the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) which is maintained and 
issued by The Secretary of Defense. In addition to NISPOM, the DOD also details protocols in 
Industrial Security Regulation
131
 and in Part 27 of the FAR which covers policy and procedures 
for safeguarding classified information in both patents and patent applications. 
 
While the FAR does outline responsibilities of contractors for all three phases of 
acquisition, there are few specifics beyond a general missive to refer to both agency specific 
protocols (if the agency being contracted with is exempt from NISP) and NISPOM as the onus is 
on the contractor to implement security measures. In addition, contractors must submit a form 
containing information about their needs and requirements with respect to clearance and 
classification authorities. Form DD 254
132
 specifies details concerning such issues as facility 
clearance and storage/safeguarding requirements as well as general contact information for 
responsible and appropriate contacts for the contractor. Facility clearance is one of the largest 
hurdles as it requires sponsorship by a government contracting activity (GCA) or another cleared 
 
 
 
130 Edwards, D. F. (2010). OCIs in Construction Contracting: Bumps in the Road Ahead. Procurement Law., 46, 4. 
131 DoD 5220.22-R  
132 DD Form 254 Retrieved July 16, 2016. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/forms/eforms/dd0254.pdf 
 
72
 agency or company, approval by the Defense Security Services, comprehensive understanding 
and implementation of both the Facility Security Clearance (FCL) Orientation Handbook and 
NISPOM, as well as registering for a Commercial and Government Entity Code (CAGE Code) 
designating a potential Facility Security Officer (FSO), clearing necessary personnel and 
disclosing foreign investment or activities. As a warning, the Checklist for New Facility 
Clearance furnished by the Defense Security Service states that alone, “Becoming familiar with 
the NISPOM will take a great deal of time and will, likewise, require a determined effort.”133 
 
The FAR takes an agnostic stance with respect to types of controlled unclassified 
information, the details of which are reserved for the DD 254 which requires both contractors 
and subcontractors to specify whether or not they will be using or dealing with Communications 
Security Information (COMSEC), which includes controlled cryptographic items (CCI), 
Restricted Data, Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI), Formerly Restricted 
Data, Intelligence Information, Special Access Information, NATO Information, Foreign 
Government Information, Limited Dissemination Information and For Official Use Only 
Information. If a contractor needs or intends to deal in anyway with classified information, this 
form also requires a granular explanation of what (producing, receiving, storing, exchanging) the 
facility or contractor will be doing with that information, and exactly which security protocols 
have been put into place and whether or not their operations are limited spatially to the United 
States and its territories. Mutual exchange of information with the Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC) must also be disclosed and outlined, and the use of the Defense 
Courier Service (DCS) must be justified and established. This is also the forum for a contractor 
to specify their need for TEMPEST as defense or not, requiring both a NATO certification and 
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 NSA specifications for both spying and protection against spying on information systems 
through radio, electrical signals, vibrations and/or sounds. 
There is more known about protection standards (which are also referred to as emissions 
security (EMSEC) than the NSA’s spying techniques for fairly obvious reasons, and their general 
methods include shielding, filtering, masking and strategic distance between walls and devices. 
In their outline of security levels, NATO defines each of the three levels through a measure of 
proximity.
134 
 
Additional guidance and requirements for contractors are outlined in DFARS. Sections 
204.470 parts 1-4 refer to guidance on classified information for contractors, mostly by referring 
to other documentation and protocols. Significantly, part 2 outlines a “National Security 
Exclusion,” which allows for the circumvention of inspection protocols detailed in FARS “for 
activities, or locations, and associated locations or information with direct national security 
significance.”135 This section specifically interacts with the U.S. International Atomic Energy 
Agency Additional Protocol (U.S. IAEA AP), and exempts work of national security concern 
from what is otherwise considered a required disclosure of nuclear activities. The determination 
of whether or not something meets the standards for reporting or the standards for the National 
Security Exclusion is up to a DoD Program Manager whose determination is to be guided by yet 
another DoD Instruction, 2060.03, which itself implements policy established in DoD Directive 
2060.1 which represents agreed upon exclusions to agreements reached by the United States and 
the IAEA. 
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 All government contractors that are granted a security clearance for access to classified 
information are required by Executive Order 13292 to sign a Classified Information 
Nondisclosure Agreement, or Standard Form 312, as are government employees. The form, 
issued by the Information Security Oversight Office of NARA, replaced earlier versions of the 
form such as SF 189 or SF 189-A. Everyone who signs has also undergone a background check, 
a personnel security investigation. This form operates as a contract between the signer and the 
U.S. Government in which the signer agrees to not disclose information to any unauthorized 
person, and provides the signer not only with an outlining of their responsibilities but also with a 
description of the consequences should they disclose information. It allows the federal 
government to pursue civil charges against those who disclose information in addition to any 
criminal charges. The form derives its authority not just from Executive Order 13292 but also 
from U.S.C. 18 § 793, 641, 794, 952; U.S.C. 50 § 783; U.S.C. 5 § 2302, 7211; U.S.C. 10 § 
1034; U.S.C. 6 § 601-606 to name a few. A key element of this form too, is providing the limits 
of liability, stating that the signer is only liable if their actions result in unauthorized disclosure, 
safeguarding against liability in a situation in which classified information is classified 
retroactively or unbeknownst to the signer. At first glance, this document might seem a curious 
one, as criminal liability is already ensconced within statute. However, this document makes 
possible civil liability and opens the door for citizen lawsuits when no criminal charges have 
been filed or government action is seen to be inadequate. One side effect of this nondisclosure 
agreement manifests in customary prepublication reviews for federal employees or contractors, 
under which they can submit publishable work for review to ensure compliance. 
 
Cell Phones in the DoD 
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 Although cellular telephone service was introduced in the United States in 1983, the 
Department of Defense introduced its first piece of definitive domestic policy regarding the use 
of cellular telephones within Department facilities on June 12, 2002 in two documents, Policy for 
Use of Cellular Telephones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) Within Department 
Buildings
136
 and 5 FAM 526.2 Restrictions for Cellular Telephones Usage
137
. In these 
documents the primary security requirements outlined are that cellular telephones (both personal 
and those issued by the United States government) must be turned off in areas where classified 
information is discussed or processed and that they must not (in any state) be placed within ten 
feet of classified processing equipment. Additionally, phones that possess either or both still 
picture and video capturing functionality are not allowed inside of Department of State domestic 
facilities. This guidance, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence Directive 
(DCID) 6/9, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities 
 
(SCIFs) and the Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum (ICPM) 2005-700-1 attachment 1 
(Annex D) and attachment 2 and 12 FAH-6 H-531.1 Cellular Telephone Standards, outlined the 
guiding protocols governing government agencies both in domestic and non-domestic contexts 
for the better part of a decade. 
In a 2007 review conducted by the Office of the Inspector General, it was found that zero out 
of ten bureaus/offices examined could be considered “fully compliant” with all prevailing protocols, 
three out of ten were found to be “partially compliant,” and seven were found to be 
“noncompliant.”
138
 The most common reasons cited for this state of affairs were a general lack of 
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 awareness of protocols and compliance standards as well as a persistent and overriding need to 
use cellular telephones in day to day and real-time working contexts, including areas in which 
classified information was accessed and processed. In addition, interviewees expressed the need 
to use cellular telephones for emergency and/or familial reasons. Levels of training and security 
briefing vary from bureau to bureau, employee to employee, and the general introductory 
security briefing does not include cellular telephone usage in its training on the processing, 
handling, and storage of classified information. In the current Department of Defense manual 
concerning the marking, processing and handling of classified information, there are scant 
suggestions or missives of guidance concerning the use of telephones with respect to classified 
information and communication. 
 
 
c. Telephone. Only approved secure telephones, including cell phones and phones 
integral to personal electronic devices, authorized by the Director, NSA pursuant to 
paragraph 3.b of this enclosure, may [be used] for telephone transmission of classified 
information. Users must ensure the secure connection is at the appropriate level of 
classification for the information being discussed. 
139 
 
 
11. USE OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS. In accordance with the requirements of 
Enclosure 4, classified information shall be transmitted only over secure communications 
circuits approved for transmission of information at the specified level of classification. 
This includes communication by telephone, facsimile, e-mail and other forms of 
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 electronic communications (e.g., messages, websites). See Volume 2 of this Manual for 
guidance on required markings. 
140 
 
 
j. Security Incidents Involving Improper Transfer of Classified Information. Any 
activity that receives classified information that has been improperly handled, addressed, 
packaged, transmitted, or transported shall make a determination as to whether the 
information has been subjected to compromise. If the activity determines that the 
classified information has been subjected to compromise, the receiving activity shall 
immediately notify the sending activity, which shall be responsible for initiating an 
inquiry or investigation, as appropriate. The receiving activity shall share information 
generated regarding the incident with the sending activity. The sending activity is 
responsible for required notifications (e.g., to the OCA). Classified information shall be 
considered as having been subjected to compromise if it has been handled through 
foreign postal systems, its shipping container has been damaged to an extent that the 
contents are exposed, or it has been transmitted (e.g., telephone, facsimile, message, e-
mail, computer or data links) over communications circuits that are not appropriate for 
transmission or classified information. If the receiving activity determines that classified 
information was not in fact compromised, but was nevertheless improperly prepared or 
transferred, the receiving activity shall report the discrepancy to the sending activity. 
141 
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 (2) FUOU
142
 information and material may be transmitted via first class mail, parcel 
post, or, for bulk shipments, via fourth class mail. Whenever practical, electronic 
transmission of FOUO information (e.g., data, website, or e-mail) shall be …approved 
secure communications systems or systems utilizing other protective measures such as 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or transport layer security (E.g., https). Use of wireless 
telephones should be avoided when other options are available. Transmission of FOUO 
by facsimile machine (fax) is permitted; the sender is responsible for determining that 
appropriate protection will be available at the receiving location prior to transmission 
(e.g., machine attended by a person authorized to receive (FOUO; fax located in a 
controlled government environment). 
 
 
The guidance espoused here then is tied to device rather than practice, limited to using approved 
devices in approved spaces. As late as 2012, when these manuals were produced, there were no 
cellular telephones approved for use on secure, classified networks or for the storage or 
communication of classified information. BlackBerry, long the company that dominated the 
market for government contracts due to the level of security of their devices, had several devices 
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 approved for communicating on unclassified government networks. In 2013, BlackBerry 10 
devices were awarded FIPS 140-2 certification for low-level secure transmissions. FIPS or the 
Federal Information Processing Standard is issued by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) and publication 140-2 is a United States government computer security 
standard used to assess and approve cryptographic modules. This standard has not been updated 
since 2002 and efforts to revise or retool the standard were attempted and stalled out in 2013. 
The failed publication of FIPS 140-3 was mired in debates about which aspects of security to 
prioritize and how to shape future research and attitudes toward awarding certification.
143
 Also 
in August of 2013, BlackBerry 10 phones, including the Z10 and Q10 alongside BlackBerry 
Enterprise Service 10, were given the “authority to operate” on U.S. Department of Defense 
networks, making it the first suite of cellular phones and services to receive this certification. As 
a result, the Defense Information System Agency (DISA) began developing its infrastructure and 
capabilities to support an influx of BlackBerry smartphones used by government personnel and 
contractors. 
 
In 2013, NIST published the Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations (NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4).
144
 This almost 500 
page guide fulfills NIST’s statutory responsibilities as outlined by the Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) in developing minimum requirements for federal 
information systems which are not meant to superseded or contradict other federal requirements 
or statutes. Because NIST’s function is meant to be necessarily broad, the advice given in this 
guide ranges from natural disasters to technical failure to human error to hostile attacks, instead 
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 of a guide narrowly catered to a particular department defined by their purview. Of course, 
this guide is not meant to operate alone, instead requiring those in charge of or interacting with 
information systems to first establish the level or security of their information system by 
consulting FIPS Publication 199, the Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 
Information and Information Systems, and then the information system impact level from that 
security category as outlined in FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for 
Federal Information and Information Systems, and then and only then can the security 
requirements suggested by NIST SP 800-53 be implemented. 
The Department of Defense and The State Department use one of three networks to 
circulate information, the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS). These networks grew out of the Defense Data Network in the 
1990s. As ARPANET transitioned from a government research project to an operational entity, 
the Defense Communication Agency ((DCA) which is now DISA) took over the essential 
infrastructure. The DDN functioned as a private internet providing connectivity across military 
bases and operational centers. Over time, DDN branched into four subnetworks which 
represented four separate military networks with differentiated security levels: Military Network 
(MILNET) for unclassified information; Defense Secure Network One (DSNET 1) for Secret 
information; Defense Secure Network Two (DSNET 2) for Top Secret information; and Defense 
Secure Network Three (DSNET 3) for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. This 
division between networks defined by security level was maintained with the transition to the 
current network configurations. 
 
SME-PED to DMCC-S 
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 While the United States government has never been in the business of developing 
proprietary or publicly funded cell phone capabilities, it has certainly worked alongside and co-
developed specific software and standards; and the impact of government needs and expectations 
cannot be underestimated in how it shapes and responds to markets. Mobile devices are an 
extremely vulnerable element of classified information infrastructure, and their rapidly 
increasing ubiquity outside of government contexts has presented significant challenges to 
ongoing security. The Secure Mobile Environment – Portable Electronic Device (SME_PED) 
program attempted to provide U.S. military personnel with a device that resembled the features 
and functionality of commercially available smartphone technology while simultaneously 
enabling interaction with SIPRNET at the secret level. As of 2011 the core elements of a SME-
PED phone would involve four electronics boards at relative trust levels: a trusted crypto 
module, the semi-trusted black and red compute modules and an untrusted radio frequency (RF) 
module. The RF module would be easily removed and replaced allowing the device to operate 
on either the Global System for Mobiles (GSM) or as a Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA). In addition to cryptography, the crypto board crucially operates along the lines of a 
keyboard, video, and mouse (KVM) switch, enabling display sharing across multiple machines 
and allowing users to see what is happening on other machines. The devices also create a 
“trusted path,” keeping the user informed of all security measures currently operating on any 
side of a networked interaction. SME-PED phones also support Common Access Cards (CAC), 
the standard form of identification for active duty uniformed service personnel, as well as 
Department of Defense civilian employees and a large number of contractors. This feature is an 
additional security measure, as CAC cards already act as crypto plugin providers for unclassified 
but sensitive email systems. The phones must also meet defense standards (MIL-SPEC) for 
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 environmental factors including heat and water, ensuring that these devices are more resilient 
than commercially available models. Instead of interacting with the security features within the 
Windows Mobile operating system, SME-PED devices are designed to rely on separate hardware 
in order to simplify security analysis. This also ensures that any attacks or external issues with 
the devices are contained to one compute module, representing an effective air gap between the 
levels of security within the phone. SME-PED phones require users to enter a personal 
identification number (PIN) in order to access the device. If the PIN is incorrect a certain number 
of times, the internal storage of the device will be zeroized, erasing stored data in addition to 
security protocols and parameters on the device. Although data is encrypted as it is stored and 
accessed, zeroization is authorized under a number of circumstances and remote zeroization is a 
feature of Research in Motion (RIM) Blackberry devices. Logistical and security challenges 
remained, as the phones remained extremely expensive, heavy and incompatible with convenient 
commercial products, and they entirely lacked the ability to crosswalk between civilian and 
military contexts. Security wise, the phones remain vulnerable when on “black” mode, as 
external agents can capture audio from the microphone and key presses from the keyboard, and 
CAC cards have allowed for the generation of digital signatures, should the software be 
compromised. These problems would be solved if the user only used the phone in its most secure 
“red” mode, but this is an unrealistic expectation given the reliance on the less secure mode for 
easy day-to-day communication. 
 
Margaret Salter, a Technical Director in the Information Assurance Directorate stated in 
2012 that the NSA was in the process of prioritizing commercial solutions. Of the development of 
the NSA’s Enterprise Mobility Architecture she said, “The plan was to buy commercial 
components, layer them together and get a secure solution. It uses solely commercial 
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 infrastructure to protect classified data.”145 Fishbowl, a mobile phone architecture providing 
secure voice over internet protocol (VOIP) capability, was unveiled the same year. It uses a 
modified Android operating system and both Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) and 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) encryption protocols, which were developed through strong 
and sustained partnerships between corporate and government entities and funding streams. In 
October of 2012, the DoD announced that they were in search of industry partners to develop a 
secure communications system for just under 200,000 devices including iPhones, iPads and 
Android systems. Up to this point, Blackberry was the only commercial entity producing devices 
with approval to run secured email access to the Pentagon’s unclassified networks. 
 
In 2013, General Dynamics unveiled a software platform called GD Protected, which 
was designed to secure commercially available Android smartphone devices to the level at which 
they can handle classified information and communication. This represents a shift for General 
Dynamics in that GD Protected focuses on the operating system rather than just the hardware, 
creating a system in which a single processor core can run a dual operating system, either secure 
or unsecure. GD Protected is available for both the LG Optimus 3D Max and the Samsung 
Galaxy S IV, piggybacking onto the hardware security provided by the design of each device. 
Adding in two independent layers of encryption at both the voice over internet protocol (VOIP) 
and the virtual private network (VPN) level, GD Protected requires data to travel through servers 
at the NSA to be verified, logged and re-encrypted before going on to the carrier’s network and 
its final destination. For the Samsung device, GD Protected comes as an addition to the KNOX 
platform co-developed by Samsung and General dynamics. KNOX has extensive security 
features geared towards protecting stored, sent and received data, and creating isolated areas 
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 within the phone for secure communications. Each element of KNOX is designed as compliant 
with federal standards for security, a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) approved 
VPN client. On May 3, 2013 the DoD announced that devices equipped with the Samsung 
KNOX platform were approved for use on DoD networks in addition to Blackberry 10 phones, 
the Playbook tablet and the Blackberry Enterprise Service 10. At that point, these devices were 
still only approved to access unclassified networks, and the only mobile devices approved for 
classified networks were the GD Sectera Edge and a test version of the Motorola Razr Maxx. As 
of 2014, Samsung Galaxy Note 4 and Galaxy S 5 became the first commercially available 
smartphones to be approved for having access to classified networks. 
In 2015 GD Protected moved out of the pilot stage and what is now known as the Defense 
Mobile Classified Capability – Secret (DMCC-S) officially replaced SME-PED. This represents a 
complete move toward commercial smartphones with enhanced security features. DMCC-S 
phones, in addition to containing the security features outlined previously, are also distinctive 
because they have camera, GPS and Bluetooth entirely disabled. Signifying a move toward what 
the DoD called their Joint Information Environment plan, which would enable soldiers and 
government officials to access classified information “from any device, anytime, anywhere.”
146
 
This goal requires economies of scale in order to provide devices to a reasonable number of people 
who need access to classified communications networks. In addition to the DOD the NSA has 
prioritized partnerships with commercial entities and corporations with the formation of the 
Commercial Solutions for Classified Program (CSfC). CSfC positions commercial products at the 
heart of its plan, prioritizing cost effectiveness and emphasizing 
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 “market-place competition.”147 Although General Dynamics has been at the forefront of 
developing tools for classified communication, Boeing has also thrown its hat into the ring with 
the development of Boeing Black, which signals a new test-phase for devices that can operate in 
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 Top Secret environments. 
148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: DMCC-S Fact Sheet from Defense Information Systems Agency 
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 “Smartphones” at the Top 
 
Before President Obama took office in 2009, he made a seemingly impossible request at the 
time, to keep his smartphone. In many ways, his identity as a candidate was tied to his facility with 
technology, his ease with communication and his connection to a seemingly more tech-savvy 
generation. Judith Butler suggested that this was a part of a broader strategy of disidentification with 
the previous administration.
149
 As president-elect he was quoted as saying, “I’m clinging to my 
BlackBerry. They’re going to pry it from my hands.”
150
 The insistence on keeping his device led to 
the creation of an NSA lab in which dozens of people reportedly worked on making the BlackBerry 
secure. NSA Technical Director Richard George framed the issue in familiar light, casting 
functionality as vulnerability.
151
 The more a phone can do, the more vulnerable it is. In addition, 
any phone with which this BlackBerry communicated needed to have the same protections in place. 
Obama kept a highly-secured version of his BlackBerry under specific conditions. Not only did 
everyone with access to the accounts tied to the phone have to attend a briefing from the White 
House counsel, but also the messages themselves were designed to prevent forwarding.
152
 In many 
ways, high government officials are expected to work in a state of deprivation when it comes to 
basic technologies and tools for communication and interaction, and it is the case that although 
Obama was constantly photographed with his BlackBerry by White House photographer Pete 
Souza, those photos always showed him in 
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 motion, in transit, in public space. In contrast, photos of him in the field or performing official 
business typically showed him using direct, wired lines of communication. The list of NSA 
approved devices in 2009 was a short one, and Obama’s exception was truly singular. Then 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sought a similar exception to keep her smart phone and was 
denied,
153
 and was offered use of the Sectera Edge instead (the L3 Communications Guardian 
was still in development). Technically, the Sectera Edge could not be labelled a smartphone and 
instead had more in common with the personal digital assistants (PDAs) that dominated the early 
2000s. The Edge required a host of supporting products to be set up and synchronized with a 
desktop, and required separate specific accessories for both its secure and non-secure modes. For 
$4,750.00, the government could purchase the Executive Kit which included: Type 1 Sectéra® 
Edge™(GSM or CDMA) device plus: Executive Carry Case, Leather Holster Travel Charger, 
Red/Black USB Cables, Vehicle Charger, Earbud, Stylus 10-pack, microSD Card with User 
Manual, Spare Battery, Privacy Shield 4-pack, Antivirus Software, Apriva® Email Client and 
Perpetual Rights fee and Office Suite for Windows® CE. In addition, the government would 
also have to purchase a separate Apriva email server, annual licenses for each mail client, server 
support, AntiVirus maintenance, different phone modules for US and international use, and 
training. A heavily redacted email exchange from February 17, 2009 marked SECRET illustrates 
the ongoing back and forth over Clinton’s use of her BlackBerry, as she requested permission to 
use it in the field inside of the SCIF. The response from the NSA further confused the point, 
“Sometimes the distinction between what can be done and what is, or is not, recommended to be 
done differently; this is one of those instances.”154 
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Figure 4: General Dynamics Sectera Edge - Discontinued 
 
Classified Records 
 
Apart from the security concerns and constraints that lead to use of devices with such 
extraordinarily limited communications capability, compared to commercially available 
smartphones, they present an especially difficult proposition for records management and 
archival work. These infrastructural arrangements mean that records are not merely the result 
of transactional work but also that they are produced within a blend of proprietary formats. As 
Amelia Acker explored in her dissertation work on the history of the SMS and its impact on 
archiving text messages, while the legal infrastructure is in place to demand recordkeeping of 
electronic communications, the technical infrastructure is not in place to follow through with 
those demands.
155 
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 These complications force us to reconsider what exactly we mean by record in this 
 
context? As we look towards crafting solutions that leverage expertise across security experts, 
 
archivists, records managers and legislators, we must determine what, if anything, we are trying 
 
to capture first and foremost. Definitions of ‘record’ necessarily proliferate throughout the 
 
multiple contexts in which records are of interest. In this particular case, the definition of record 
 
used by legislators is meant as declaration of commitment to knowledge sharing with the public 
 
and a directive for the work of archivists and records managers. This dual function makes the 
 
definition necessarily broad and diffuse. The definition of record from the Federal Records Act 
 
is: 
 
Records include all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine-readable materials, or other 
documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by 
an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the 
transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency 
or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, 
procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the 
informational value of the data in them (44 U.S.C. 3301). 
 
A few terms in this definition jump out as being especially useful in ascertaininghow the 
 
government understands its own relationship to records, record-keeping and archives, namely: 
 
evidence and informational value. The National Archives and Records Administration defines 
 
evidential value as “the value of records or papers as documentation of the operations and 
 
activities of the records-creating organization, institution, or individual,”
156
 and there are almost 
 
14,000 mentions of the word evidence in the Federal Code of Regulations that range in their 
 
level of specificity with relation to their institutional or juridical context. Although neither of 
 
these definitions provide us with an understanding of how something comes to be understood as 
 
evidence, within a legal context, authenticity is one of the primary requirements for determining 
 
 
 
156
 Evidential Value [def. 1] National Archives and Records Administration. Glossary of Terms. Retrieved 
October 12, 2016. https://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/archives-resources/terminology.html 
 
91 
 the admissibility of evidence. Before any record can be admitted into evidence, it must be 
authenticated by analyzing the context of record creation that is determined to be reliable, 
testimony or expert judgment (Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901). The state of authentication 
in terms of the legal context is in flux as the complexity of technological systems, the 
distributed nature of documentary forms and the relative technological expertise of involved 
parties leave traditional methods of assessment and determination wanting. Legal standards and 
expertise simply cannot keep up with technological change, and a system based on precedent is 
hard pressed to develop legal standards for new systems and their forms and formats. 
157 
 
In his exploration of modernity’s specific evidential paradigm, Carlo Ginzburg develops 
an argument founded on Jeremy Bentham’s proclamation that evidence is fundamentally 
relational.
158
 Ginzburg is explicit about the temporal relationship expressed by evidence; it 
remains a trace of what was once a contemporaneous action. He identifies this as venatic 
deduction, establishing part to whole, with an indexical quality relating past to present. By 
emphasizing the relationship between the form of evidence and action, Ginzburg gives us a clue 
to consider records as evidence, as their very form does not just point us to an activity but is also 
in some ways, a continuation of that activity. 
 
While it cannot possibly stand entirely outside of the sphere of influence of modern 
evidential paradigms, archival studies has necessarily developed its own unique relationship to 
evidence and evidential value. Archival work has grown alongside and out of governmental and 
juridical contexts, but it also is concerned fundamentally with the management of and access to 
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 and use of records. So rather than understanding evidence as relational through indexicality, 
what evidence is to whom and when it is has become a central subject of investigation and 
debate throughout the last century. In his A Manual of Archival Administration
159
, Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson expressed a narrow and pointed definition of archival materials, defining them in the 
strictest terms of governmental business. Jenkinson equates the status of records as evidence with 
their production in the daily business and transactions of governmental work, their creation then 
somehow outside of bias or contingency. T.R. Schellenberg later distinguished and separated 
informational value and evidential value
160
 but remained focused on governmental and 
administrative records. NARA defines informational value as “the value of records or papers for 
information they contain on persons, places, subjects, and things other than the operation of the 
organization that created them or the activities of the individual or family that created them.”161 
 
Evidential value derives from evidence of the organization and functioning of a particular 
governmental agency or office, whereas informational value derives from evidence of who and 
what that agency dealt with. This understanding of records containing dual values, both 
evidential and informational, is clearly embedded in our legislative language, identifying records 
as containing evidence of the body producing records, as well as the people and issues involved 
in the production and circulation of that record. 
 
Evidence becomes through “processes of social negotiation after the fact.”
162
 In order to 
facilitate these negotiations, however, preserving context and authenticity have been core tasks of 
archival work, maintaining records that are unchanged from their accession to their use. This 
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 context and authenticity does not have any bearing on whether the contents of the record are true 
or reliable. Within this infrastructural context, we are confronted by layers of challenges 
precipitated by media specificity. Previous attempts at codifying electronic recordkeeping have 
struggled with how to handle media specificity even as they tried to grapple with the increasing 
necessity of cross institutional partnerships.
163
 It is clear from the description of the 
infrastructural landscape within this chapter, that even just considering the definition contained 
in the Federal Records Act requires a massive overhaul in practice to contend with the 
recognition and preservation of informational and evidential value as it would require retaining 
the record in its dynamic and overlapping infrastructural arrangement; including everything 
from proprietary corporate software to multiple security layers across communicating devices. 
 
Although much more radical ideas directly challenging and destabilizing these traditional 
concepts of the record and evidence have been circulating within Archival Studies for decades, 
their reach into governmental arenas and/or implementation have yet to materialize. As records 
become increasingly inseparable from networked technologies and a multiplicity of platforms 
and infrastructural arrangements, it is worth considering what the techniques and concepts of 
records continuum thinking might contribute to the work of governmental records. The 
continuum approach eschews the linearity of the life-cycle model that moves records through 
from creation to disposition to preservation, conceptualizing each of these as a separate stage 
that clearly precedes and follows the other.
164
 By contrast, the continuum model focuses on the 
movement and activity of records as well as their imbricated evidentialities. Instead of 
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 understanding records in terms of stages, continuum theory places records within four 
dimensions: records creation, capture, organization of recordkeeping processes and 
pluralization.
165
 The Records Continuum Model (RCM) has produced a multitude of 
frameworks situating records as dynamic entities within a range of ideas concerning the relative 
importance of material constraints. Frank Upward has asserted that records no longer should be 
considered physical entities but instead as logical entities.
166
 Following this, the physical and 
material context of record creation, management and flow ceases to be tied to its authenticity. 
While RCM and noncustodial models of records and archival management proliferate, legal 
constraints continue to insist on the relationship between physical custody and authenticity. This 
leaves archivists and records managers in a double bind; challenged by shifting conceptual 
paradigms that understand records in a multiplicity of contexts and recognizing the limitations of 
juridical-evidentiary frameworks for collective memory, human rights work or social justice 
while still having to create and maintain systems that facilitate transparency and authenticity 
according to traditional understandings. Infrastructural thinking about records shifts the lens 
from the individual record to the system of its production and maintenance, facilitating a bridge 
between these shifting paradigms. Rather than thinking of records as fixed or in flux, we can 
understand them as systemic, allowing us to both capture and value not just their movement 
through space-time but also their capacity for a variety of meaning-making. 
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 Chapter Three: …but her emails or Spectacle and Rupture in Classified Information 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Introduction 
 
The ranks of officials in this judiciary system mounted endlessly, so that not even the 
initiated could survey the hierarchy as a whole. And the proceedings of the Courts were 
generally kept secret from subordinate officials, consequently they could hardly ever 
quite follow in their further progress the cases on which they had worked; any particular 
case thus appeared in their circle of jurisdiction often without their knowing whence it 
came, and passed from it they knew not whither. Thus the knowledge derived from a 
study of the various single stages of the case, the final verdict and the reasons for that 
verdict lay beyond the reach of these officials. 
167 
 
 
The crime of Joseph K. in Kafka’s The Trial is a moving target, and his quest to 
 
understand exactly what it is he is on trial for represents the impossibility of the individual’s 
 
confrontation of the wholly bureaucratic. He cannot see the system in its entirety and each layer 
 
pushes him into deeper confusion and frustration, a never-ending chain of referents. Citizens are 
 
simultaneously subject to the law and remote from it, shaped by constraints but unable to discern 
 
the boundaries, made all the more extreme by bureaucracy’s most defining characteristic, 
 
tedium. The view of bureaucracy in The Trial is totalizing, opaque and never-ending. These 
 
features contribute to what Max Weber conceptualizes as the most powerful aspect of 
 
bureaucratic organization, inertia. A “settled orientation”168 that provides a serene backdrop 
 
against which change and transition can occur is both a precursor and an effect of the 
 
organization and management of administrative artifacts. In considering classified information as 
 
bureaucratic infrastructure, this settled orientation becomes troubled. 
 
In her essay “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” Susan Leigh Star defines the 
 
generalizable characteristics of infrastructure, one of which is that it is “visible upon 
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 breakdown.” Star and others have pointed to breakdown as a unique moment of visibility for 
infrastructure as a relational phenomenon, to see exactly the junctures at which standards, 
technology and the stuff of infrastructure fails to fulfill its function. Within the context of 
classified information, this breakdown is typically the rule rather than the exception, classified 
information infrastructure is almost spectacularly flawed, and the majority of experience that lay 
people have with classified information is through perpetual breakdown, or what I would like to 
refer to as rupture. I choose rupture in this instance because it has a certain suddenness to it, 
rather than the sense of a gradual wearing away. Classified information infrastructure does not 
breakdown from overuse or from gradual erosion or neglect, although its misuse and abuse might 
be routine, its breakdown is punctuated instead of singular. This rupture comes in myriad forms: 
leaking, hacking, misuse, overuse, design flaw, legal contradiction and theft, to name a few. 
Hacking has become so commonplace that in 2014 James Comey, then Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), characterized American corporations as belonging to one of two 
types, those who have been hacked by the Chinese and those who do not yet know they have 
been hacked by the Chinese.
169
 More than once sensitive, redacted documents were quickly 
uncovered due to the misuse of an Adobe redaction tool, someone had to simply copy and paste 
text into a Word document to reveal the redacted information. Technologies approved for use 
with classified information are often outdated, poorly coordinated or inconvenient, failing to 
adequately deal with the complexity of networked records. The last decade has seen some high-
profile leaks of classified information including those of Chelsea Manning and Edward 
Snowden, both of whom characterized their actions as essential checks against what they have 
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 alternately described as an ever-growing and destructive secrecy state.
170
 In the first few months 
of 2017, leaks from within the White House, the Intelligence Community and the State 
Department have been relatively consistent, exposing the somewhat routine use of leaks as both 
coordinated and uncoordinated forms of communication. Alternately, one element of rupture 
within the context of classified information infrastructure that is less publicly discussed is the 
contradiction contained within rules and regulations themselves. Hilary Clinton’s use of a private 
email server throughout her tenure as Secretary of State serves as an ideal case study for the 
ways in which these possibilities for rupture coalesce, and how these ruptures transform into 
competing rhetorics, evolve into controversy and are framed as spectacle within classified 
information infrastructure. 
 
Mapping a Controversy 
 
Controversy mapping is a methodological and pedagogical tool stemming from concepts 
developed by Bruno Latour in Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network 
Theory.
171
 While it relies on visualizing the competing constituencies and narratives across 
disciplines and professional circles, I adapt controversy mapping here without visualization in 
order to describe the complexity and interconnectedness of networks of information, 
technologies, policies and political entities. Much like infrastructural inversion, controversy 
mapping relies on switching figure and ground in order to enable focusing on particular layers as 
a part of the whole. Latour’s four recommendations provide an entryway into processing the 
complexity of controversies. He begins by positing that one should attempt to avoid simplifying 
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 the individual propositions that enter into the discussion, thus capturing perplexity. Secondly, he 
maintains that in order to accurately and completely portray controversy, including the largest 
number of perspectives possible is ideal. Thirdly, when taking new propositions into account, 
you should compare and contrast pre-existing propositions in order to identify commonalities. 
Fourthly, once propositions are taken into consideration, they must be considered legitimate 
going forward. There are some obvious drawbacks and limitations to these four 
recommendations, least of which begins with his lack of definitional work on terms such as 
legitimate and proposition. However, what we can take from them is the importance of due 
diligence to the representation of a multiplicity of vantage points and although he falls short of 
identifying why, legitimacy of perspective is at the core of controversy. In analyzing the Clinton 
email server scandal, each of the constituencies is defined by their relationship to legitimacy, 
including the classified system at large, its justifications, the technologies in use, the 
investigatory body assessing the aftermath, and the media and multiple publics. Extending this 
Latourian framework with the aid of Yochai Benkler’s concept of the “networked public sphere,” 
allows us to think of the grounds for the development and circulation of a controversy as media 
ecology that encompasses social media, traditional media outlets, non-professional news outlets 
and, in this case, the possibility of external state intervention.
172 
 
Records Management in the State Department 
 
“Slower than molasses running uphill in winter.” – Roy Wood Jr. 
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 An issue at the heart of the Clinton controversy that is highly misunderstood by those 
outside of archival and record-keeping professional communities is that of records management. 
One cannot begin to discuss the potential impediments and/or loopholes involved in managing 
classified information contained in emails without understanding the foundational challenges in 
email management at the federal level. In the eyes of the law and in the daily practices of the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), what is a record, which records should 
be kept and how should those records come to NARA? The Archivist of the United States 
determines which federal records warrant permanent preservation, which records should be 
transferred to NARA and which should be made available for public access. This power, derived 
from The Federal Records Act in conjunction with 44 U.S.C. Chapters 21 and 29, extends to the 
retention and disposition of federal records. NARA estimates that less than five percent of 
records produced and managed by the federal government should be considered possessing 
permanent archival value and thus require custodial transfer to NARA from individual agencies. 
All federal records are required to be kept for a period of time, those not thought to have 
permanent value may be destroyed after they are no longer necessary for the immediate needs of 
the agency, and when their use for public or legal accountability has expired. Email has been a 
challenge for federal agencies and by extension for NARA as well. The legacy records 
management practices and protocols entrenched within daily agency work placed the 
responsibility of email records management on each individual end-user, including the decision 
to determine whether or not the email would be considered a record or non-record as well as 
whether it required retention based on the content of each individual email. Over time agencies 
adopted ad hoc “print-and-file” policies, leaving the user to print out all electronic records, not 
just email, for official filing. Bizarrely, this printed copy was then considered the official 
 
 
 
100
 recordkeeping version, the “record copy.” Print-and-file persisted as the cost of implementing a new 
recordkeeping system prevented many agencies from doing so, leading to concerns over the results 
of ad hoc and mixed recordkeeping practices across agencies such as the potential loss of 
permanently valuable email. Printed emails also do not contain information crucial to determining 
the document’s authenticity including metadata. In addition, the sheer volume and speed at which 
email communication is produced within and across agencies made print-and-file untenable. Despite 
the passage of legislation by Congress in 2007 requiring email records to be managed electronically, 
instances of mismanagement have continued to plague the federal records management landscape. 
As so often is the case, legislation and mandates does not always come with funding attached, 
particularly when it comes to NARA. In 2014 alone, three separate incidents characterized the stakes 
of email records management. Lois Lerner, the former head of the tax-exempt status department of 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) became central to an investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding the application of added scrutiny regarding the tax-exempt status of Tea-party affiliated 
groups. Although roughly 67,000 emails with Lerner as the sender or the receiver were produced, 
two years-worth of email had purportedly disappeared. The details of how the IRS managed their 
email became the subject of both critique and skepticism. The IRS backed up data on its email 
server, which runs Microsoft Outlook, at the end of each day. These backups were then kept on 
digital tape for six months. Additionally, the IRS maintained a policy that kept employee email 
storage space on the email server at 500 megabytes. Since emails considered official records cannot 
be deleted, IRS employees saved official records locally and determined whether or not email rose to 
the standard of “appropriate for preservation as evidence of the government’s function or activities, 
or valuable because of 
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 the information they contain.”173 To make matters more complex, Lerner’s computer crashed in 
2011, right during the period of contention. Although she contacted technical support to assist 
her in recovering data from her hard drive, it was impossible and policies did not require 
individual machines be backed up.
174
 In August of 2014, records management official Kathleen 
Cantwell at the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency in charge of the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, informed the National Archives of a breach in 
records management policy. A letter stated that some of Marilyn Tavenner’s emails, a CMS 
administrator, had been deleted. Gina McCarthy, an administrator at the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), was also prompted to inform Congress that the agency was incapable 
of accessing a number of emails belonging to a scientist working on a mining project 
assessment that had become the center of some controversy. 
 
Throughout the last decade, NARA has consistently revised and published regulations 
and guides for electronic records and email management. In 2010 NARA put together the Email 
Management 2.0 working group wherein the Capstone Approach was researched and put forth as 
guidance across agencies. This, in conjunction with an Email Management webpage
175
 and the 
Records Management Toolkit,
176
 aimed at an audience of records managers and information 
officers within agencies rather than on individual users or federal employees. In tandem with 
President Barack Obama’s signing of the Presidential Memorandum on Managing Government 
Records in 2011 and the issuance of Managing Government Records Directive (M-12-18) by the 
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 Office of Management and Budget and NARA, NARA published bulletin 2013-02, Guidance on 
a New approach to Managing Email Records. This bulletin advocated for the implementation of 
the Capstone Approach which attaches the determination of final disposition to the role of the 
sender/receiver rather than the content of the email, replacing email by email review and 
consideration by individuals, and categorizing entire email accounts as permanent or not. The 
bulletin, however, stands as a suggestion rather than a mandate, and further encourages the use of 
automated solutions to block capture based on specific email accounts and duplicates. It also 
suggests a radical shift in disposition authorities. In this bulletin, NARA acknowledges that 
many problems stem from individual users lacking awareness regarding specific disposition 
authorities. Instead of asking individual users to determine and mark emails according to content 
and disposition authority, the Capstone Approach allows agencies to propose a unique 
disposition schedule that considers email as its own record series rather than individual records 
within other series. NARA also developed a General Records Schedule (GRS) in an attempt to 
minimize the individualized records schedules proposed by individual agencies. Previously, 
these individual records schedules were proposed, open for public comment and then approved 
or not by NARA. The GRS provides disposition authority in three items: Item 010, Item 011 and 
Item 012. Item 010 outlines the disposition authority for the email of senior officials, including a 
definition of officials in ten categories: head of the agency; principal assistants to the head of the 
agency; deputies of all positions in categories 1 and 2; staff assistants to those in categories 1 and 
2; principle management positions; directors of significant program offices; principal regional 
officials; roles or positions that routinely provide advice and oversight to the agency; those roles 
and positions filled by Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation; and any other 
positions that predominantly create permanent records to “mission critical functions or policy 
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 decisions or policy decisions and/or are of historical significance.”
177
 This item specifies itself as 
not media neutral and therefore applies only to electronic records. Additionally, it extends to any 
legacy email accounts and any email accounts in which agency business is done. Item 011 extends to 
all other officials not outlined in the previous item and sets a minimum retention of seven years for 
all email records. This would govern the majority of agency email traffic, signifying a fairly drastic 
increase in the minimum retention standard for most agencies. NARA’s justification for this 
retention schedule suggests that seven years would be adequate in providing information for 
litigation as it is in line with general statute of limitations standards.
178 
 
FAM/FAH 
 
In 2005 the State Department codified and published a sixteen-part manual, the Foreign 
Affairs Manual (FAM), that contains just under seven thousand references to classified information. 
This manual was developed in the midst of the George W. Bush administration, in which twenty-two 
million emails were “lost.” The administration too used a private email server, in this case owned by 
the Republican National Committee. It was also non-compliant with laws governing government 
records and ignored a Congressional subpoena regarding the emails. The Presidential Records Act 
(PRA) was passed by Congress in 1978, mandating that all presidential and vice presidential created 
after January 20, 1981 be preserved and maintained. The PRA also mandated that presidential 
records are public materials. Although the first White House email system was installed and used by 
the Ronald Reagan administration, both the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations failed to 
maintain their email records. A 1989 federal law 
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 suit designed to compel the White House to comply with the existing standards put forth by the 
PRA was filed by a number of groups, and inspired a court order preventing over 6,000 email 
backup tapes containing copies of White House emails from being erased. The George H.W. 
Bush administration additionally established a singular agreement with the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) allowing George H.W. Bush to treat his White House 
emails as personal records. The lawsuit was settled with the Bill Clinton White House, and the 
email system implemented within the White House came complete with a pop-up notifying the 
user that deletion would be a violation of the PRA, when and if someone tried to delete an 
email. These measures did not however guarantee that guidelines were followed, as is evidenced 
by continued problems with email within the Clinton White House.
179
 In 2003, a whistleblower 
came forward to the National Security Archive, informing them that the George W. Bush White 
House was not saving its emails. Alongside Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington, the National Security Archive refiled its previous lawsuit. The automated email 
system that had been in place during the Clinton White House had been discontinued and the 
“lost emails” began on January 1, 2003. 
 
These lost emails were potentially at the core of cases involving the White House, 
including the purportedly political firing of several United States attorneys, and the case of the 
retaliatory outing of CIA agent Valerie Plame. In 2008, lawyers working for the administration 
claimed that a bad system upgrade had caused the loss of up to five million emails, including 
email backups from the lead up to the invasion of Iraq. Later they admitted that, contrary to 
original estimation, they had lost up to twenty-two million emails. In December of 2009, the 
Barack Obama White House found a similar number of emails dated between 2003 and 2005 that 
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 had been mislabeled and, although the emails were handed over to the National Archives at the 
time and the lawsuit was settled, the emails would not be made available to the public as the 
majority of them were ineligible for declassification until 2021. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s report on the firing of U.S. attorneys, in turn, seemed to imply that the email 
disappearances were a refutation of the assertions of the unintended consequences of system 
upgrades, problems in IT, or that Karl Rove’s email deletion was simply a matter of “the type of 
routine deletions people make to keep their inboxes orderly.”180 The report stated “This 
subversion of the justice system has included lying, misleading, stonewalling and ignoring the 
Congress in our attempts to find out precisely what happened. The reasons given for these firings 
were contrived as part of a cover-up, and the stonewalling by the White House is part and parcel 
of that same effort.” The wholesale disappearance of this number of emails is unlikely, but 
whether or not the National Archives has the resources to commit to restoring and making this 
kind of material available once it is declassified is another matter. As Thomas Blanton of the 
National Security Archives has stated, “Their entire budget is less than the cost of a single 
Marine One helicopter. It’s an underfunded orphan.” 
 
So it is against this backdrop that the FAM and FAH (Foreign Affairs Handbook) were 
published. Like all manuals and guidelines, it derives authority from a collection of statutes, 
Executive Orders and previous iterations of similar instructional texts. In this case, section 5 FAM 
752
181
 which outlines the protocols and guidelines for managing email derives its authority from 
nine sources including: Privacy Act of 1974 as amended (5 U.S.C. 552 (a)); Freedom of 
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 Information Act (FOIA) of 1966, as amended; privacy exemptions (5 U.S.C. 552(b)6 and 
(b)7(c)); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. Seq.); E-Government Act of 
2002, Section 208 (44 U.S.C. 3602); Safeguarding against and Responding to the Breach of 
Personally Identifiable Information, M-07-16 (May 22, 2007); 35 CFR Parts 1220, 1222, 1228, 
and 1234 Electronic Mail Systems August 28, 1995; Executive Order 13526, Classified National 
Security Information; 1 FAM 271.5 and 5 FAM 113; and The Federal Records Act (44 U.S.C. 
31). It is important to note that while other sections of the FAM have been routinely updated in 
the intervening years, this particular section has not. Authority derivation is at the heart of 
compliance expectations, as the assumption is that one who follows the instructions in this 
manual is compliant with each and every statute. The manual stresses limited personal use, the 
avoidance of features such as “reply all,” as well as the avoidance of anything that could slow 
down messaging or create backlog and the possibility of consistent monitoring of email use. The 
transmission of Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information is also outlined, which is 
sanctioned with a series of outlined reservations concerning the risks of transmitting personally 
identifiable information (PII) through unencrypted networks. Classification and sensitivity 
markings for email are briefly mentioned here, but are further explored in 5FAH-2 H-440, 5 
FAM 460 and 5 FAH-3 H-700. 
 
The onus of determining whether or not emails qualify for retention lies with both the 
originators and recipients of the email. When using SMART, this too is potentially automated, a 
user can simply click the “Convert to Archive” button in Microsoft Outlook to enable sending 
the email chain to the Archive where it is retained and available for SMART searches. The FAM 
asserts that email messages are records when and if they meet the definition of a record as stated 
in the Federal Records Act (44 U.S.C. 3301). In other words, emails are records when they are 
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 “made or received by an agency under Federal law or in connection with public business and are 
preserved or are appropriate for preservation as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, 
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government, or because of the 
informational value of the data in them.”
182
 The FAM further expands this into plainer language for 
users, outlining that the following must be marked for preservation: “records that document 
important meetings; records that facilitate agency officials’ and their successors’ action; records that 
make scrutiny by the Congress or other duly authorized agencies of the Government possible; and 
records that protect the financial, legal, and other rights of the Government and of persons directly 
affected by the Government’s actions.” Throughout the FAM, the simple missive that email should 
be treated just like paper records, attempting to situate new practices within familiar territory, 
especially for those with limited experience with digitally mediated recordkeeping, prevails. 
SMART retains two types of “record emails” including “directly addressed messages sent to one or 
more individuals; and for the record messages sent directly to the Archive.” Curiously, since this 
section has not been updated since 1995, as it was adapted from previous statute, so the section on 
preservation of emails is glaringly inadequate both to instructing users and in its assessment of 
available technology and expertise. I reproduce this section in its entirety here, as I believe this 
reveals some of the most obvious internal contradictions within classified information infrastructure 
in addition to revealing both the impossibility of full compliance and the shifting priority from 
investing in human judgment to building an automated system. This also taps into an issue inherent 
to the genre of manuals, which are meant as working reference guides rather than texts to be 
memorized or read for pleasure. However, simply looking up guidance for preserving email records 
would yield just 
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 under 200 results, and the only one bestowed with the specific moniker of “how to” has not been 
updated since 1995, having little to do with the preservation standards and techniques which 
have since been partially automated through SMART. 
5 FAM 443.3 How to Preserve E-Mail Records 
 
(TL:IM-19; 10-30-1995) 
 
For those E-mail messages and attachments that meet the statutory definition of records, 
it is essential to ensure that the record documentation include the E-mail message, any 
attachments, and essential transmission data (i.e. who sent the message, the addressees 
and any other recipients, and when it was sent). In addition, information about the receipt 
of messages should be retained if users consider it necessary for adequately documenting 
Department activities. If transmission and necessary receipt data is not printed by the 
particular E-mail system, the paper copies must be annotated as necessary to include such 
data. Until technology allowing archival capabilities for long-term electronic storage and 
retrieval of E-mail messages is available and installed, those messages warranting 
preservation as records (for periods longer than current E-mail systems routinely 
maintain them) must be printed out and filed with related records. Instructions for 
printing and handling of Federal records for most of the Department’s existing E-mail 
systems have been prepared and will be available through bureau Executive Offices
183 
 
This is followed by a promise that the Department is attempting to develop technology that 
would be capable of properly dealing with email and other forms of electronic communication. 
This also has remained without an update. Part of this section was indeed updated in 2015, 
containing guidance for the use of “Non-Official Email Accounts” 
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 SMART and “Print-and-File” 
 
The State Messaging and Archival Retrieval Toolkit (SMART) was introduced in 2009. 
It was designed to enable State Department employees to preserve emails and diplomatic cables 
through Microsoft Outlook. The system stored records centrally, facilitated access to material 
department wide and represented a coordinated attempt to “move away from what was a text-
based, telegram-type messaging system.”184 Previous to SMART, employees were consigned to 
printing and filing in order to preserve records, and it should be noted that upon its introduction, 
the Office of the Secretary declined use of the system due to concern over controlling access to 
sensitive and classified materials.
185
 Reports from the Office of the Inspector General have 
noted that since the implementation of SMART, use across agencies has varied quite widely.
186 
 
However, in 2012 the Office of Management and Budget and NARA issued a joint memorandum 
mandating that agencies eliminate paper-based recordkeeping with respect to email, and 
transition to managing all email records in an electronic format by December 31, 2016.
187
 In 
2013, NARA then published a bulletin granting agencies the authority to use the Capstone 
Approach to managing email records. Among other things, this approach collects and manages 
based on the role of the recipient or sender of the email rather than focusing on the content of the 
email, allowing for easier compliance with federal statutes governing records management and 
preservation. 
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 In January of 2015, the Executive Secretary of State produced a memorandum to the 
offices of the Secretary, the Deputy Secretaries of State, the Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs and the Counselor of the Department that informed that starting in February of 2015, all 
email in their State Department accounts would be permanently retained stating, “You should 
not use your private email accounts (e.g., Gmail) for official business.”188 
 
Hillary Clinton took office as Secretary of State in January of 2009 and that same month, 
an aide for former President Bill Clinton registered the clintonemail.com domain name and 
Hillary Clinton began to use hdr22@clintonemail.com. In this same year, the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations was updated to specifically refer to email accounts, stating that if personal 
email accounts were to be used for agency business, that it is the agency’s responsibility to 
ensure that the emails are preserved according to federal regulation and within the agency 
recordkeeping system. After Clinton stepped down as Secretary of State, NARA updated their 
guidelines regarding personal email accounts, stating that they should only be used in 
“emergency situations,” and repeating that if personal emails are used that they must be 
preserved in accordance with agency recordkeeping practices. In 2014, President Barack Obama 
signed the Federal Records Act which emphasized the responsibility of agency heads in the 
documentation and preservation of agency activities. 
 
In the aftermath of the death of four Americans in the attack on a United States 
diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, Libya, investigations begin into how the incident was handled 
by the State Department, in general, and by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, specifically. 
In December of 2012, Darrel Issa, then chairman of the House Oversight Committee, asked 
Hillary Clinton about her possible use of a private email account in a letter to the State 
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 Department and was met with a formal response that did not answer that specific question. After 
Clinton left office in 2013, the investigation into the incident in Benghazi found correspondence 
between Clinton’s private email account and government accounts of her staff and other agency 
employees. After the initial hearings on Benghazi, then House Speaker John Boehner created a 
select committee in May of 2014 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack as well 
as the government response. Negotiations regarding wholesale access to Clinton’s emails from 
the period in question begin with some urgency in July of 2014. Cheryl D. Mills, Clinton’s 
former chief of staff assured the select committee that they would gain access but that it would 
take time, within the month the State Department provided the committee on Benghazi 15,000 
pages of documents including a small number of emails from Clinton’s private email account. In 
January of 2015, in response to a formal request by the State Department, Clinton produced 
55,000 printed pages of more than 30,000 emails. It is not until February of 2015 that the State 
Department acknowledges that Hillary Clinton relied exclusively on her personal email account 
as Secretary of State. During this period, Clinton asked the State Department to release her 
emails to the public, and simultaneously acknowledged that during the course of her tenure she 
had deleted 32,000 personal emails from her personal account. It took close to a year to redact 
and publicly release the 30,000 emails originally handed over to the select committee and in this 
time, Hillary Clinton announced her candidacy for President of the United States, increasing 
media and official scrutiny of her email management practices. In July of 2015, investigators 
found classified information in emails from Clinton’s private server. The emails were not marked 
as classified when originally sent/received and therefore did not contain proper markings that 
would have alerted the sender to their status. The appearance of classified information however, 
prompted investigators to refer to the Justice Department and it did not take long for the Federal 
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 Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to open an investigation. In January of 2016, the State Department 
announced that it would not release twenty-two emails that were classified as Top Secret. This 
classification was applied and elevated after the fact, for these too were not marked when they 
were sent/received. 
The Office of the Inspector General released a report in May of 2016 reviewing the 
legacy of policies regarding email and records management. In this report, it is stated that in 
addition to Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of State Colin Powell used a laptop computer to 
send emails via his personal email account to his assistants, ambassadors and colleagues.
189 
 
Additionally, Powell has told the State Department that he did not retain those emails in either 
electronic or “print-and-file” and that he remains ignorant about whether or not State Department 
systems captured any of his emails in agency servers. The report was careful to distinguish 
Powell’s lack of compliance and Clinton’s, as department policy had become much more 
nuanced and sophisticated regarding both electronic records management, in general, and email 
management, specifically. However, this report also describes widespread ignorance of and 
reluctance to use print and file methods within the State Department, noting that, “NARA stated 
that this lack of compliance exists across the government. Although the Department is aware of 
the failure to print and file, the FAM contains no explicit penalties for lack of compliance, and 
the Department has never proposed discipline against an employee for failure to comply.”190 
Not to mention that even if print and file was a successful method of saving information, that is 
all it did, as no one was tasked with what would amount to an extremely labor intensive process 
of indexing thousands of printed emails. This is one of the issues meant to be ameliorated by the 
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 introduction of SMART in 2009, but as with all other policies, “compliance varies greatly across 
bureaus, in part because of perceptions by Department employees that SMART is not intuitive, 
is difficult to use, and has some technical problems.”191 The Capstone Approach was not 
implemented within the State Department until 2015, and this report states explicitly that it had 
plans to implement a commercial product to manage its email that will be capable of managing 
legacy email, enabling search, auto-tagging and security controls. The report goes on to describe 
in detail, the chaos that is State Department records management. Fairly consistently, claims that 
protocols and standards are being observed and maintained are followed by the exposure of 
practices that are spotty at best. For example, the Office of Information Resources Management 
(IRM) reported that it has maintained copies of email records through .pst files but had not 
created any form of inventory for the files. When further prompted, a considerable number of 
those .pst files were password protected and no one knew the password, or files were corrupted, 
incomplete or empty.
192
 Another example, the FAM requires all employees to sign a statement 
of separation acknowledging and confirming that they have surrendered documentation related 
to their official business with the government upon their departure from the department. No 
Secretary since Madeline Albright has signed the DS-109 separation statement.
193
 Although by 
October of 2016, the FBI investigation into Hillary Clinton had concluded, the FBI announced 
that it had discovered new emails they considered relevant to whether or not Clinton mishandled 
classified information. These emails were found on a seized device shared by Anthony Weiner 
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 and Huma Abedin, an aide to Hillary Clinton. Ultimately, out of the emails turned over by 
Clinton, eight email chains included Top Secret information, thirty-six chains contained Secret 
information, 2,008 emails contained Confidential information. The vast majority of these 
classification designations were retroactive, so would not have been marked when sent/received 
initially. 
 
A Generation of Controversy 
 
On September 3, 2016 the FBI released both a summary of their interview with Hillary 
Clinton and a memorandum about the investigation. The investigation into whether or not any 
laws were broken with respect to the handling of classified information concluded that while 
Clinton’s actions were “extremely careless,” they did not warrant criminal charges, a result that 
was affirmed by Attorney General Loretta Lynch. However, the FBI investigation was not the 
only investigation into Clinton’s use of a private email server and/or her handling of classified 
information. Judicial Watch, a conservative legal advocacy group, has brought a handful of 
lawsuits against the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act for records from 
Clinton’s time there. In addition, although the Select Committee on Benghazi issued its final 
report, which found no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Clinton, additional inquiries by the 
Senate Homeland Security Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community have also been underway. There have been such a large 
number of requests for information regarding the Clinton email controversy that NARA has 
released and published forty-seven documents in response, addressing the intricacies of records 
management practices and policies with special attention to email records management. Not only 
has this information been coordinated and published, but there is an entire webpage on the 
NARA website devoted to disentangling State Department email policy, cataloging all media 
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 inquiries and appearances by NARA and State Department officials and tracking changes in 
policy over time. 
Apart from the obvious chaotic nature of the records management environment within the 
State Department, there are several persistent issues that arise when considering the Clinton 
email controversy: the responsibility and requirements for marking classified information within 
the email environment; the responsibility and requirements for retention and deposit of email 
materials; the absence of a strategy for dealing with temporal disjunction in classification. These 
three issues also represent the ways in which classified information and archives and records 
management contexts are entirely inseparable, even as their policies are typically developed in 
isolation or contradiction to one another. When Sandy Berger walked out of the National 
Archives on two different occasions with classified documents hidden in his socks and pants,
194
 
it is a clearer determination of exactly who is at fault, what the intention might be, what the 
vulnerabilities are. In regards to Clinton’s emails, the case exposes overlapping systematic 
failures in records management, classified information management and maintaining a consistent 
relationship to NARA. Diffuse problems within bureaucratic systems challenge notions of 
authority, culpability and responsibility that typically operate. The structures of legal culpability 
fail to consider the ways in which power, agency, and responsibility operate within bureaucratic 
contexts. The problem of “many hands,”195 a central feature of bureaucratic organization that 
relies on many officials at different levels contributing to both the standards for behaviors as well 
as the behaviors themselves, makes it “difficult even in principle to identify who is morally 
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 responsible for political outcomes.”
196
 Typically, responsibility in government is considered in two 
ways, hierarchically and collectively. Within the hierarchical model, as outlined by Weber, 
responsibility for activities and their outcomes falls to the highest person within a formalized 
hierarchy. Here we also find a distinction between administrators and politicians, one who sets 
policies and one who executes those policies, relegating them to different regimes of responsibility 
respectively.
197
 Furthermore, Weber effectively removes agency from the administrator, placing 
responsibility outside an individualized or collective understanding of morality. However, this does 
not resemble the contemporary configurations of bureaucratic labor and agency, and it could be 
argued that if this did at some point resemble a structure for interpreting moral responsibility, it 
should not have been. It is precisely this kind of diffusion of agency and responsibility that leads to 
routine abuses of power.
198
 Apart from this, the distinction between politician and administrator 
collapses within complex bureaucracies, as officials routinely operate within “issue networks” that 
are rapidly and routinely shifting. In addition, officials are subjects within as well as elements of 
infrastructural networks that are at times inharmonious. Dennis Thompson describes the acceptance 
of hierarchical authority and blame as a kind of political ritual,
199
 a display of control and 
responsibility without much political consequence. What Thompson does not consider is the highly 
gendered rhetorical economy of political discourse, in which the projection of strength and leadership 
might operate differently along gender lines. In contrast, collective responsibility acknowledges that 
culpability often resides in an exchange, namely that within an organization, it is exceedingly rare 
that any one 
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 person operates alone, especially in a case that results in political consequence. At its weakest, 
the collective responsibility model holds everyone accountable for everything or no one 
accountable at all, but routinely there are gradations of culpability according to implicit/inactive 
and explicit/active compliance. In this instance, we have the head of a Department working in a 
system that is riddled with policy holes and contradictions. If the series of reports by the 
Inspector General are to be believed, it was and is a relatively open secret that people were 
consistently in a state of noncompliance. Not only this, but that there is really no mechanism or 
will for enforcement with respect to records management and proper handling of information, 
until it reaches crisis. In an email to Hillary Clinton, a former Director of Policy Planning stated 
that “State’s technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high 
officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done 
quickly and effectively.”200As we saw in the previous chapter discussing the difficulties in 
employee cell phone policy compliance, this is a common refrain with respect to using 
technology in the federal workplace. Compliance is often considered an impediment to efficient 
and effective work. The Inspector General’s report went so far as to state that employees also 
avoided designating emails as records because they “do not want to make the email available in 
searches for fear that this availability would inhibit debate about pending decisions.” 
 
The question then remains, how exactly does Clinton’s use of a private email server 
become controversy at an unprecedented scale, when all reports and investigations revealed 
widespread similar practices and an overall lack of expertise in managing email records across 
agencies? Although there are other high profile incidents involving classified information, rarely 
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 has an incident garnered such attention without explicit intent on the part of the accused. The 
system itself, which is in many ways in a constant state of breakdown, is recast in the media and 
through public discourse as simple and knowable, casting Clinton then as spectacularly careless 
or nefarious. The legal framework governing the leaking, mishandling or theft of classified 
information is robust and diffuse. At its core is the Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. § 793, 
which criminalizes such activities, but weds its successful prosecution to proof of intent of 
injuring the United States or aiding a foreign nation. Although the language of the Espionage 
Act does not specifically refer to classified information but to “national defense information,” 
the very consideration of a record as classified belies its sensitivity and therefore its status could 
be used as evidence on its face of injury to the United States. A later amendment to the 
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 798, specified multiple forms of classified information, including the 
communication of intelligence activities, and importantly omits language concerning intent. 
Instead, the language foregrounds that the communication must be done “knowingly and 
willfully.” A second law forming this larger legal framework is 18 U.S.C. §641, which is non-
specific to classified information but instead refers to a general provision against theft of 
government property, including records. Additional laws take on more specific challenges, such 
as The Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which criminalizes the revelation of the identity of 
covert agents. 
 
Customarily, investigations into the leaking of classified information are conducted by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation under the supervision of The Department of Justice. Typically, the 
agency who produced and/or owned the classified information reports the leak or theft to the 
Department of Justice who determines whether or not an investigation is necessary and should be 
opened. Investigations are opened when and only when leaked information is 
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 confirmed.
201
 However, at this point, there is no longer a typical order of events, as 
investigations are often subject to the rhetorical whims of partisanship and can be framed as 
retaliatory or without merit. The past few Administrations have seen fit to appoint special 
prosecutors when instances of leaking came to the fore, putting the investigation into the hands 
of law enforcement. It is a mistake to think about this or any controversy as a spontaneous or 
natural occurrence. In their book Merchants of Doubt,
202
 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway 
trace the careers of a small number of scientists whose work contributed to several ongoing 
controversies, including climate change and the dangers of sustained tobacco use.
203
 Rather 
than emerging out of established forms of debate and consensus building within scientific 
communities, these controversies are strategically funded and deployed by companies in whose 
interest they serve, and the doubt leveraged against scientific consensus is bolstered by the 
credentials and reputations of the scientists in question. Oreskes and Conway go on to 
contextualize the persistence and strength of these controversies as they become depicted by the 
media within a frame of false equivalence, and how the narrative of doubt becomes heroically 
situated as anti-establishment and anti-elite.
204
 When considering Clinton’s email server 
controversy, it is key to position its timing within the context of another controversy and 
associated conspiracy theories surrounding Clinton’s tenure with the State Department: the 
attack on the United States consulate in Benghazi, Libya. 
 
Those convinced that there was explicit wrong-doing were left with the desire for more 
information, the investigation did not yield the expected results and deferred confirmation of 
their belief not just in the events of the day, but those concerning Clinton’s competence, at the 
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 very least, and her duplicitousness, at the very worst. After the release of the final report from the 
House Select Committee on Benghazi, The Washington Post reported the reactions of people 
attending a meeting of the Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi, all of who expressed 
disappointment and skepticism. One woman is quoted as asking, “Has someone in the GOP 
leadership gotten their fingers involved in watering down some of this to benefit Secretary 
Clinton?”205 The Citizens’ Commission is still active, releasing their own research and reports, 
and now focused not just on uncovering the events leading up to the attack, but also in 
investigating the cover-up.
206
 Right-wing conspiracy outlet InfoWars has published just under 
three thousand articles on Benghazi in the past five years, half of which explicitly claim that 
Hillary Clinton lied and/or hid information before, during and after the attack. Clinton’s 
testimony in front of the House Select Committee became a referendum not only on her actions 
regarding Benghazi, but also played out in media as a test of her competence and authenticity; 
both double binds for Clinton as political roles and their defining attributes are cast as masculine, 
and analysis of women politicians is radically different in tone and content. An impossible 
challenge emerges for Clinton’s rhetorical strategies with regard to the Benghazi hearings, one 
pitting femininity against competency within the political realm.
207
 Further, femininity can be 
more specifically situated in this context as authenticity, insofar as any expression of emotional 
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 identification or involvement was considered not only false but also highly calculated for 
political aim.
208 
 
The controversy over Clinton’s use of a private email server emerges from not just the 
political theater of the Benghazi hearings, but from decades of analysis of Clinton’s behaviors in 
both official and personal capacities. Quite literally too, the revelations concerning Clinton’s use 
of a private server came from disclosures made during the investigation into Benghazi, as 
Williams & Connolly, Clinton’s legal team turned over 55,000 pages of email to the State 
Department for review. If controversy and conspiracy theory thrive on the breakdown of trust in 
institutions and leaders, sustained media circulation of stories about Hillary Clinton sowed the 
seeds, which is not to say that Clinton’s use of a private email server does not expose a range of 
deep seated issues regarding the complexities and pitfalls of the current records management 
framework within the federal government. An ad hoc strategy for communications technology 
represents a significant challenge to records management, signified by a lack of coordination, 
technological expertise and enforcement and oversight. The consequences of this are noteworthy 
within a framework that conflates appropriate records management practices with achieving 
transparency and accountability for those who hold public office. This relationship between 
records, transparency and accountability is at the core of the controversy’s proliferation, and the 
ease with which political adversaries were able to leverage pre-existing stereotypes concerning 
Clinton to draw conclusions about intent. In many ways the depiction of the use of a private 
email server, and the subsequent fallout over email deletion that circulated in the media, relies on 
massive coordination and technical expertise. This runs counter to the results of the FBI 
investigation itself which revealed Clinton’s own aversion to and lack of comfort with 
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 technology, the general disorganization within her team, and the poor navigation of classification 
and regulatory systems that have decades to go before catching up with the basic technology use 
found within most business contexts. 
 
The Investigation 
 
On July 10, 2015, the FBI began their investigation into Clinton’s use of a private email 
server. The investigation was initiated as a result of a referral received by the US Intelligence 
Community inspector General (ICIG), urging the FBI to look into “the potential unauthorized 
transmission and storage of classified information on the personal email server of former Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton (Clinton).”
209
 The FBI’s investigation took on a more narrow focus, 
attempting to zero in on the possible transmission or storage of classified information on 
unclassified systems as well as whether or not that classified information was potentially accessible 
to unauthorized individuals. In late 2016, the FBI released its Form 302 interviews with Hillary 
Clinton and various aides along with their investigatory summary of her use of a private email 
server, outlining their results but also the chain of events leading up to 2016. 
 
Justin Cooper, a former aide to President Bill Clinton purchased an Apple OS X server 
to host email services for the President’s staff. That server was kept in the Clinton home in 
Chappaqua, New York and originally hosted both presidentclinton.com and wjcoffice.com, both 
used by the President’s staff. Before Hillary Clinton was sworn in as Secretary of State in 2008, 
she used a personal BlackBerry with service from Cingular (at first) and AT&T (finally). In 
January of 2009 Clinton stopped using the email associated with her BlackBerry device and 
began to use a private domain, clintonemail.com, to host email on the Apple server in her 
Chappaqua home. At this time, the Apple server had become outdated and Bryan Pagliano was 
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 brought in as an information technology specialist to build a new server system and help with 
administration. In interviews, Pagliano has said that he assumed this server would be used by 
President Clinton’s staff and Hillary Clinton claims to have been entirely unaware of the server 
transition. Pagliano ultimately requisitioned hardware for this second email server from Hillary 
Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign headquarters in Arlington, VA and purchased additional 
necessities from various commercial outlets; the server was eventually installed in the Clintons’ 
basement in their Chappaqua residence. Pagliano then migrated email data from the Apple 
Server to the new server, however the FBI was unable to obtain the Apple server
210
 to conduct 
a forensic investigation, so the extent to which the necessary data was transferred is unknown. 
Pagliano and Cooper served in various roles as IT assistance with respect to the server, 
conducting updates and installing additional security measures (including a Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) encryption certificate).
211
 It is noted in the FBI report that Clinton said she had 
“no knowledge of the hardware, software, or security protocols used to construct and operate 
the servers.”212 An entire backup of the server was made on a weekly basis to a Seagate 
external hard drive and a differential backup was completed everyday from 2009-2011, when 
that hard drive was replaced with a Cisco Network Attached Storage (NAS) device. 
 
In 2013 a combination of the need for increased technical support and Pagliano’s own 
exit from staff necessitated finding a new vendor to manage the email server. Platte River 
Networks (PRN) was eventually awarded the contract and a Service Level Agreement was 
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 signed on July 13, 2013.
213
 An employee of PRN powered down the Pagliano server in June of 
2013 and sent it to a datacenter run by Equinix, Inc., where it remained until it was handed over 
to the FBI in 2015. At this point, no functioning hardware remained at the Clinton home in 
Chappaqua. In June of 2013, PRN remotely migrated email accounts from the Pagliano server to 
the PRN server and PRN took over hosting email services for the Clintons.
214
 PRN had Datto, 
Inc. configure a backup device to take multiple snapshots of the server system on a daily basis 
that were then to be retained for a period of 60 days. While the snapshots were meant to be 
stored locally only, a the request of the Clintons, a technical oversight disclosed in 2015 
revealed that Datto had also been backing up the server to Datto’s secure cloud storage.215 
Interviews also revealed that although the Clintons requested that email be encrypted, so that no 
one but the senders/receivers could read the content, PRN did not configure email settings in this 
manner, citing that they needed to allow administrator access to provide service support.
216
 In 
terms of security, PRN did set up two firewalls and used an Intrusion Detection System called 
CloudJacket. 
 
Clinton’s BlackBerry usage was also linked with each server throughout the period 
investigated. The FBI ultimately identified thirteen mobile devices that had been associated with her 
known phone numbers, any of which could have been used to send and receive emails using the 
clintonemail.com addresses. Of these thirteen identified devices, eight were used during her tenure 
as Secretary of State, but none of the devices were available at the time of the investigation.
217
 
Additionally, the FBI identified five iPad devices potentially used to send email. 
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 Ultimately, here they found e-mails from 2012 in a drafts folder that were determined not to 
contain any potential classified information. The location of Clinton’s discarded mobile devices 
are unknown apart from two instances recalled by Justin Cooper in which he “destroyed 
Clinton’s old mobile devices by breaking them in half or hitting them with a hammer.”218 No 
mention is made of resetting or wiping devices of data by anyone on Clinton’s team or in the 
FBI report. 
 
At the start of her term as Secretary of State, the State Executive Secretariat’s Office of 
Information Resources Management (S/ES-IRM) offered Clinton a State email address. That 
offer was declined, favoring the continued use of the private email server previously 
established. Although at the time of Clinton’s tenure, the FAM required the day-to-day 
operations of the State to be conducted via an “authorized information system,” it is held by 
those involved that Clinton did not transition to an authorized system nor seek guidance on 
email as a system in question.
219
 Stories regarding who and when people raised concerns or 
gave advice are mixed and inconclusive although Clinton has claimed that knowledge of her use 
of a private server must have been widespread. However, there was no official restriction during 
Clinton’s tenure concerning using private accounts for official business, despite the fact that 
information regarding using personal accounts was circulated and generally warned against due 
to security risks. Security risks were also cited as the reason for opting out of the SMART 
system as it would have provided broader access to sensitive materials, leaving Clinton’s office 
with the “print and file” method. 
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 In terms of records management and preservation, there are indications that this was a 
concern for Clinton from the beginning of her tenure. One of the most curious episodes of this 
entire saga is Clinton’s missive to former Secretary of State Colin Powell in early 2009 regarding 
his use of a BlackBerry during his tenure. Powell explicitly warns Clinton stating that “if it 
became ‘public’ that Clinton had a BlackBerry, and she used it to ‘do business,’ her e-mails 
could become ‘official recor[s]and subject to the law’ and “Be very careful. I got around it all by 
not saying much and not using systems that captured the data.”220 For her part, Clinton says she 
believed all necessary records would have been retained anyway, as she communicated with 
others’ official State email accounts. 
 
Interestingly, the Secretary of State’s office is located within a Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Known as “Mahogany Row,” this area of the State 
Department maintains restrictions on the use and carrying of mobile devices. Clinton’s office at 
State did not even have a computer and her personal devices were stored outside of the SCIF. In 
fact, Clinton also built a SCIF in her residence in Washington D.C. and in Chappaqua, and staff 
have stated that she never used a desktop computer and used her mobile devices alone to access 
email accounts. 
 
Classified Information on the Server 
 
Whether it was characterized as careless or intentional, the release of classified 
information was at the heart of the controversy and legally at that of the FBI’s investigation. 
Hundreds of emails classified CONFIDENTIAL were sent or received by Clinton while she was 
traveling outside of the continental United States (OCONUS). The FBI also identified three 
email chains that included eight individual email exchanges to or from Clinton’s personal email 
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 accounts which contained at least one paragraph marked (C). This marking could be an 
indication that the paragraph contained CONFIDENTAL information, but these messages 
contained no additional control markings. Through the FOIA review process, only one of these 
chains containing the marking (C) was determined to contain CONFIDENTIAL information, 
and it is undetermined whether or not this was a contemporary or retroactive classification. This 
little (C) became somewhat of a point of contention in testimony by FBI Director James Comey 
on why charges were not being brought up on Clinton. An exchange between Comey and 
Representative Matt Cartwright (D-PA) addressed widespread confusion regarding what, if 
anything, the (C) marking would have meant to Clinton. Comey clarifies that (C) was an 
inappropriate or mistaken marking and not even an expert could have been expected to recognize 
its meaning. 
221 
 
Ultimately, there were 81 email chains containing 193 individual email exchanges that 
were classified from CONFIDENTIAL to TOP SECRET levels at the time the emails were 
drafted on UNCLASSIFIED systems and sent to or from Clinton’s personal server. These 81 
email chains also contained classified equities from five other agencies including the CIA, DoD, 
FBI, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the NSA. Out of these, 8 chains were 
classified TOP SECRET, 37 were classified SECRET and 36 were classified CONFIDENTIAL 
at the time they were sent. In addition, 7 email chains had information related to a Special 
Access Program (SAP) and three email chains contained Sensitive Compartmented Information 
(SCI). 36 of these chains were Not-Releasable to Foreign Governments (NOFORN) and 2 were 
considered releasable only to Five Allied partners (FVEY). Sixteen of the email chains were 
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 downgraded later by USIC agencies.
222
 At least 32 classified email chains went through the 
personal email account of Clinton or the personal email accounts of close Clinton aides. 
 
Interviews providing context for these numbers and the habits that lead to transmission 
of classified information reveal a daily acceptance of contradiction and workaround. One 
informant related that he knew information was classified but that speed and efficiency remained 
a priority. Stating, “you just can’t do business that way,”223 he alludes to the complexities of the 
classification system. Another interviewed talked of the “operational tempo,” and noted that 
employees were constantly “talking around” classified information, not to mention that 
information considered classified was routinely already public knowledge.
224
 Perhaps the most 
impactful result of the FBI investigation regards Clinton’s own knowledge of protocol, 
procedure and her own role in classified information infrastructure. While Clinton does 
acknowledge that she knew her position made her an Original Classification Authority (OCA), 
she did not recall ever receiving formal training or guidance on the matter and could not identify 
“how the classification of a document” is identified, instead relying on staff to guide her on 
specific policies.
225 
 
Perpetual Breakdown 
 
This episode represents a visible rupture in the functioning of classified information 
infrastructure. Visible is the key here, as knowledge from within communities dealing on a daily 
basis with classified information would seem to suggest that while the behavior is routine and the 
problems common knowledge, the coverage and persistence of this story is what is remarkable. 
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 Elizabeth Gotein, the co-director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s national security program, 
has pointed out that “Classification is not an adjective; it’s a verb.”226 This is a verb that 
operates at a distinct temporal register, one that is slower and more deliberate than the day-to-
day “operational tempo” of the government, where reaction times and quick communication 
dominate information needs. This episode shows us the spectacular version of the mundane 
reality of inadequate training programs, redundant regulatory documents and procedures, out of 
date technology and the complexities of systems that cross vendors, proprietary technologies and 
professional boundaries. However, what this episode also puts on display is the rhetorical fusion 
of recordkeeping with transparency, accountability without nuance, and the media vacuum that 
can fill the void of secrecy with exaggeration, bias and conspiracy. Classified information 
infrastructure is indeed made visible in a particular way through rupture, but what it exposes is 
the perpetual breakdown endemic to classification work. 
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 Chapter 4: The Majestic Twelve: Classification, Evidence and Conspiracy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Conspiracy theories have a unique place in American political discourse, their most virulent 
believers often cite a deep mistrust of the government as a core American value, forming identities 
and communities around a shared set of norms and evidence, and pitting their version of history or 
current events against the mainstream. David Brion Davis has, in looking at the fears and paranoias 
of early American political operatives, wondered if the circumstances and realities of the American 
Revolution forever aligned steely resistance to dark subversive forces with an essential part of a 
national identity.
227
 The rhetorical invocation of contagion to invasion is familiar territory, and has 
arisen around disparate political movements and populations. From Jewish refugees described by 
President Franklin Roosevelt as a possible “Trojan horse,” to rather familiar language from J. Edgar 
Hoover describing the “Trojan horse of Communist fifth column.” Peter Knight identifies the 1960s, 
in general, and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, in particular, as a cultural shift in 
which conspiracy theory thinking eked out into the American cultural mainstream. One might see 
this period of great political division and unprecedented surveillance of the American population as 
leading to an erosion of trust in government action and accountability. Also during this time, one of 
the most prominent and strongest set of interlocking conspiracy theories was beginning to crystallize; 
the known existence and government cover up of extraterrestrial life rose to the surface and has only 
gained traction with each passing year. The study of conspiracy theories and those that espouse them 
have ranged from political philosophical discussions, psychological diagnoses and other forms of 
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 pathologizing, but rarely have the ways in which conspiracy theorists form consensus around 
particular forms of evidence been considered as central to their functioning, reach or potential 
staying power. The relationship of any conspiracy theory community to evidence is complex, as 
the nature of conspiracy implies a lack of mainstream consensus and therefore a lack of accepted 
evidence. Conspiracy theories often rely on a calling forth of common sense, asking one to fill in 
the blanks in a list of tangentially related factors. While the possibility of the existence of 
extraterrestrials, intelligent or otherwise, remains a matter of debate and speculation for 
scientists and laypeople alike, the belief that the United States government knows of and covers 
up the existence of extraterrestrial life has grown into a vibrant and persistent conspiracy theory. 
For believers in this generation long coordinated cover up, proof comes in a variety of forms. 
While eyewitness testimony defines the majority of support for confirmed experiences with 
extraterrestrials, evidence of conspiracy requires different elements. Many believers invest 
substantive time, money, and effort into collecting, analyzing and authenticating evidence apart 
from eyewitness testimony. This chapter will consider a set of documents that have come to 
serve as definitive proof for some believers that the so-called Majestic Twelve (MJ-12) exists. 
They will be discussed in order to define and examine the role of the infrastructure of classified 
information in how these documents are perceived as evidence, both within communities that 
might be labeled conspiracy theorists as well as within the government agencies that supposedly 
authored the documents. The infrastructure of classification allows for these documents to 
circulate beyond and through levels of expertise and domains of knowledge, and to challenge 
practices of authentication and our assessment of evidentiary value. This chapter will begin by 
providing context for the MJ-12 as it functions in Ufology circles, as well as the discovery and 
subsequent investigation into the authenticity of unearthed documentation. I will then discuss the 
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 relationship between classified information and conspiracy theories at the infrastructural level. 
Then I will describe and analyze methodologies of authentication coming from ufology within 
the context of both diplomatics and critical bibliography as a means of deconstructing the 
evidential claims set forth by these documents, analyzing how their claims to authority arise 
through the aesthetic deployment of classification markings and institutional affiliation. This 
process runs counter to the ways in which these documents are presented and contextualized by 
the National Archives. Finally, I will discuss the documents of MJ-12 within the framework of 
“imagined records” set forth by Anne Gilliland and Michelle Caswell in order to get at the 
ways in which these records function across evidential boundaries, and persist not just in spite 
of but because of secrecy and absence. 
 
The Majestic Twelve 
 
In the winter of 1984, filmmaker and amateur ufologist Jamie Shandera found a manila 
envelope that had been anonymously and surreptitiously dropped through his mail slot. The 
envelope contained no information, no explanatory note or missive referring to its purpose apart 
from a New Mexico postmark. Contained inside was a single undeveloped role of 35mm film. The 
film, later developed by Shandera and his colleague and fellow ufologist Bill Moore, would prove to 
contain what would then be considered the bulk of existing evidence of a secret government 
organization. The Majestic Twelve is the code name of an alleged secret committee of scientists, 
military leaders, and government officials formed by a 1947 Executive Order authored by President 
Harry Truman, itself classified. The documentary evidence for the existence of The Majestic Twelve 
or MJ-12 included two documents, which would come to be known as the Eisenhower Briefing 
Document and the Truman-Forestall memo. Although this would not be the first mention of The 
Majestic Twelve entirely, it was the first to touch the inner 
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 circle of ufology, and these documents would become inextricable from key debates concerning 
government behavior with respect to the existence of extraterrestrials, the possession of alien 
technology and what is characterized by some ufologists (and some government officials) as a 
sustained campaign of disinformation on the part of government agencies. Moore and Shandera 
spent the next several years attempting to authenticate the documents through research in the 
National Archives, and the creation of a kind of “social life” of the documents228 focused on 
connecting the people named in the documents to the times and places that could be verified. The 
next thirty years would see a splintering of the ufology community into camps defining 
themselves according to their understanding of these documents and three methodologies have 
emerged for their potential authentication or debunking. These include the use of forensics by 
Bob and Ryan Wood, the use of linguistic analysis by Michael Heiser and Carol Chaski and the 
historical/contextual approach championed by Stanton Friedman. With the exception of Carol 
Chaski, whose professional training and intellectual community stands outside of ufology for the 
most part, each of these people is heavily invested both personally and professionally in ufology 
debates. In addition, those outside of the ufology community have also taken up the challenge of 
authenticating or debunking this original set of documents, as well as the community of 
documents that have arisen around them. The Government Accountability Office (the 
investigative arm of Congress), the National Archives and the United States Air Force have all 
conducted independent investigations, determining these documents to be falsified or forged. 
 
Within ufology circles, the standard story about how the Eisenhower briefing document 
and the Truman-Forestall memo came out into the open is by and large the same. It begins with 
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 Shandera’s mysterious mail drop, and ends with authors and researchers Timothy Good,229 
 
Stanton Friedman and their colleagues making both the documents and their extensive efforts at 
authentication public; Friedman appearing most famously on ABC’s Nightline to debate Phil 
Klass, an ardent denier of UFO cover ups and then Director of the Committee for Skeptical 
Inquiry (CSICOP). In this debate, in which Friedman refers to the documents as a “cosmic 
Watergate,” Phil Klass infamously called out the mainstream media to investigate the 
documents, stressing that their typical vetting processes and standards for evidence would 
disqualify serious inquiry. So what, in the intervening three years, had given Friedman the sense 
that he really had broken through as significant a cover up as Watergate? Friedman and Bill 
Moore had spent considerable time and effort looking into the initial documents, beginning with 
the identification of those named as the members of the Majestic Twelve, corroborating their 
connections and movements, and assessing the likelihood of their participation. A little over a 
year after Shandera received the initial envelope containing the photographs, Bill Moore himself 
received an unsolicited, mysterious postcard containing a cryptic message imploring him to visit 
the National Archives of the United States and more specifically to visit Box 189. Moore and 
Shandera headed to the National Archives and found, folded between two folders, what would 
come to be known colloquially as the Cutler-Twining memo, written by Robert Cutler in July of 
1964. Cutler, adviser of National Security Affairs for Eisenhower, was addressing Nathan 
Twining, a named (in the Eisenhower Briefing Document) member of the Majestic Twelve. For 
Friedman, Moore and Shandera, this was a game changer, not only did they see this document as 
authentication for their previously held materials, but its evidentiary value was bolstered by the 
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 fact that it alone was an original, not a duplication or photo as the previous documents had been. 
When asked about the recent interactions with Box 189, the staff at the National Archives told 
Friedman that it had been handled for the first time in September of 1984. Friedman points to 
this fact as significant because the last living named member of The Majestic Twelve, Jerome 
Huntzinger, died just two weeks before Box 189 was handled, suggesting that the release of 
these documents might have been timed to coincide with his death. 
 
Studying Conspiracy Theory 
 
It is difficult to deny that, in general, the term conspiracy theory carries with it a 
pejorative connotation. At its most basic, conspiracy theory merely means “a belief that some 
covert but highly influential organization is responsible for an unexplained event,”230 and its 
application can be as broad as verifiable phenomena in United States history such as the 
Tuskegee experiments, which lasted four decades, to the patently absurd Pizzagate scandal that 
posited an underground childhood sex ring coordinated by Hilary Clinton operating out of a 
pizza parlor basement in Washington D.C. The latter’s association with the same descriptive 
term as the former strains credulity, but the qualities that make or unmake a conspiracy theory 
are simply eventual proof that it is indeed more than a theory. This poses one of the most 
fundamental issues for those studying conspiracy theories: taking seriously extant theories and 
their evidential base as the expression of legitimate fears, concerns or anxieties while retaining a 
critical approach to their possible dangers and misuse. 
 
In his 1945 book The Open Society and Its Enemies,
231
 Karl Popper used the term 
“conspiracy theory” to describe and critique the ideologies he understood to be at the heart of 
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 historicism. He saw an undeniable link between the rise of totalitarianism and the absorption of 
conspiracy theories that at their heart were nationalist and racist, and while he stressed that the 
existence of actual conspiracies is also undeniable, he made the salient point that conspiracies 
typically fall apart before their promise is fulfilled. “Conspiracies occur, it must be admitted. But 
the striking fact which, in spite of their occurrence, disproved the conspiracy theory is that few of 
these conspiracies are ultimately successful. Conspirators rarely consummate their conspiracy.” 
Popper, for his part, eschews the dominant approach to studying conspiracy theory throughout 
the Western academy that tends to rely on a certain penchant for the pathological. The 
foundational 1966 essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” by American political 
historian Richard Hofstadter framed conspiracy theory thinking and paranoia in general as an 
attitude that undermined normative understandings of and attachments to what he framed as 
American democratic norms. The essay pits a healthy relationship to pluralism in both politics 
and culture against a singular, rigid and paranoiac belief system represented by conspiratorial 
thinking. Hofstadter walks a fine line in the essay as he simultaneously defines and diagnoses the 
paranoid style as non-normative, while also arguing for its historical place as a consistent, 
recurring and uniquely American style of political discourse that rears its head especially during 
moments of political and socio-economic flux.
232
 Hofstadter outlines the six facets of the 
paranoid style, which are useful to summarize here not only because of the depth of their 
influence on the ways in which subsequent scholarship on conspiracy theories is framed, but for 
identifying how and why an attention (or inattention as it were) to documentation and evidentiary 
value is largely absent from conspiracy theory scholarship. 
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 • Universal and historical in scope – The paranoid style centers conspiracy as the central 
driving force of history rather than something that is contingent or precipitated by 
specific configurations of people and events.
233 
 
• Apocalypse – The stakes are always urgent and world ending. “Time is forever just 
running out.”234 
 
• Urgency – Rather than framing the conflicts at hand as issues that can be dealt with 
incrementally or through political compromise, conspiracies are framed in absolutes.
235
 
 
• Omnipotence – The agents of conspiracy are all seeing, all knowing and all powerful. 
Since conspiracies are the driving force of history, their agents are bending history 
toward their will and their benefit.
236 
 
• Evidence – Reliance on a constant accumulation of facts that make up a coherent 
whole. Hofstadter is careful to point out here that the paranoid’s attitude towards 
evidence is totalizing “since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures or ambiguities.”237 
 
• Interpretation – The paranoid always must at some point, in order to connect disparate 
facts or accumulate evidence where it does not immediately and obviously exist make a 
leap of the imagination in order to bridge the gap between the “undeniable to the 
unbelievable.”238 
Hofstatder, in these last two points, touches upon issues that deserve more attention, as they are 
key to both the sustenance of ongoing conspiracy theories and the strength of their impact 
outward. The development of a culture of research and explanation, that requires the vantage 
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 point of someone who can make a leap of imagination, can simply see that the truth is a vital 
connective tissue bringing together disparate populations. Not only does this culture further 
solidify the identity of the researcher with the community, due to time and intellectual 
investment, but also legitimizes the results of the research through community consensus. 
What Hofstadter refers to as “pseudo-scholarship,”239 has become an industry representing 
media outlets, in person conferences, and journals and publications that fully ape scholarly 
convention through a circular invocation of expertise, peer review and citation practices. 
 
The bulk of scholarship concerning conspiracy theory within the American context takes 
this Hofstadter essay as its intellectual foundation, but range from the diagnostic to the historical. 
What I refer to as the diagnostic describes works that tend to classify conspiracy theory as non-
normative, extreme and to be rooted out. In these works, Hofstadter’s “paranoid style” is an 
illness that threatens to overtake American mainstream political rationalism. Philosopher Brian 
Keeley attempts to analyze the enduring popularity of conspiracy theories through their 
epistemological foundations, and what he identifies as fundamental epistemological flaws.
240 
 
Specifically, he defines an even more specific subset of conspiracy theories that he names 
“Unwarranted Conspiracy Theories” or UCTs. Unwarranted in this case because of the ways 
in which conspiracy theorists themselves weigh, consider, evaluate and present evidence for 
their particular cases. According to Keeley, UCTs are defined by the following characteristics: 
 
• An account that posits an alternative theory of events that opposes accepted views or 
understandings 
 
• The reasons behind the conspiracy are self-serving to the conspirators and can also be 
considered to be evil 
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 • These theories seek to tie together seemingly disparate and/or unrelated events, 
people and factors 
 
• The real truth, to be uncovered, is made up of high-stakes, closely maintained secrets 
even though all of the players and events might be known to the public 
 
• Their primary tool is “errant data”241 
 
It is this “errant data” that Keeley sees as the central epistemological flaw of UCTs. The use of 
any data belies a trust in the source of the data itself and the means by which it was 
communicated. As the positionality of conspiracy theories typically relies on a breakdown of 
trust in mainstream institutions and authorities, the consideration of different forms of data 
becomes key. The more traditionally trusted an institution might be, the less trustworthy its data. 
Keeley points out that conspiracy theories bring the central role of trust in evidentiary evaluation 
to the surface. In addition, this trust also dictates whether or not one might allow evidence to 
challenge a perceived truth or value, or whether it is rejected. Keeley’s concern is that the 
mutual development of the evidence/trust matrix implicated in conspiracy theories makes 
impossible a belief in legitimacy of scientific work or political discourse, and that the depths of 
that mistrust are boundless. Keeley understands this tendency as having a snowball effect, 
leading to an extreme skepticism. This skepticism, then, only breaks away in moments in which 
evidence confirms a deeply held belief or furthers a particular narrative. Exemplified by the all-
encompassing maxim of The X-Files’s Fox Mulder, “I Want to Believe,” the epistemological 
foundations of conspiracy theories rely on a desire for the right evidence to be true and all clues 
to the contrary can be dismissed as part of the lie. 
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 Rather than a dearth of evidence, conspiracy theories have a counter-intuitive 
relationship to evidence, in that they often are based on a much larger and more pored over 
evidential basis than mainstream, accepted beliefs, or what Steve Clarke has referred to as the 
“received view.”242 In the most extreme sense, all evidence is evidence of a conspiracy theory, 
as even evidence to the contrary is then evidence of the cover up. In his description of Gail 
Brewer-Giorgio’s 1988 book that outlines the possible proof for Elvis Presley still being 
alive,
243
 Clarke lays out the lengths of the argument to connect what appears on the surface to 
the actual meaning. For example, the appearance of Presley’s poor health conditions prior to his 
death is exactly what one would expect from someone attempting to fake their own death, all 
evidence pointing to the plausibility of his death then becomes evidence that he went to great 
lengths to conceal his actual health. The enactment of conspiracy theory culture revolves around 
an almost fever like excitement regarding the accumulation and presentation of evidence, and 
typically an attempted adherence to the aesthetics and style of argumentation of widely accepted 
rhetorical standards. 
 
An outgrowth of the Hofstadter school of conspiracy theory study, Daniel Pipes’s 
 
Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where it Comes From
244
 takes a long 
historical view of paranoia and conspiracy theory thinking throughout the West. While Pipes 
analyzes the prevalence of fears geared towards ultra-powerful secret societies, the majority 
of his cases revolve around the persistence of scapegoating rooted in anti-Semitism. Like 
Hofstadter, Pipes frames conspiracy theory thinking and the paranoid style as a fundamental 
threat to democratic principles, going so far as to center “conspiracism” in an unqualified 
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 indictment of the fascist and communist regimes of the twentieth century. In her investigations 
into totalitarian regimes and the propaganda that aids in both their rise to and maintenance of 
power, Hannah Arendt also places conspiracy theories at the forefront of her diagnosis.
245 
 
Similarly, Robert Robins and Jerrold Post’s Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of 
Hatred
246
 positions the paranoid style at the heart of twentieth century political turmoil, 
featuring short historical analyses of political upheaval or specific figures. These works identify 
conspiracy theories with a strong and charismatic leader, and although Pipes does spend a bit of 
time arguing for the threat of the web as a vehicle for conspiracy theories, their outline of the 
features of conspiracy theories are relatively inflexible for different forms of intellectual 
diffusion or political organization. 
 
In Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture, Elaine Showalter eschews the 
attention paid to charismatic leaders and manipulation, and attempts to frame conspiracies as 
groundswell epidemics. She explicitly makes the connection between psychological illness and 
belief in conspiracy theories, making a case for a one-to-one relationship between the two. 
Taking at times a pedantic tone, she addresses a series of contemporary “epidemics” including, 
perhaps most controversially, Gulf War Syndrome (GWS), “contemporary hysterical patients 
blame external sources – a virus, chemical warfare, satanic conspiracy, alien infiltration – for 
psychic problems.”247 Showalter oscillates between identifying these epidemics as individual 
or societal. 
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 For each of these scholars, the problematics arising from conspiracy theories are not 
merely rhetorical. In his analysis of the persistence of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,
248 
 
Chip Berlet posits that the strength of conspiracy theory claims can detach the details of their 
implementation from their often racist and hateful origins. Berlet, a veteran of tracking and 
documenting right-wing hate groups across the political landscape in the U.S., draws this parallel to 
the circulation of theories regarding Barack Obama’s role in the planning and creating of a North 
American Union fusing the interests of Mexico, Canada and the United States. An outgrowth of the 
militia movements of the 1990s, and nurtured by contemporary “patriot” movements, the theory of 
the North American Union expresses a perfect fusion of the suspicion of the federal government with 
an erosion of national sovereignty rooted in nationalist and racist beliefs. Berlet in many ways is the 
canary in the coal mine of the current acceptance of radical conspiracy theories by the mainstream 
political right, as he documents the warnings of the North American Union from such divergent 
political figures as Patrick Buchanan, Ron Paul and Phylis Schlafly.
249
 Berlet places conspiracy 
theories at the heart of American political discourse and identifies three persistent groups around 
which these theories coalesce: the Freemasons and/or the Illuminati; the Plutocrats and/or Bankers; 
and Jews. He maintains that every conspiracy theory that holds purchase on the American 
imagination will have one or more of these groups as their foundation. In the case of the North 
American Union, he tracks the ways in which different groups use particular scapegoats according to 
their prevailing political orientation. Berlet sees the persistence of conspiracy theories as a result of 
many overlapping factors, both historical and 
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 contemporary, fusing religious traditions within the United States, political ideologies founded 
on individualism, economic libertarianism and populism with familiar scapegoats. 
Although conspiracy theories all have their own particular historical moments and 
paranoiac touchstones, each has a set of characteristics that allow for their proliferation. The 
conspirators must be both easily identifiable and relatively obscure from public view – they must 
be seen and not seen simultaneously in order for power to be attributed to them. Jovan Byford 
stresses the power of the broad category in achieving this both identifiable and not identifiable 
quality. A category such as “international bankers” is both a real group of people and completely 
useless in terms of differentiation or identification.
250
 This delicate balance between the visible 
and invisible also characterizes the methods by which conspiracies persist and succeed. 
Conspiracy theories require some form of mass manipulation, otherwise the conspiracy would 
be obvious to everyone. The conspiracy theorist then is cast as uniquely attuned and able to see 
through these forms of mass manipulation to uncover the truth. Ranging from control of the 
media, to purposefully introducing disease into particular populations, to planting microchips 
inside the bodies of the public, these methods of manipulation hinder otherwise healthy human 
agency. The truth and individual autonomy are just out of reach, and most importantly, not 
irretrievable. The conspiracy theories of the twentieth century are often concerned with the 
ownership and means of circulation of information. The rhetorical purchase of media 
manipulation has an extensive history, specifically in its historical ties to anti-Semitism, whose 
echoes are inescapable in contemporary invocations of conspiratorial media production. When 
Charles Lindbergh said that Jewish “ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, 
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 our radio and our Government”251 was the greatest danger to America leading up to World War 
II, he not only advocated for a skepticism toward mainstream cultural production and news 
organizations but also identified Jews as an external force seeking to manipulate American 
hearts and minds. In this instance, a fear of centralized economic power makes an unhappy 
marriage with racist, nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas. In a different vein, the skepticism around 
science and medicine that results in disbelief of humanity’s role in climate change or the 
effective use of vaccination, also paints a picture of a vast conspiracy attempting to silence brave 
dissenters through funding manipulation and false consensus building. 
 
Contemporary opinion polls would lead one to believe that conspiracy theories have moved 
from something on the fringes of mainstream culture, to a typical way the American population 
processes national events signified by change or trauma. In a 2007 Zogby International poll, 42% of 
respondents reported that there was likely a cover-up involved in the investigation of the attacks on 
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
252
 Other polls have asked respondents to specify 
whether or not they thought the U.S. government was directly responsible, or if they had 
foreknowledge and chose to do nothing. The genre of ‘speculative history’
253
 that dominates the 
History Channel has ushered in a new style of narrative development, eschewing traditional rubrics 
of expertise and juxtaposing conspiracy-laden counter-narratives with historical scholarship. 
Ufologists are placed alongside archaeologists to speculate as to the possible hand of alien life in the 
construction of ancient civilizations, and the decades long saga surrounding the airing of The Men 
Who Killed Kennedy only served to drive ratings up. So too have conspiracy theories crept into the 
24-hour television news cycle, as they 
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 are repeated and legitimated by news anchors. Advocates of the “birther” conspiracy theory, 
postulating that Barack Obama is not a true citizen of the United States and thereby required a 
large scale cover up to doctor his birth certificate, saw their numbers grow and support 
strengthen as their questions circulated across news outlets in tandem with factual reporting. In 
the process, CNN’s Lou Dobbs, as well as many Fox News anchors, legitimated not just the 
birther agenda but also its underlying racist foundations. 
In each of these stances towards conspiracy theory development and the persistence of 
conspiracy theories, a most difficult reconciliation remains. Somewhere between the cognitive 
dissonance that dominates much of the evidentiary paradigm of conspiracy, and the reality of 
actual cover-ups and conspiracies, lies a space fertile with potential narrative. The question of 
what qualifies as a conspiracy theory has been breached by many, framed alternately as an issue 
of epistemology or simply as a matter of venue.
254
 I argue that conspiracy theories and 
classified information infrastructure are co-constitutive in three significant ways: classified 
information infrastructure normalizes secrecy and places it at the center of the relationship 
between citizenry and the state, eroding trust; the temporal scale of classified information 
infrastructure creates an informational vacuum for determinate time periods, requiring citizens 
to fill in the blanks concerning government activities and historical development; and classified 
information infrastructure requires and generates new evidential paradigms as established 
evidential paradigms break down. As Jack Bratich argues, conspiracy theories are understood 
by their relationship to what Foucault calls a “regime of truth.”255 
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
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 which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.
256 
 
This is key to understanding how classified information infrastructure and conspiracy theories 
co-constitute one another, as they legitimate not only the content, but the mechanisms by which 
truth and historical narrative are formed. Ginzburg’s discussion of paradigm has been discussed 
previously but it is worth refiguring here. Specifically, the temporal orientation of venatic 
deduction uses current traces left behind as a guide to creating a relationship between part to 
whole, as well as present to past. These connections are at the root of the development of 
juridical standards of evidence within the American justice system. Evidence is considered 
evidence as such if it maintains a traceable connection to an event, its authenticity and 
admissibility relying on the preservation of this chain. Government records act as evidence not 
just of the organizational activity of singular agencies, but as a means for constructing 
contemporary and historical narratives about the activities of public officials. Classified 
information is a sanctioned break in the provision of evidence, leaving space for alternative 
narrative building and the development of new evidential paradigms that stem from new data or 
no data. 
 
We Want to Believe 
 
Explanations for the witnessing of unexplained phenomena are the stuff of mythology 
throughout human life. Unidentified flying objects are no different, that is until the relative 
increase in sightings coincided with shifts in military technology and political paranoia most 
exemplified by the hysteric response to the 1938 airing of the science fiction radio drama 
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 adaptation of H.G. Wells The War of the Worlds. The “foo fighters” routinely seen throughout 
World War II by Allied pilots lay the foundation for contemporary ufology in the United States; 
confirmed by Kenneth Arnold’s sighting at Mt. Rainier, Washington in 1947. The “foo fighters” 
were understood by most to be experimental aircraft, but laid the groundwork for a powerful mixture 
of fear and mistrust. Furthermore, they helped shape the Arnold sighting which became the bedrock 
upon which the aesthetics of so-called alien craft and the narratives constructed around them would 
be built. Kenneth Arnold was himself a pilot, who on June 24, 1947, was searching for the wreckage 
of a Marine Corp C-46 transport airplane that had crashed. While in the air, he witnessed what he 
described as nine flashes of light in quick succession that with distance became clearer. Arnold 
described the objects in detail, even supplying a rough sketch as evidence to the Army Air Force.
257
 
The coining of the term “flying saucer” was an embellishment by the press, as Arnold had stated that 
the objects flew as if they were saucers skipping on water. Alternately, Arnold described their 
configuration as “flying on a single, horizontal plane, but they also weaved from side to side, 
occasionally flipping and banking – darting around….the tail of a Chinese kite.”
258
 The visual gave 
a somewhat experienced pilot the impression that the crafts were not piloted and although he 
initially thought he was witnessing the testing of experimental aircraft, he would also state that the 
sighting gave him an “eerie feeling.”
259
 The concept of flying saucers, birthed by what Arnold 
understood as a misquote and misunderstanding of his original description, diffused throughout 
American popular media and seeing flying saucers became somewhat of a household phenomenon. 
In a 1967 report on the 
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 dramatic increase in sightings of unexplained aerial phenomena, Ted Bloecher, one of the first 
in the burgeoning field of ufology, documented 853 sightings
260
 of flying saucers in 1947 in the 
United States and Canada alone following Arnold’s description. It is difficult to overestimate the 
extent to which the imagery of Arnold’s original sighting permeated popular culture. Comics, 
television shows and movies circulated the images of flying saucers, and the narratives around 
them were routinely paired with stories of invasion, takeover and the destruction of humankind 
by alien life. 
 
Arnold’s sighting, and with it the solidification of the flying saucer as a common cultural 
touchstone for a post-WWII generation, did not operate within a vacuum. 1947 remains an 
auspicious year in the annals of ufology, as a few weeks later saw the event that would become 
known as the “Roswell incident.” The existence of alien life is in and of itself not a conspiracy. 
The conspiracy is the cover up of that existence by the United States government, but the 
histories of the potential existence and cover up are twin histories, their genesis mere weeks apart 
and their presence in the American cultural landscape inextricable. From an evidentiary 
standpoint, the sightings had provided people with eyewitness testimony, whereas Roswell 
offered a tantalizing promise of forensic evidence. After a preliminary press release, written by 
Lieutenant Walter Haut, initial interest in the Roswell crash died down as the military offered up 
the explanation of a downed weather balloon. The press conference was a parade of physical 
evidence, including the crumpled foil of the balloon itself; an offering to a scared and skeptical 
public that all of the elements were not only there, but were easily identifiable, familiar and fit 
into expected activities. 
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Figure 5: A.J. Bond Johnson photo of Gen. Ramey with the alleged Roswell debris. Credit - Fort Worth Star- Telegram 
Photograph Collection, Special Collections Division, The University of Texas at Arlington Libraries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In their book, UFO Crash at Roswell: The Genesis of a Modern Myth, Saler, Ziegler and Moore 
argued that the persistence of stories about Roswell resemble the methods of circulation of 
traditional folk tales, relying on trusted storytellers within a circumscribed community, shifting 
slightly with the generations but remaining faithful to its core elements. Economies and 
communities have materialized around the resurgence of interest in Roswell since the 1970s, 
including conventions, books, talk show appearances and various media spectacles. Each of 
these takes as its center a particular narrative and evidential framework from the initial crash and 
builds the case for a sustained government cover up of the truth. The release of classified 
information related to Roswell is a perennial topic for government officials. Famously, then 
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 candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President of the United States Bill Richardson 
alluded to his own thwarted attempts as a Congressman to secure the release of Roswell 
documents by the Department of Defense and the Los Alamos Lab. He stated, “The government 
doesn’t tell the truth as much as it should on a lot of issues.”261 Most recently, Presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton publicly stated her intention to release Roswell documents when 
appearing in an interview with late-night talk show host Jimmy Kimmel, leading some in the 
ufology community to dub her the first “E.T. candidate.”262 For many, the release of these 
documents would presumably serve to authenticate the knowledge already contained in the MJ-
12 documents. While MJ-12 represents a much larger set of events than the singular Roswell, in 
many ways it is undeniably linked, as the original two MJ-12 documents refer to a crash and 
retrieval team, not just researchers or investigators but a team designed specifically to deal with 
Roswell-like incidents. 
 
Although popular interest in the existence of extraterrestrials has remained at a steady pitch, 
the issue has remained marginal with respect to research communities. Scientific and establishment 
agendas have rarely seriously added extraterrestrial life to their agenda, creating a kind of “social 
stigmatization” associated with the interests.
263
 The assumption of illegitimacy has positioned 
research into the phenomena as marginal, and over the last several decades, a parallel research 
community has emerged. Research institutions, conferences and other forms of information sharing, 
peer review and circulation have solidified, taking their cues from 
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 established and reputable academic institutions. Within the United States, these parallel 
institutions often frame their activities as counter-balancing or directly antagonistic towards 
government secrecy. These boundaries between academic research and ufology were not entirely 
solid, a handful of researchers have expressed at least interest in the possibility,
264
 but since the 
Condon Report was published in 1968, asserting that the work of a commission on UFOs out of 
the University of Colorado had yielded nothing of value or interest in two decades, serious 
academic research has been scant
265
; barring those scientists associated with the ongoing work 
at the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI).
266
 These communities have also had to 
develop their own means of collecting, sharing and preserving information about sightings on a 
grand scale. The International UFO Museum and Research Center in Roswell, New Mexico 
implemented a unique cataloging system organizing their resources according to incident level, 
since many of their resources are made up of personal testimonies. The Mutual UFO Network 
(MUFON)
267
 maintains a crowdsourced database of UFO sightings that anyone can contribute 
to and access through a simple form. Many people also keep personal collections; amateur 
ufologists such as Luis Schonherr developed a personal cataloging system in order to keep track 
of almost 3000 cases of UFO sightings he maintained on individual index cards.
268
 In a broad 
sense, these research practices are seen as counter to scientific standards as they often rely on 
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 eyewitness testimonies, and can be characterized as a system of belief in search of scientific 
support rather than the other way around. Much like the larger pattern of academic research into 
conspiracy theories, researchers focusing on communities of UFO believers have consistently 
pathologized their subjects.
269
 This long-standing antagonism and positioning of oppositional 
knowledge institutions and research practices characterizes the way in which ufology 
communities consider evidence from the United States government. Reactions to reports from 
government entities range from skepticism to anger, as many see the government not just as a 
disinterested party but as active participants in campaigns of disinformation and sustained cover-
up. Therefore, a leaked government document might be considered more likely to be authentic 
evidence than one released intentionally by the government itself. The discourse that has 
coalesced around the MJ-12 betrays the vitality of situating the document as evidence within 
pre-existing systems of belief and evaluation. 
 
A Note on Authenticity 
 
Within archival studies and practice, authenticity as both a state and a concept takes on 
slightly different or more complex meaning than the colloquial understanding of authenticity. 
Authenticity relies on the relationship between the record and the creator(s) of the record; an 
authentic record is a record that is created by the entities represented as the creator. However, 
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 authenticity does not necessarily have anything to do with the truth or reliability of the record. 
 
For example, a document containing the signature of Harry S. Truman is considered authentic if 
 
the signature is verified, even if that document purposefully misrepresents reality, it is proof that 
 
the document came from where it claims to be from, not that its contents are true. To this end, 
 
methods of determining authenticity rely on contextual clues and processes of determining 
 
similarity dissimilarity to other records, 
 
Validating authenticity entails verifying claims that are associated with an object – in 
effect, verifying that an object is indeed what it claims to be, or what it is claimed to be 
(by external metadata). It is important to note that tests of authenticity deal only with 
specific claims (for example,’ did X author this document?’ and not with open-ended 
inquiry (‘Who wrote it?’). Validating the authenticity of an object is more limited than 
is an open-ended inquiry into its nature and provenance.
270 
 
Hoax or Proof? Authenticating the MJ-12 Documents 
 
An entire cottage industry has arisen around determining the authenticity of the MJ-12 
 
documents. Their status has created camps within the ufology community, drained financial 
 
resources from several entities and resulted in one external investigation on the part of the United 
 
States Air Force. Over the past few decades, the number of MJ-12 documents has exploded, 
 
growing from the original three received by Shandera to hundreds, each representing degrees of 
 
connection to the original documents, however tenuous. Although the number of MJ-12 
 
documents have proliferated greatly, for the purposes of this analysis, I will remain constrained 
 
to the original documents: the Eisenhower briefing document, the Truman-Forrestal memo. 
 
Three methodologies have emerged for their potential authentication or debunking, including: 
 
the use of forensics by Bob and Ryan Wood; the use of linguistic analysis by Michael Heiser and 
 
Carol Chaski; and the historical/contextual approach championed by Stanton Friedman. The 
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 Eisenhower briefing document lists the committee of twelve scientists, military officers and 
government officials tasked with both crash retrieval and the cover up of extraterrestrials after 
describing the recovery of a wreckage in 1947. It also includes the development of an alternate 
story to combat the public’s knowledge of extraterrestrial life. The Truman-Forrestal memo is 
a memorandum signed by President Harry Truman directing then Secretary of Defense James 
Forrestal to move forward with the Majestic Twelve with “all due speed and caution.”271 
 
Bob and Ryan Wood have devoted a significant portion of their careers and reputations 
to authenticating and providing information about the MJ-12 documents. They maintain a 
website providing researchers with copies of the documents along with an authentication rating 
and analysis of their historical context. The Woods’ understanding of authenticity is complex, 
pulling from an amalgamation of standards and practices, but always foregrounding forensic 
techniques. Their central concern remains placing these documents within reputable and 
replicable circles in order to facilitate wider, mainstream acceptance of their theories. In an 
“Introduction to Authenticity Ratings,” they outline six separate questions for assessing the 
authenticity of documents including: 
1. Where did the document come from? 
 
2. What are the results of the forensic paper, ink, watermark, typewriter and handwriting 
tests? 
3. Are there unique and obscure content markers that are accurate for this type of 
document? 
4. Are there direct first hand witnesses? 
 
5. How difficult is the document to hoax or fake? 
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 6. Who would have faked the document and why? 
 
In addition to these questions, the Woods also stress that each question and its attendant answer are 
not equal, there are relative weights given to particular aspects of the documents, “For example, there 
is a strong difference between forensic paper and ink testing, a weighting of 5.0, and more easily 
obtained document content, a weighting factor of 2.0. Courts widely recognize this concept, 
discounting eyewitness testimony in favor of DNA evidence.”
272
 The Woods are consistently 
aligning their methods of authentication and their standards of evidence with juridical systems, 
claiming authority through similar adherence to basic concepts and some similar techniques of 
analysis. Ufology is especially concerned with asserting legitimacy, as their claims for so long relied 
on eyewitness testimony and the first-hand experiences of survivors and abductees demonstrate. The 
website makes repeated claims that their tools are adequate not only for confirming their own beliefs, 
but for converting the skeptic through the application of objective tools and analysis. Their final 
analyses considers eight weighted factors, including: eyewitnesses or first-hand witnesses that have 
seen, written, read or destroyed the document in question are given a weighting factor of 3.0; zingers 
are verifiable rare subtleties of particular documents, their example is “typographical anomalies 
associated with the printed process of the era,” and these are given a weighting factor of 5.0; content 
secures a weighting factor of 2.0 and refers to the words and meanings contained within the 
document; chronology considers the document within the context of organizational history and 
garners a weighting factor of 2.0; typography regards the techniques of production and reproduction 
and is given a weighting factor of 4.0; forensics considers testing inks, paper and watermarks against 
known and shared standard, this has a weighting factor of 5.0; linguistics utilizes expert analysis of 
syntax and style 
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 and is given a weighting factor of 3.0; anachronisms considers formatting, dates or other detail 
that would be inappropriate for the time period in which the original document was produced, 
this is given a weighting factor of 5.0. 
While the Woods have scrutinized the mountain of MJ-12 documents that have surfaced 
since 1984, in each of their analyses they include a curious redundant preamble. The logic follows 
that we know there have been UFO crashes due to the physical traces and remains of the crafts, in 
addition to eyewitness testimony. Therefore, we would assume that the United States government 
would have developed a plan to deal with the consequences and fall out from such knowledge. 
Presumably then, if such a government plan were formulated, we would then infer, bureaucracy 
being what it is, that there would be quite a substantive paper trail. In turn, we know that some 
documents must exist and, given the nature of classified documentation, we will only have 
incomplete information and means of authentication so we must start at a different point. “To take 
the position that without proof of genuineness they are fake is illogical because of the certainty that 
such documents exist if crashes have occurred. Similarly, to take the position that, without proof of 
fakery, they are genuine is also illogical because it is certainly true that some fake documents might 
exist. This logic says that, before a questioned document determination, it is equally likely that they 
are genuine as that they are fake.”
273
 (Author’s emphasis.) It should be noted that the Woods favor 
considering the documents as a whole, and although they do provide individual document 
authenticity ratings, their emphasis remains on this as a class of documents. Skeptics both inside and 
outside of the ufology community have pointed to this as the Woods’ and the MJ-12 documents’ 
Achilles heel, as the house of cards relies on authentication across documents. In a two-part essay for 
the MUFON UFO Journal in 1999, former MUFON Board 
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 Member Tom Deuley presented this as the crux of his skepticism. The bulk of the MJ-12 
documents were given to the Woods by another source, Tim Cooper. Since the provenance of the 
MJ-12 documents is one of their most obvious issues, the Woods published a document on their 
website entitled “Ten Reasons Why Tim Cooper is NOT a Provenance Problem.”274 Cooper 
acted as an independent researcher and claims that the majority of his documents were received 
through FOIA requests with a few in-person sources, including a CIA archivist. The Woods 
rebuttal document includes allusions to evidence of postmarks, the assessment of a forensic 
typewriter specialist named Dr. James Black and Cooper’s own lack of interest in attention and 
fame. Most curious is reason number 10, however, which deviates drastically from the former 
insistence on context, authentication and external verification. 
 
10. Although of speculative value, high quality remote viewing (psychic) assets have 
targeted Tim Cooper and the documents and concluded the documents are 
predominately real and Cooper is not a forger. In fact, there seems to be multiple origins 
of documents feeding to Cooper.
275 
 
While police departments have been known to include psychics as investigatory resources
276
 and on 
occasion some psychics have been allowed to testify in court,
277
 psychic confirmation cannot be 
widely considered a standard forensic technique of authentication. While in some ways, this 
blending of epistemological frameworks and commitments is characteristic of ufology circles, it 
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 is distinct here as the Woods pride themselves on their commitment to generalizable, agreed 
upon techniques of authentication. Vitally, Cooper’s addition to the group of MJ-12 documents 
provided the Woods with a second version of the Eisenhower Briefing Document and the 
Truman-Forrestal memo, versions that were not photos, allowing them to analyze the paper and 
typographical techniques, which they determined to be authentic. Currently, they assess these 
documents with the highest possible rating on their authenticity scale. Their quest to provide 
evidence in support of the documents’ authenticity also includes direct responses to issues 
raised by critics. 
Although the Woods have taken on the mantle of providing a comprehensive guide to 
the MJ-12 documents, Stanton Friedman is most closely associated with long standing efforts to 
authenticate the documents. Friedman is a retired nuclear physicist who has found a robust 
second career in ufology. He has written five books and dozens of articles, including a book 
devoted to the MJ-12 documents and what they reveal. He contends that “…the documents, 
when carefully and objectively examined, lead to the conclusion that there was indeed an 
Operation Majestic-12.”278 There are many people, skeptics and believers alike, who have taken 
issue with the investment in the MJ-12 documents. Throughout their research efforts, Moore, 
Shandera and Friedman have conceded the possibility that the documents are fraudulent,
279
 but 
insisting that whether or not they are fraudulent, they would have had to have been produced 
from within the government.
280
 None have been more vocal than Philip Klass, who has 
insinuated himself into the authentication debate at every turn. He and Friedman have a 
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 particular tone of dismissiveness for each other, both in their publications and in the handful of 
interviews they have done together. In his book on the documents, Friedman says of Klass, “…in 
denigrating UFOs in general and the MJ-12 briefing document in particular, [Philip] Klass is 
basically whistling in the dark. The small amount of time he has spent in archives shows that he 
is essentially an armchair theorist, as are most debunkers…his minimal research, flawed logic, 
and propagandistic writing call into question of his claims…”281 Friedman consistently 
references his time spent in multiple government archives and his deep knowledge of archival 
research. His methods for authentication predominantly rely on this strength, he builds a case for 
authenticity through confirming details and context within and outside of the documents. For the 
Eisenhower Briefing Document, Friedman has claimed that there is no “mistaken information” in 
the document, solidifying its claims to authenticity.
282 
 
The centrality of mechanisms for knowledge sharing and information evaluation within 
the ufology community makes publications in circulation venues for disagreement and consensus 
building. Citizens Against UFO Secrecy was an activist organization founded in 1977 focused 
specifically on putting pressure on the United States government to make information about 
UFOS publicly available. The organization filed FOIA requests and published a newsletter 
entitled Just Cause three times a year. Just Cause featured analysis of the MJ-12 documents and 
the cultures growing around them between 1985-1990. 
 
In early 1989, Just Cause published information regarding a developing project between 
former National Enquirer reporter Bob Pratt, William Moore and Richard Doty, the goal of 
which was to release MJ-12 related information within fictional contexts. This triad represented 
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 the complexity of relationships, motivations and vantage points circulating within these 
communities. While Moore was investigating Doty as a possible source of intentional 
government disinformation concerning UFOs, Pratt was investigating both of his partners on the 
project under a similar light. The proceedings from the 2007 International MUFON Symposium, 
a venue for consistent and lively debate concerning the MJ-12 documents, among many other 
things, reveal the devolution of Moore’s reputation within the ufology community as revelations 
of his participation in disinformation campaigns were alleged. In the proceedings, Brad Sparks 
and Barry Greenwood trace the movement of information back and forth between Moore and 
Doty. They use Friedman and Moore’s own claims about their identification of key names and 
dates prior to any release of MJ-12 documents as evidence of their aid, either implicitly or 
explicitly, in document forgery.
283
 Sparks and Greenwood also repeat the call for Shandera, 
Moore and Friedman to release the postcards and other communication with anonymous sources 
as contextual information, bolstering the evidence of document authenticity. Sparks and 
Greenwood see all of Friedman’s work of lining up figures and dates as collapsing under the 
weight of its own circularity. As Friedman has stated, “somebody had to do a lot of homework 
that no one else has done,” identifying himself and Moore as the primary researchers on Roswell 
and the crash recovery/cover-up.
284
 From the point of view of Sparks and Greenwood, the 
preeminent researchers on a phenomenon meticulously compiled details which they then shared 
with government insiders who, in turn, produced documents confirming the information they 
were given; Moore and Friedman may have inadvertently created the very disinformation they 
consumed. 
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 Friedman’s authentication work represents the most complete of the historical/contextual 
framework, as his extensive archival work and first-hand interviews attempt to verify details 
within the records with supporting documentation or witness testimony. Friedman was 
extensively supported by the larger ufology community, receiving a $16,000.00 grant
285
 from 
the Fund for UFO Research to conduct his studies. One of his biggest revelations was the extent 
to which Donald Menzel, an alleged member of the MJ-12, was himself involved in secret 
government work. Friedman’s research asserted that Menzel had done work for the CIA, NSA 
and more than thirty corporations, and was fluent in several languages and cryptography. 
Menzel’s status had been as a public skeptic, so Friedman’s allegations cast Menzel as leading 
somewhat of a double life. 
 
Friedman’s final report and subsequent book were awaited with great anticipation, and 
commented upon extensively in several newsletters and community publications. Just Cause 
repeatedly covered Friedman’s investigations and other MJ-12 related updates, their general tone 
increasing with credulity as events unfolded in late 1987, calling the saga a “fiasco” and 
systematically taking apart the main arguments made by proponents of the documents’ 
authenticity.
286
 Three years later they were steeped in their critique, asserting that it is an important 
story “for the devastating effect it has had on legitimate government document research on UFOs,” 
and stating, “[t]here is no question that because of the MJ-12 story, the credibility of that with which 
CAUS deals has been seriously damaged.”
287
 While Just Cause remained skeptical throughout their 
coverage of the MJ-12 story, the tone of later publications contrasts greatly with the hopeful, 
investigatory spirit of initial coverage.
288
 Once the tide turned, 
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 the intimate nature of the ufology community itself became a source of evidence against the 
authenticity of the documents. In a 1990 issue of Just Cause, Robert G. Todd uses details of his 
own correspondence with Moore to outline similarities between the Eisenhower Briefing 
Document and his personal letters. Todd shows Moore’s return address, which he alleges is made 
with a stamp kit, and compares this with the headers included in the Eisenhower Briefing 
Document, drawing similar typographic details including the raised letter “I.”289 
 
Another method peppered throughout both Woods and Friedman’s work is linguistic 
analysis. However, Michael Heiser and Carol Chaski were the two researchers with the skills and 
background who focused primarily on linguistic authentication. Although their methodologies 
excluded many of the documents as they only examined those with clear author attribution and were 
of substantive length. In his report on their analysis, Heiser explains Chaski’s methods, including 
biometric analysis, qualitative analysis of idiosyncracies and quantitative computational stylometric 
analysis of the language in the documents. The only possible method to employ with respect to the 
MJ-12 documents is the third, “focusing on readily computable and countable language features, e.g. 
word length, phrase length, sentence length, vocabulary frequency, distribution of words of different 
lengths…function word frequency and punctuation.
290
 For their analysis, Heiser and Chaski ran 
computational stylistic comparisons between verifiable authored documents and known MJ-12 
documents, looking for statistically significant overlap. Of the documents tested, only the Cutler-
Twining memo was determined to be likely authentic. Many in the ufology community dismiss this 
analysis as part of a political 
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 agenda on the part of Heiser whose work has included research countering theories about 
alien civilizations. 
The FBI has investigated MJ-12 documents sent to its offices in 1988 and although the 
details of their report were not published, MJ-12 documents were published on the FBI website; 
the only difference between these documents and the ones published by Wood and his cohort is 
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 that the FBI’s version has BOGUS jubilantly written across the pages.
291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Page 5 of the Majestic 12 documents in "The Vault" Credit: The FBI 
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 NARA maintains a short disclaimer on their website alongside their documents and reports 
concerning the Air Force and Project BLUE BOOK. The statement refers to “numerous inquiries 
concerning documents identified as ‘MJ12,’” describes several searches for these documents and 
details references made to them at NARA, including within the records of the U.S Air Force, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Truman and Eisenhower Libraries, and the National Security Council. 
Their searches yielded but one result for a “Memorandum for General Twining, from Robert 
Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, Subject: ‘NCS/MJ-12 Special Studies Project” dated 
July 14, 1954, and the memo does not define or identify MJ-12.
292 
 
Diplomatics 
 
Diplomatics, which was reconceptualized as contemporary archival displomatics in the 
1990s by archival scholar Luciana Duranti. Duranti’s invocation of diplomatics techniques 
responded to the need for working with electronic records. Medieval documents needed to be 
considered and authenticated individually, and the methodologies used arose out of this 
particular need. Duranti posited that these methodologies were relevant in the face of changing 
formats and technological contexts, and could assist in providing a framework for determining 
the authenticity of digital records. This is not to say that each document must contain all of these 
elements, or that somehow something does not qualify as a document if it does not contain one 
element. The central driving force behind diplomatic analysis remains enabling the determination 
of authenticity through the identification of relationships between form and function. Form, or 
what diplomatics considers the set of conventions and rules that govern representation, can be 
broken out from the specific persons, institutions or operations about which a document might 
be. According to diplomatics, form is comprised of extrinsic and intrinsic elements. The extrinsic 
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 elements are the material of the document, its medium, seals, annotations, original markings, the 
“technique used to prepare it for receiving the message.”293 Language is key here, beyond 
meaning conventions, order and formatting are what distinguish particular disciplinary or 
administrative norms. This has some relationship to the concept of genre, which dictates what is 
determined by the relationship between the function of the document and its formal qualities. In 
other words, you might communicate the same basic information in an inter-office memo and a 
year-end report, but their formal qualities would signal the audience and intent in particular 
ways. Since diplomatics arose as a set of methodologies to determine and analyze the 
authenticity of medieval documents, the seal was a vital extrinsic documentary element. While 
this might not be immediately relevant, its contemporary corollaries such as the stamp, folder or 
markings remain central in determining the “authority and solemnity of a document, its 
provenance and function, and its authenticity.”294 In addition, the annotations contained within 
the document are considered extrinsic. Annotations can include those added by an archives or 
records manager in order to identify the document as part of a group of document, or to enable 
its findability and subsequent retrieval; those considered as part of the transaction that claims the 
document as part of its process, or after the completion of an event documented. The forms of 
annotations are varied but include signatures, notes, inter-agency or office instructions, marks 
and signs and other evidence of movement throughout contexts during both the handling of the 
document and through its subsequent management. A document’s intrinsic elements are 
comprised of its protocol, text and eschatol, and are all derived from a sense of an ideal text; 
which is also a concept in bibliographic and textual studies.
295
 The protocol, or the signaling of 
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 the administrative context of the document’s production and circulation, includes the people and 
agencies or institutions involved. This contains the letterhead, the date issued, the superscription 
(if present, this will signal the author of the document), inscription (which indicates the 
intended audience or receiver), salutation and subject.
296
 The text of the document typically 
makes up the bulk of the document, and it constitutes the desires of the author or authorizing 
agency, might provide description or evidence of a singular act, or describes the memory or 
impact of an act. While this might be the most salient part of the document for the majority of 
scholars, simply understood as the content, with respect to diplomatics it is to be similarly 
considered as the document’s other qualities. The final intrinsic element of a text is the eschatol, 
or the attestation of the context of the documents final authorization, which might include 
another date specific to the witnessing or signing of a document; in addition to complimentary 
clauses or any accompanying notes about the circumstances of signing. For the purposes of 
analyzing the MJ-12 documents, diplomatics is a particularly salient methodology with its focus 
on individual documents outside of documentary context, as well as their aesthetic and formal 
qualities. In its resurgence with respect to electronic records, an attention to the tools of 
production are also of interest. 
 
For their part, the ufologists working to authenticate the MJ-12 documents circle these 
techniques, claiming their authority but rarely implementing the most thorough practice. Take for 
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 example, the examination of the signature of Harry S. Truman in the Truman-Forrestal memo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The Truman-Forrestal Memo Credit: Ryan Woods 
 
 
 
Diplomatics draws a clear line from the status and form of a particular signature to the 
document’s claims to authenticity; authentication “is the legal recognition that a signature is 
affixed by and belongs to the person whose name it expresses, that a document is what it 
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 purports to be, or that a copy conforms to an original.
297
 Since the signature of Harry S. 
Truman is present on a multitude of documents that can be authenticated quite easily, it is one 
of the many things that has fixated ufologists on either side of the authentication debate. 
Stanton Friedman and the Woods have drawn parallels to another known memo from Truman 
to Vannevar Bush written in 1947. Philip Klass and other skeptics have attempted to prefigure 
assumptions around the signature’s resemblance to other Truman documents by focusing on the 
mediation of the MJ-12 documents. Klass has specifically pointed to the possibility of Xerox 
technology being used by forgers to create an identical signature.
298
 By calling attention to the 
potential forgery enabled by xerography, Klass may have accidentally put these documents into 
dialog with some of the most famous leaked classified documents in American history, the 
Pentagon Papers. Daniel Ellsberg’s process of photocopying and releasing what later became 
known as the Pentagon Papers involved editorial work through Xerox, as he sometimes omitted 
classified markings or other contextual information, understanding the documents’ evidentiary 
value as something entirely outside of bibliographic fidelity or aesthetic consistency.
299 
 
The MJ-12 Documents as Imagined Records 
 
In two articles, archival scholars Anne Gilliland and Michelle Caswell position the concept 
of imagined records as a resistant framework challenging juridical standards of evidence that have 
understood records narrowly, discounting affective registers, eyewitness testimony and collective 
counter-narratives.
300
 This work seeks to expand the function of the record both inside 
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 and outside of official contexts. Narratives proliferate around the MJ-12 documents in spite of 
the dubious results of decades long investigations into their authenticity, suggesting that their 
persistence fulfills functions external to traditional juridical evidentiary structures. The 
documents express a collective desire to prove not just the existence of extraterrestrials, but also 
the existence of a long-standing government cover-up. The confirmation of these desires could 
only be expressed by leaked government documents. Classified information infrastructure 
facilitates the imaginary by relying on a persistent informational absence. 
Caswell and Gilliland offer up a critique of the quest for a singular truth. In the fact of its 
spectacular inadequacy within the context of post-conflict societies or human rights related 
tribunals, a singular truth is not only impossible but may not be desirable. While the stakes in 
this case are radically different, the evidential economies and parallel scientific institutions 
maintained and nurtured by ufologists express a similar desire to operate outside of the bounds of 
the accepted. The MJ-12 documents are a unique example of this, as they still commit to the 
primacy of the tangible, which is roundly taken apart in Gilliland and Caswell’s critique. The 
records and the vibrant debates around their authenticity also provide an opportunity for a 
subversion of official truth-making and the state’s version of events. For any community defined 
by an adversarial relationship to the state, especially one characterized by paranoia and lack of 
trust, the control over the mechanisms of authorizing evidence are paramount. 
 
Conclusion 
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 This dissertation is partly an experiment in thinking infrastructurally about classified 
information. In attempting to pin down the constituent parts of classified information 
infrastructure, we have new insight into the ways in which records are produced, managed and 
preserved (or not) within a complex array of technological, organizational and social 
arrangements. Rather than use this conclusion to revisit some of the previous arguments made, 
what follows will consider some of the larger conceptual and practical shifts required by 
thinking infrastructurally, and how these developments can affect change within Archival 
Studies, Information Studies and Infrastructure Studies. 
Each chapter in this dissertation focused on a piece of the infrastructure puzzle, but 
what can bringing them together do? At the level of policy and training, an ideal type of 
classified information infrastructure is articulated. This ideal type assumes the legitimacy of 
official secrecy and represents information as a carrier of potential risk building classified 
information into the fabric of narratives of national security. Classified information 
infrastructure is co-constituted by ever deepening investments and reliance on private contracts. 
As public investment in technological infrastructure has waned, the technologies of 
classification have become significant competitive markets. Work that had been conceived of 
as inherently governmental is up for bid, under the dominant rubric of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. This rearrangement of investment prioritizes short term commitments over 
enduring ones. The national security industrial complex blurs distinctions between political and 
economic commitments, figuring public information as an untapped profit center and eliding 
significant questions about long term use and integrity. 
 
Classified information infrastructure is irrevocably embedded within private economic 
networks. Infrastructure is built upon an installed base, its persistence and strength the flipside of 
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 its intractability. This base includes individual devices developed with information security 
protocols, proprietary software, forms and formats and network architecture, just to name a few, 
and makes the profitability of contractors synonymous with continued security. 
Rupture within classified information infrastructure is often spectacular, as the need for 
secrecy must always be performed in order to be justified. The close examination of the case of 
Hillary Clinton’s private email server reveals several things including the mundanity of 
breakdown, the routine ignorance of protocols and guidance, the lack of technical expertise 
throughout the government. What was characterized as an exception and a drastic one as that is 
revealed to be business as usual. These punctuated spectacles justify the vitality and necessity of 
secrecy at the federal level. In this instance then, rupture is a structural feature of this 
infrastructure, rather than something that merely reveals its otherwise smooth functioning. 
Paradoxically, classified information infrastructure operates in the public sphere not just 
through the performance of spectacular failure but also through its imaginative properties. The 
known existence of secret information allows for collective imaginings about the activities of the 
government, producing knowledge cultures and communities from the absence of information. 
We see this with the robust community that has formed around the Majestic-12 documents, a 
community with complex and unique evidentiary practices. 
Problems that proliferate within classified information infrastructure are created through 
the interaction of protocols, technological systems and cultural norms and expectations. 
Competing temporalities of these constituencies create a temporal disjunction of records in 
which their status is troubled by anachronisms exemplified by the persistence of “print and file” 
practices. This leads to an artificially hampered record, keeping systems bounded by the inability 
of law and technology to participate in an even exchange. As records move through a system, the 
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 system itself becomes as much a document of organizational practice as the content or form of an 
individual record. 
We must move beyond the assumptions built into both the life-cycle model of records 
and archives management and the records continuum model, as they still conceptualize some 
kind of fixed entity that moves within a system. In thinking infrastructurally about classified 
information, it becomes imperative to shift the figure and ground to consider the system itself as 
the record. This does not eliminate the need for assessing value, implementing retention 
schedules, conducting appraisal and other such activities, but does require archival thinking to 
be part and parcel of every day communication practices. As we have seen, NARA does not 
have the financial or logistical support to substantively address their existing workload much 
less act in oversight or regulatory capacities. However, as records become ever more embedded 
in complex arrangements of proprietary hardware and software, and overlapping systems of 
recordkeeping and networked communication, it is vital for NARA to reconceptualize its 
relationship to the daily work of government agencies; integrating their principles and practices 
from the point of creation instead of acting only after the transfer of records occurs between 
agencies. Classified records themselves also need reconceptualization, as they are new records 
with each iteration. 
 
This temporal disjuncture has also led to an increase in transferring human expertise in 
marking and handling records to automated systems. This is both a response to complexity and 
cost, but fundamentally shifts responsibility as well as practice. While standards and protocols 
for marking and handling classified information are public knowledge, published routinely by 
government agencies in accessible forms, the details of proprietary software and hardware are 
not available to citizens, rendering this layer of transparency inert. Thinking infrastructurally 
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 about classified records enables us to shift the narrative away from rupture as exceptional and 
recognize a system in a state of perpetual breakdown that requires a radical rethinking. 
Particularly if we continue to see government records as key to a sustained healthy relationship 
between citizens and the state, as a critical tool in crafting historical narrative, and the formation 
of diverse knowledge communities. Further work needs to be done toward developing a model of 
system as record that adequately addresses these prevailing issues. Additionally, this work 
focused on the United States federal context specifically. Future work could consider the ways in 
which cultures of secrecy and the historical development of secrecy infrastructure develop 
alongside political cultures. Much of the conspiracy theory literature labors to point to a uniquely 
American political sensibility that produces the conditions for ongoing narratives, but this does 
not mean conspiracy theories do not exist elsewhere. Crucially, classified information 
infrastructure is no longer nationally isolated. Global economics, technologies and supply chains 
dominate contracts and cooperation between governments in terms of information sharing 
dictates that practices and standards must be legible and open enough to allow for 
communication. The installed base of infrastructure creates a condition of precarity in which 
shifting economic or political winds could present significant challenges public information. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AEA Atomic Energy Act  
ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
C Confidential 
CAC Common Access Cards 
CAGE Code Commercial and Government Entity Code 
CAPCO Controlled Access Program Coordination Office 
CCI Controlled Cryptographic Items 
CMDA Code Division Multiple Access 
CDO Controlling DoD Office 
CMWG Classification Management Working Group 
CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information 
COMINT Communications Intelligence 
COMSEC Communications Security Information 
CTS COSMIC Top Secret 
CUI Controlled Unclassified Information 
DCA Defense Communication Agency 
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive 
DCS Defense Courier Service 
DDN Defense Data Network 
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
DIDO Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official 
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 
DMCC-S Defense Mobile Classified Communication - Secret 
DNI Director of National Intelligence 
DoDD DoD Directive 
DoDI DoD Instruction 
DOE Department of Energy 
DoS Department of State 
DSNET 1 Defense Secure Network One 
DSNET 2 Defense Secure Network Two 
DSNET 3 Defense Secure Network Three 
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 
DUSD (I&S) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence and Security 
DTM Directive-Type Memorandum 
EMSEC Emissions Security 
E.O. Executive Order 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
EXDIS Executive Distribution 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FCL Facility Security Clearance 
FDO Foreign Disclosure Officer 
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 FGI Foreign Government Information  
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
FOUO For Official Use Only 
FRD Formerly Restricted Data 
FSE File Series Exemption 
FSO Facility Security Officer 
FVEY Five Allied Partners 
GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence 
GRS General Records Schedule 
GSM Global System for Mobiles 
HCS HUMINT Control System 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
HVSACO Handle via Special Access Channels Only 
IAW In Accordance With 
IC Intelligence Community 
ICD Intelligence Community Directive 
ICPM Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 
ICRC Interagency Classification Review Committee 
IT Information Technology 
IMCON Controlled Imagery 
IPSec Internet Protocol Security 
IRS Internal Revenue Service 
ISCAP Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ISOO Information Security Oversight Office 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
KVM Keyboard, Video, Mouse 
LIMDIS Limited Distribution 
MASINT Measurement and Signals Intelligence 
MILNET Military Network 
MJ-12 Majestic Twelve 
NARA National Archives and Records Administration 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDP National Disclosure Policy 
NF NOFORN 
NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals 
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Net 
NISP National Industrial Security Program Policy 
NISPPAC National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee  
NISPOM National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NNPI Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information 
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 NODIS No Distribution  
NSI National Security Information 
OADR Originating Agency’s Determination Required 
OCA Original Classification authority 
OCONUS Outside of the Continental United States 
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
ORCON Originator Controlled 
OUSD(I) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
PRA Presidential Records Act 
PROPIN Proprietary Information 
RCM Records Continuum Model 
RD Restricted Data 
RELIDO Releasable by Information Disclosure Official 
REL TO Authorized for Release to 
RF Radio Frequency 
RIM Research In Motion 
S Secret 
SAMI Sources and Methods Information 
SAP Special Access Program 
SBU Sensitive but Unclassified 
SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information 
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities 
SF Standard Form 
SI Special Intelligence 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SLTPS-PAC State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Policy Advisory Committee 
SMART State Messaging and Archival Retrieval Toolkit 
SME-PED Secure Mobile Environment – Portable Electronic Device 
SMS Short Message Service 
SNM Special Nuclear Material 
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol 
SSC Special Security Center 
STINFO Science and Technology Information Policy 
TS Top Secret 
U Unclassified 
UCNI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information 
U.S.C. United States Code 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
U.S. IAEA AP U.S. International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol 
VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 
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